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series preface
Anthropology is a discipline based upon in-depth ethnographic 
works that deal with wider theoretical issues in the context of 
particular, local conditions – to paraphrase an important volume 
from the series: large issues explored in small places. This series 
has a particular mission: to publish work that moves away from 
an old-style descriptive ethnography that is strongly area-studies 
oriented, and offer genuine theoretical arguments that are of interest 
to a much wider readership, but which are nevertheless located and 
grounded in solid ethnographic research. If anthropology is to argue 
itself a place in the contemporary intellectual world, then it must 
surely be through such research.
We start from the question: ‘What can this ethnographic material 
tell us about the bigger theoretical issues that concern the social 
sciences?’ rather than ‘What can these theoretical ideas tell us about 
the ethnographic context?’ Put this way round, such work becomes 
about large issues, set in a (relatively) small place, rather than 
detailed description of a small place for its own sake. As Clifford 
Geertz once said, ‘Anthropologists don’t study villages; they study 
in villages.’
By place, we mean not only geographical locale, but also other 
types of ‘place’ – within political, economic, religious or other 
social systems. We therefore publish work based on ethnography 
within political and religious movements, occupational or class 
groups, among youth, development agencies, and nationalist 
movements; but also work that is more thematically based – on 
kinship, landscape, the state, violence, corruption, the self. The 
series publishes four kinds of volume: ethnographic monographs; 
comparative texts; edited collections; and shorter, polemical essays.
We publish work from all traditions of anthropology, and 
all parts of the world, which combines theoretical debate with 
empirical evidence to demonstrate anthropology’s unique position 
in contemporary scholarship and the contemporary world.
Professor Vered Amit
Dr Jon P. Mitchell
vii
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preface to the second Edition
It would not be correct to claim that anthropology has changed 
dramatically in the twelve years that have passed since the 
publication of the first edition of this book. However, there are 
several reasons why we felt that a thorough revision and update 
was in order by now.
First, the non-metropolitan anthropologies – from Brazil to 
Russia, from Japan to India – were treated cursorily and somewhat 
superficially in the first edition. This has now, at least to the best of 
our abilities, been rectified. Recent scholarship on ‘other people’s 
anthropologies’ has been of great help here.
Second, there were a number of small errors, inaccuracies 
and ambiguities scattered around in the first edition. We cannot 
guarantee that they are all gone, but again, we have done our best.
Third, there have in fact been some slight changes or adjustments 
in the course that anthropology has been taking in the last few years. 
For example, the field of globalisation studies, an incipient and 
slightly naughty trend in the 1990s – naughty because it eschewed 
an assumed orthodoxy seeing anthropology as the study of small, 
fairly isolated societies – has grown into maturity. Few anthropolo-
gists today see problems in studying the relationship between the 
global and the local, and most do, in one way or another.
Fourth, as a matter of fact, the early chapters have been revised 
and modified just as much as the latter ones. Indeed it may be said 
that the remote past has changed just as rapidly as the recent past. 
Partly we see the past in a different light because of recent changes; 
partly new research and a deepened understanding reveals new 
details and formerly ignored patterns. 
It is not true, in other words, that the past is safe and immune 
to change since what has happened has happened. As anthropolo-
gists interested in history have shown time and again, the past is 
something malleable and dynamic. Each generation has its own 
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preface to the first Edition
This is an ambitious book, but not a pretentious one. It is ambitious 
in that it tries, within the space of relatively few pages, to make sense 
of the diverse history of anthropology. Our priorities, omissions 
and interpretations are bound to be contested, since there can be 
no single authoritative history of anything, least of all a sprawling, 
dynamic and disputed field like anthropology. Still, the book is 
unpretentious, since our aim throughout has been to offer a sober 
and balanced account of the historical growth of anthro pology as 
a discipline, not to propose a radical re-interpretation of it. 
There exists a growing scholarly literature on the history of 
anthropology, which this textbook does not try to compete with. 
Nevertheless, we know of no existing book with exactly the same 
scope as this one. The scholarly literature is often specialised, and 
existing textbooks on anthropological history are either more 
theoretically oriented or more committed to one or a few professional 
traditions. Although we may not always have succeeded, we have 
strived to give an impression of the parallel, convergent and 
interdependent developments of all major traditions in social and 
cultural anthropology.
The book is chronologically ordered. Beginning with the ‘proto-
anthropologies’ from ancient Greece to the Enlightenment, it 
continues with the creation of academic anthropology and the 
growth of classical sociology during the nineteenth century. The 
third chapter concentrates on the four men who, by general 
consensus, are considered the founding fathers of twentieth-century 
anthropology, and the fourth chapter indicates how their work was 
continued, and diversified, by their students. The fifth and sixth 
chapters both deal with the same period – from about 1946 to about 
1968, but concentrate on different trends: Chapter 5 discusses the 
theoretical controversies surrounding concepts of society and social 
integration, while Chapter 6 covers concepts of culture and symbolic 
meaning. In Chapter 7, the intellectual and political upheavals of 
the 1960s and 1970s are presented, with emphasis on the impulses 
emanating from Marxism and feminism. Chapter 8 deals with 
the 1980s, concentrating on the postmodernist movement and its 
close cousin, postcolonialism, two critical trends, which seriously 
ix
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x A History of AntHropology
challenged the discipline’s self-confidence; while the ninth and final 
chapter presents a few of the major post-postmodern trends that 
emerged during the 1990s.
We do not consider the history of anthropology to be a linear 
tale of progress. Some ‘modern’ controversies, for example, have 
occupied scholars since the Enlightenment and even earlier. At the 
same time, we believe that there has been a steady, cumulative 
growth in knowledge and understanding within the subject, not 
least with regard to method. Moreover, as anthropology responds 
to changes in the outside world, its substantial focus changes 
accordingly. Thus, the movement from the early industrial and 
colonial age to the information age of global modernities has led 
the subject through a series of transformations, yet essentially it 
continues to raise the same questions that were asked 50, 100 or 
even 200 years ago.
Oslo/Copenhagen, July 2001
THE & FSN
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Proto-Anthropology
How long have anthropologists existed? Opinions are divided 
on this issue. The answer depends on what you mean by an 
anthropologist. People around the world have always been curious 
about their neighbours and more remote people. They have gossiped 
about them, fought them, married them and told stories about 
them. Some of their stories were written down. Some were later 
criticised as inaccurate or ethnocentric (or flatly racist). Some stories 
were compared with others, about other people, leading to general 
assumptions about ‘people elsewhere’, and what humans everywhere 
have in common. In this broad sense, we start an anthropological 
enquiry the moment a foreigner moves into the neighbouring flat.
If we restrict ourselves to anthropology as a scientific discipline, 
some would trace its roots back to the European Enlightenment 
during the eighteenth century; others would claim that anthropology 
did not arise as a science until the 1850s, others again would 
argue that anthropological research in its present-day sense only 
commenced after the First World War. Nor can we avoid such 
ambiguities.
It is beyond doubt, however, that anthropology, considered as the 
science of humanity, originated in the region we commonly refer to 
as ‘the West’, notably in four ‘Western’ countries: France, Britain, 
the USA and Germany. Historically speaking, this is a European 
discipline, and its practitioners, like those of all European sciences, 
occasionally like to trace its roots back to the ancient Greeks.
HERODOTUS AND OTHER GREEKS
Thanks to research carried out by anthropologists, historians and 
archaeologists, we today believe that ‘the ancient Greeks’ differed 
quite radically from ourselves. In the classical city-states, more than 
half the population were slaves; free citizens regarded manual labour 
as degrading, and democracy (which was also ‘invented’ by the 
Greeks) was probably more similar to the competitive potlatch 
feasts of the Kwakiutl (Chapter 4), than to the institutions described 
in modern constitutions (Finley 1973; P. Anderson 1974).
1
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2 A HiSTORy Of ANTHROPOlOGy
Going back to the Greeks is thus a long journey, and we peer into 
their world through cracked and smoky glass. We catch glimpses of 
little city-states surrounded by traditional Iron Age farmland where 
family and kinship formed the main social units, connected to the 
outside world through a network of maritime trade relationships 
between urban settlements along the Mediterranean and Black Sea 
coasts. The trade in luxury goods and the free labour entailed by 
slavery brought considerable wealth to the cities, and the citizens of 
the polis, with their distaste for manual work, had at their disposal 
a large surplus, which they used, among other things, to wage war, 
and to build temples, stadiums, baths and other public buildings, 
where male citizens could meet and engage in philosophical disputes 
and speculations about how the world was put together.
It was in such a community that Herodotus of Halicarnassus 
(c. 484–425 bce) lived. Born in a Greek colonial town on the 
south-west coast of present-day Turkey, Herodotus began to travel 
as a young man and gained personal knowledge of the many foreign 
peoples that the Greeks maintained contacts with. Today, Herodotus 
is mainly remembered for his history of the Persian Wars (Herodotus 
1982), but he also wrote detailed travel narratives from various parts 
of western Asia and Egypt, and (based on second-hand information) 
from as far away as the land of the Scythians on the northern coast 
of the Black Sea, the Ethiopians, and the peoples of the Indus valley. 
In these narratives, far removed as they are from our present world, 
we recognise a problem that has pursued anthropology, in various 
guises, up to this day: how should we relate to ‘the Others’? Are 
they basically like ourselves, or basically different? Most, if not all, 
anthropological theory has tried to strike a balance between these 
positions, and this is what Herodotus did too. Sometimes he is a 
prejudiced and ethnocentric ‘civilised man’, who disdains everything 
foreign. At other times he acknowledges that different peoples have 
different values because they live under different circumstances, 
not because they are morally deficient. Herodotus’ descriptions 
of language, dress, political and judicial institutions, crafts and 
economics are highly readable today. Although he sometimes 
clearly got the facts wrong, he was a meticulous scholar, whose 
books are often the only written sources we have about peoples of 
a distant past.
Many Greeks tested their wits against a philosophical paradox 
that touches directly on the problem of how we should relate to 
‘the Others’. This is the paradox of universalism versus relativism. 
A present-day universalist would try to identify commonalities and 
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PROTO-ANTHROPOlOGy 3
similarities (or even universals) between different societies, while 
a relativist would emphasise the uniqueness and particularity of 
each society or culture. The Sophists of Athens are sometimes 
described as the first philosophical relativists in the European 
tradition (several almost contemporary thinkers in Asia, such as 
Gautama Buddha, Confucius and Lao-Tze, were concerned with 
similar questions). In Plato’s (427–347 bce) dialogues Protagoras 
and Gorgias, Socrates argues with the Sophists. We may picture 
them in dignified intellectual battle, surrounded by colourful temples 
and solemn public buildings, with their slaves scarcely visible in the 
shadows between the columns. Other citizens stand as spectators, 
while Socrates’ faith in a universal reason, capable of ascertaining 
universal truths, is confronted by the relativist view that truth will 
always vary with experience and what we would today call culture.
Plato’s dialogues do not deal directly with cultural differences. 
But they bear witness to the fact that cross-cultural encounters 
were part of everyday life in the city-states. The Greek trade routes 
stretched from the Straits of Gibraltar to present-day Ukraine, they 
fought wars with Persians and many other ‘barbarians’. The very 
term ‘barbarian’ is Greek and means ‘foreigner’. To a Greek ear 
it sounded as if these aliens were only able to make unintelligible 
noises, which sounded like ‘bar-bar, bar-bar’. Similarly, in Russian, 
Germans are to this day called nemtsy (the mute ones): those who 
speak, but say nothing.
Aristotle (384–322 bce) also indulged in sophisticated speculations 
about the nature of humanity. In his philosophical anthropology he 
discusses the differences between humans in general and animals, 
and concludes that although humans have several needs in common 
with animals, only man possesses reason, wisdom and morality. 
He also argued that humans are fundamentally social by nature. In 
anthropology and elsewhere, such a universalistic style of thought, 
which seeks to establish similarities rather than differences between 
groups of people, plays a prominent role to this day. Furthermore, 
it seems clear that anthropology has vacillated up through history 
between a universalistic and a relativistic stance, and that central 
figures in the discipline are also often said to lean either towards 
one position or the other.
AfTER ANTiQUiTy
In the classical Greek city-state, conditions were perhaps particularly 
favourable for the development of systematic science. But in the 
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ensuing centuries as well, ‘civilised’ activities such as art, science and 
philosophy were cultivated all around the Mediterranean: first, in 
the Hellenistic period, after the Macedonian, Alexander the Great 
(356–323 bce) had led his armies to the northern reaches of India, 
spreading Greek urban culture wherever he went; then later, during 
the several centuries when Rome dominated most of Europe, the 
Middle East and North Africa, and impressed on its population a 
culture deriving from Greek ideals. In this complex, multinational 
society, it is not surprising to find that the Greek interest in ‘the 
Other’ was also carried on. Thus, the geographer Strabo (c. 63–64 
bce–c. ce 21) wrote several voluminous tomes about strange peoples 
and distant places, which sparkle with curiosity and the joy of 
discovery. But when Christianity was established as state religion 
and the Roman Empire started falling apart in the mid-fourth 
century ce, a fundamental change took place in European cultural 
life. Gone were the affluent citizens of the cities of Antiquity, who 
could indulge in science and philosophy, thanks to their income from 
trade and slave labour. Gone, indeed, was the entire city culture, 
the very glue that held the Roman Empire together as an (albeit 
loosely) integrated state. In its place, countless local European 
peoples manifested themselves, carriers of Germanic, Slavic, 
Finno-Ugric and Celtic traditions that were as ancient as those 
of pre-urban Greece. Politically, Europe fell apart into hundreds 
of chiefdoms, cities and autonomous local enclaves, which were 
only integrated into larger units with the growth of the modern 
state, from the sixteenth century onwards. Throughout this long 
period, what tied the continent together was largely the Church, 
the last lingering trustee of Roman universalism. Under the aegis 
of the Church, international networks of monks and clergymen 
arose and flourished, connecting the pockets of learning in which 
the philosophical and scientific traditions of Antiquity survived.
Europeans like to see themselves as linear descendants of Antiquity, 
but throughout the Middle Ages, Europe was an economic, political 
and scientific periphery. Following the rise of Islam in the seventh 
century, the Arabs conquered territories from Spain to India and, 
for at least the next seven centuries, the economic, political and 
intellectual centres of the Mediterranean world lay in sophisticated 
metropolises such as Baghdad and Cordoba, not in the ruins of 
Rome or Athens, nor in glorified villages such as London or Paris. 
The greatest historian and social philosopher of this period was Ibn 
Khaldun (1332–1406), who lived in present-day Tunisia. Khaldun 
wrote, among other things, a massive history of the Arabs and 
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Berbers, furnished with a long, critical introduction on his use of 
sources. He developed one of the first non-religious social theories, 
and anticipated Émile Durkheim’s ideas about social solidarity 
(Chapter 2), which are today considered a cornerstone of sociology 
and anthropology. In line with Durkheim and the first anthropolo-
gists who utilised his theories, Khaldun stresses the importance of 
kinship and religion in creating and maintaining a sense of solidarity 
and mutual commitment among the members of a group. His theory 
of the difference between pastoral nomads and city-states may, with 
the wisdom of hindsight, be said to have been centuries ahead of 
its time. 
A contemporary of Khaldun, Ibn Battuta (1304–1369), was in 
his way just as significant for the history of anthropology. Not a 
major social theorist, Battuta is considered to be the most widely 
travelled person of the pre-industrial world. Born in Tangier in 
present-day Morocco, Battuta’s travels brought him as far east as 
China and as far south as present-day Tanzania. Battuta’s main 
work, the Rihla (‘Travels’), was completed in 1355. Although later 
scholars doubt the authenticity of some of the journeys described in 
the book, it is considered a major source of knowledge about the 
world known to the Arabs at the time, and of prevailing interpreta-
tions of other cultures.
In spite of the cultural hegemony of the Arab world, there are a 
few European writings from the late medieval period, which may 
be considered precursors of latter-day anthropology. Most famous 
is Marco Polo’s (1254–1323) account of his expedition to China, 
where he allegedly spent 17 years. Another example is the great 
journey through Asia described in The Voyage and Travels of Sir 
John Mandeville, Knight, compiled by an unknown author in the 
fourteenth century. Both books stimulated the European interest in 
alien peoples and customs, although the reliability of their accounts 
must have been questioned already then (Launay 2010).
Then, with the advent of mercantilist economies and the contem-
poraneous Renaissance in the sciences and arts, the small, but rich 
European cities of the late Middle Ages began to develop rapidly, and 
the earliest signs of a capitalist class emerged. Fired by these great 
social movements and financed by the new entrepreneurs, a series of 
grand exploratory sea voyages were launched by European rulers. 
These journeys – to Africa, Asia and America – are often described in 
the West as the ‘Age of Discovery’, though the ‘discovered’ peoples 
themselves may have had reason to question their greatness (see 
Wolf 1982).
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THE EUROPEAN CONQUESTS AND THEiR imPACT
The ‘Age of Discovery’ was of crucial importance for later 
developments in Europe and the world, and – on a lesser scale 
– for the development of anthropology. From the Portuguese 
King Henry the Navigator’s exploration of the West coast of 
Africa in the early fifteenth century, via Columbus’ five journeys 
to America (1492–1506), to Magellan’s circumnavigation of the 
globe (1519–22), the travels of this period fed the imaginations of 
Europeans with vivid descriptions of places whose very existence 
they had been unaware of. These travelogues, moreover, reached 
wide audiences, since the printing press, invented in the mid-fifteenth 
century, soon made books a common and relatively inexpensive 
commodity all over Europe.
Many of the early travelogues from the New World were full 
of factual errors and saturated with Christian piety and cultural 
prejudices. A famous example is the work of the merchant and 
explorer Amerigo Vespucci, whose letters describing his voyages to 
the continent that still bears his name were widely circulated at the 
time. His writings were reprinted and translated, but his descriptions 
of the Native Americans (who were called Indios, Indians, since 
Columbus believed he had found a route to India), reveal a much 
less scrupulous attitude to facts than in Herodotus’ or Khaldun’s 
writings. Occasionally, Vespucci seems to use the Native Americans 
as a mere literary illustration, to underpin the statements he makes 
about his own society. Native Americans are, as a rule, represented 
as distorted or, frequently, inverted reflections of Europeans: they 
are godless, promiscuous, naked, have no authority or laws; they are 
even cannibals! Against this background, Vespucci argues effectively 
for the virtues of absolutist monarchy and papal power, but his 
ethnographic descriptions are virtually useless as clues to native 
life at the time of the Conquest. 
There were contemporaries of Vespucci, such as the French 
Huguenot Jean de Léry and the Spanish clergyman Bartolomé de 
las Casas, who gave more truthful and even sympathetic accounts of 
Native American life, and such books also sold well. But then, the 
market for adventure stories from distant climes seems to have been 
insatiable in Europe at this time. In most of the books, a more or less 
explicit contrast is drawn between the Others (who are either ‘noble 
savages’ or ‘barbarians’) and the existing order in Europe (which 
is either challenged or defended). As we shall see in later chapters, 
the legacy of these early, morally ambiguous accounts still weighs 
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on contemporary anthropology, and to this day, anthropologists 
are often accused of distorting the reality of the peoples they write 
about – in the colonies, in the Third World, among ethnic minorities 
or in marginal areas. And, as in Vespucci’s case, these descriptions 
are often denounced as telling us more about the anthropologist’s 
own background than about the people under study.
The conquest of America contributed to a veritable revolution 
among European intellectuals. Not only did it provoke thought 
about cultural differences, it soon became clear that an entire 
continent had been discovered which was not even mentioned 
in the Bible! This potentially blasphemous insight stimulated the 
ongoing secularisation of European intellectual life, the liberation 
of science from the authority of the Church, and the relativisation 
of concepts of morality and personhood. As Todorov (1984) argues, 
the Native Americans struck at the very heart of the European 
idea of what it means to be human. The Native Americans were 
humans, but they did not behave in ways that Europeans considered 
‘natural’ for human beings. What was then human? What was 
natural? During the Middle Ages, philosophers assumed that God 
had created the world once and for all and given its inhabitants 
their particular natures, which they had since retained. Now it was 
becoming possible to ask whether the Native Americans represented 
an earlier stage in the development of humanity. This in turn led to 
embryonic notions of progress and development, which heralded 
a radical break with the static worldview of the Middle Ages, and 
in the later history of anthropology, notions of development and 
progress have at times played an important role. But if progress is 
possible, it follows that progress is brought about by the activity of 
human beings, and this idea, that people shape their own destinies, 
is an even more enduring notion in anthropology.
Thus, when the Europeans examined themselves in the mirror 
held up by the Native Americans, they discovered themselves as 
free, modern individuals. Among the most striking expressions 
of this new-found, subjective freedom, are the Essais (1580) of 
the French philosopher Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592). With 
an open-mindedness and in a personal style that were unheard 
of at the time, Montaigne speculates about numerous issues large 
and small. Unlike nearly all his contemporaries, Montaigne, in his 
writings about remote peoples, appears as what we today would call 
a cultural relativist. In the essay ‘Of Cannibals’, he even concludes 
that if he had been born and raised in a cannibal tribe, he would 
in all likelihood himself have eaten human flesh. In the same essay, 
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Montaigne invoked le bon sauvage, ‘the noble savage’, an idea of 
the assumed inherent goodness of stateless peoples, which is another 
part of the common heritage of anthropology.
In the following centuries, the European societies expanded 
rapidly in scale and complexity, and intercultural encounters – 
through trade, warfare, missionary work, colonisation, migration 
and research – became increasingly common. At the same time, ‘the 
others’ became increasingly visible in European cultural life – from 
Shakespeare’s plays to Rameau’s librettos. Every major philosopher 
from Descartes to Nietzsche developed his own doctrine of human 
nature, his own philosophical anthropology, often basing it directly 
on current knowledge and beliefs about non-European peoples. 
But in most of these accounts ‘the others’ still play a passive role: 
the authors are rarely interested in their lifeways as such, but 
rather in their usefulness as rhetorical ammunition in European 
debates about Europe, or about ‘Man’, usually synonymous with 
a ‘Male European’.
A famous example was the great seventeenth-century philosophical 
debate between rationalists and empiricists. The former position was 
held by René Descartes (1596–1650), a Frenchman of many talents, 
who made substantial contributions to mathematics and anatomy, 
and is widely considered to be the founder of modern philosophy. 
Among anthropologists Descartes’ name is almost synonymous with 
the sharp distinction he supposedly drew between consciousness and 
spiritual life on the one hand, and the material world and the human 
body on the other. However, the clear-cut ‘Cartesian dualism’ that 
is often criticised by anthropologists is a caricature of Descartes’ 
thought. Descartes distinguished two kinds of substance: that of 
thought and mind, which had no spatial dimensions, and that of 
the spatially organised world. The latter could be partitioned up, 
measured and made subject to the laws of mathematics so its true 
properties might be revealed, the former could not. But by critical 
reasoning one could identify ideas that were axiomatically true.
The primary task of philosophy was to identify ideas that would 
form an unassailable basis for scientific knowledge of the external 
world. To achieve this, Descartes assumed an attitude of ‘radical 
methodological doubt’: any idea that may be doubted is uncertain, 
and thus an unsuitable foundation for science. Not many ideas 
survived Descartes’ acid test. His famous cogito ergo sum (‘I think, 
therefore I am’) expressed his primary certainty: I can be sure that 
I exist since I know that I think. Descartes’ philosophical system is 
derived from this axiomatic truth.
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Descartes was not a social philosopher. Still, he was a child of his 
times. He asserted that the individual was the measure of all things. 
If God’s existence can be proven, it must be on the basis of the 
individual’s certain knowledge of himself. Even if God, through the 
inborn ideas, was the ultimate source of certain knowledge, it was 
the reason of individuals that separated true ideas from falsehood, 
applied true ideas on the world, and ‘perfected’ society ‘from a 
semi-barbarous state … to civilization’ (Descartes 1637: part 2).
Descartes’ belief in reason, typified in the clear and consistent laws 
of geometry, was shared by his opponents, the British empiricists. 
The empiricists also attempted to establish a foundation for 
certain knowledge, but Descartes’ notion of axiomatic ideas was 
unacceptable for them. John Locke (1632–1704), the first great 
Empiricist philosopher (Chapter 6), claimed that the human mind 
was a blank slate, tabula rasa, at birth. Our ideas and values have 
their origin in our experiences, or ‘sense impressions’, as they 
were called. Tabula rasa is a much used and abused term. Locke 
did not claim that people were born with no abilities at all. One 
had an inborn intellect. When sense impressions put their mark 
on the blank slate, the intellect combined them with other sense 
impressions to form ideas about the world that became points of 
departure for abstraction and generalisation. Here Locke is laying 
the groundwork of a human science that combines a universalistic 
principle (we are all born the same) and a relativistic principle (our 
differing experiences make us different).
Locke was a political liberalist and a confirmed democrat, and 
his philosophical empiricism is related to his political argument for 
the idea of ‘natural law’ (lex naturalis). Like ‘Cartesian dualism’ the 
notion that all humans have certain inborn rights goes back to the 
Middle Ages, when it was argued that natural law was established 
by God. Locke claimed that natural law was not a gift from God 
or princes, but a defence of the individual’s needs. Thus, Locke’s 
argument explicitly contradicted that of the rationalists, but his 
basic anthropology was similar to theirs. As in Descartes, the 
individual was the measure of all things. This was a radical view in 
the seventeenth century. Even when it was used to justify the power 
of princes (as Thomas Hobbes did), it had revolutionary force. All 
over Europe, kings and princes were confronted by the demands of 
an increasingly restive and powerful liberal bourgeoisie: demands 
that the Ruler be bound by law to respect the rights of individuals 
to property, personal security and rational public debate.
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As in Descartes, the ‘primitives’ are a minor concern within this 
larger argument. They remain a category of contrast. ‘Children, 
idiots, savages and illiterate people’ are ‘of all others the least 
corrupted by custom, or borrowed opinion’, writes Locke. But, 
he continues, if we consider their behaviour, we see that they are 
helpless, they have no inborn ideas to support them. Therefore they 
must be ‘improved’ (Locke 1690: §27).
The legacy of these seemingly distant philosophical debates is still, 
as we shall see later in this book, evident in anthropology today. 
An empiricist stamp rests on British anthropology, a rationalist 
stamp on French ethnologie. On German anthropology completely 
different influences came to bear. 
WHy All THiS iS NOT QUiTE ANTHROPOlOGy yET
This brief review of the prehistory of anthropology has suggested 
that a number of issues that would later attain prominence in the 
discipline had been the subject of extensive debate since Antiquity. 
Exotic peoples had been described normatively (ethnocentrism) or 
descriptively (cultural relativism). The question had repeatedly been 
raised whether people everywhere and at all times are basically the 
same (universalism) or profoundly different (relativism). There had 
been attempts to define the difference between animals and humans, 
nature and culture, the inborn and the learned, the sensual body and 
the conscious mind. Many detailed descriptions of foreign peoples 
had been published; some were based on meticulous scholarship.
In spite of these continuities, we maintain that anthropology as a 
science only appeared at a later stage, though it is true that its birth 
was a more gradual process than is sometimes assumed. Our reasons 
for this are, first, that all the work mentioned so far belongs to one 
of two genres: travel writing or social philosophy. It is only when 
these aspects of anthropological enquiry are fused, that is, when 
data and theory are brought together, that anthropology appears. 
Second, we call attention to the fact that all the writers mentioned 
so far were influenced by their times and their society. This is of 
course true of modern anthropologists as well. But modern anthro-
pologists live in a modern world, and we argue that anthropology 
makes no sense at all outside a modern context. The discipline is a 
product, not merely of a series of singular thoughts such as those 
we have mentioned above, but of wide-ranging changes in European 
culture and society, that in time would lead to the formation of 
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capitalism, individualism, secularised science, patriotic nationalism 
and cultural reflexivity.
On the one hand, then, certain topics have followed us throughout 
the time we have dealt with so far. On the other hand, from the 
fifteenth century onwards, a range of new ideas and new forms of 
social life have appeared, which will form the groundwork on which 
anthropology and the other social sciences will be built.
Two of these new ideas have been discussed above. First, we 
have seen that the encounter with ‘the Other’ stimulated European 
intellectuals to see society as an entity undergoing change and growth, 
from relatively simple, small-scale communities, to large, complex 
nations. But the idea of development or progress was not confined 
to notions of social change. The individual, too, could develop, 
through education and career, by refining his personality and finding 
his ‘true self’. As the sociologist Bruno Latour (1991) points out, 
the idea of the autonomous individual was a prerequisite for the 
idea of society. Only when the free individual was established as 
‘the measure of all things’ could the idea of society as an association 
of individuals put down roots and become an object of systematic 
reflection. And only when society had emerged as an object to be 
continuously ‘improved’ and reshaped into more ‘advanced’ forms 
could the independent, rational individual change into something 
new and different, and even ‘truer to its nature’. And without an 
explicit discourse about these ideas, a subject such as anthropology 
could never arise. The seeds were sown in early modern philosophy, 
important advances were made in the eighteenth century, but it 
was only in the nineteenth century that anthropology became an 
academic discipline, and only in the twentieth century that it attained 
the form in which it is taught today. We shall now turn to the 
intellectual currents of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
before recounting – in the next chapter – how the discipline of 
anthropology came of age.
THE ENliGHTENmENT
The eighteenth century saw a flowering of science and philosophy 
in Europe. The self-confidence of the bourgeoisie increased, citizens 
reflected on the world and their place in it, and would soon make 
political demands for a rational, just, predictable and transparent 
social order. The key word was enlightenment (Aufklärung, 
lumières), literally shedding light on matters that had so far been left 
in the dark. As Locke and Descartes had argued, the free individual 
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was to be the measure of all things – of knowledge and of the social 
order: the authority of God and princes was no longer taken for 
granted. But the new generations of intellectuals developed these 
ideas further. They met in informal clubs and salons to discuss art, 
philosophy and social issues. Private letters and diaries evolved 
into newspapers and novels, and although censorship was still 
common in most places in Europe, the new media soon gained 
greater freedom and wider circulation. The bourgeoisie sought to 
free itself from the power of Church and nobility, and to establish 
in their stead a secular democracy. Traditional religious beliefs 
were increasingly denounced as superstitions – roadblocks on the 
way to a better society, governed by reason. The idea of progress 
also seemed to be confirmed by the development of technology, 
which made important advances at this time. New technologies 
made scientific measurements more accurate. Industrial machinery 
made a hesitant debut. Descartes’ purely theoretical attempt to 
prove the universal truth of mathematics was becoming a practical 
issue of incalculable relevance. For if mathematics, the language of 
reason, could reveal such fundamental natural truths as Newton’s 
laws, did it not follow that nature was itself reasonable, and that 
any reason-driven enterprise was bound to succeed? All these 
expectations culminated in the French Revolution, which attempted 
to realise the dream of a perfectly rational social order in practice, 
but was quickly superseded by its irrational opposite: the revolution 
devoured its children. Then the dreams, the disappointments, the 
paradoxes of the Revolution spread during the Napoleonic Wars 
in the early 1800s to all of Europe, deeply influencing the ideas of 
society that later generations would develop.
But we are still in the eighteenth century, the ‘Age of Reason’, 
when the first attempts were made at creating an anthropologi-
cal science. An important early work was Giambattista Vico’s 
(1668–1744) La scienza nuova (1725; The New Science, 1999), 
a grand synthesis of ethnography, religious studies, philosophy 
and natural science. Vico proposed a universal scheme of social 
development, in which all societies passed through four phases, 
with particular, well-defined characteristics. The first stage was a 
‘bestial condition’ without morality or art, followed by an ‘Age of 
Gods’, of nature worship and rudimentary social structures. Then 
came the ‘Age of Heroes’, with widespread social unrest due to 
great social inequality, and finally the ‘Age of Man’, when class 
differences disappeared and equality reigned. This epoch, however, 
was in its turn threatened by internal corruption and degeneration 
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to ‘bestiality’. Here, for the first time, we see a theory of social 
development that not only contrasts barbarism and civilisation, but 
specifies a number of transitional stages. Vico’s theory would become 
a model for later evolutionists from Karl Marx to James Frazer. But 
Vico has an element that many of his followers lacked. Societies 
do not necessarily develop linearly towards constantly improved 
conditions, but go through cycles of degeneration and growth. This 
gives Vico’s Enlightenment work a critical and romantic subtext, 
as in Rousseau (see below).
Vico was an Italian pioneer, but it was in France that the first steps 
were taken towards the establishment of anthropology as a science. 
In 1748, Baron de Montesquieu (1689–1755) published his De 
l’esprit des loix (The Spirit of Laws, 1977). This is a comparative, 
cross-cultural study of legislative systems which Montesquieu had 
first- or second-hand knowledge of, and from which he attempts 
to derive the general principles that underlie legal systems cross-
culturally. Montesquieu pictures the legal system as an aspect of the 
wider social system, intimately entwined with many other aspects of 
the larger whole (politics, economy, kinship, demography, religion, 
and so on) – a view that has led many to describe him as a proto-
functionalist (Chapter 3). According to Montesquieu, polygamy, 
cannibalism, paganism, slavery and other barbarous customs could 
be explained by the functions they fulfilled within society as a whole. 
Montesquieu also wrote the remarkable Lettres persanes (1722; 
Persian Letters, 1973), a collection of fictitious letters from two 
Persians describing France to their countrymen. He here exploits 
the ‘strangeness’ of cultural difference to parody France at the 
time of Louis XIV. The book is thought-provoking. Even today it 
remains controversial, since Montesquieu has been accused of being 
a proto-Orientalist (Said 1978, 1993), who unduly emphasised the 
exoticism of the Persians. This critique is undoubtedly justified, 
and Montesquieu’s primary aim is clearly not to describe Persia 
but to criticise France. But the Persian letters also reveal an 
understanding of a problem in contemporary anthropology that 
might be referred to as homeblindness: our inability to see our 
own culture ‘objectively’, ‘from outside’. Montesquieu employed 
a particular technique to overcome this problem: he described his 
own society from the point of view of an outsider, a technique that 
is widely used in anthropology today.
Yet another step towards a science of anthropology was taken 
by a group of idealistic French intellectuals. These were the Ency-
clopaedists, led by the philosopher Denis Diderot (1713–1784) and 
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the mathematician Jean Le Rond d’Alembert (1717–1783). Their 
aim was to collect, classify and systematise as much knowledge as 
possible in order to further the advance of reason, progress, science 
and technology. Diderot’s Encyclopédie was published in 1751–72, 
and included articles by illustrious intellectuals like Rousseau, 
Voltaire and Montesquieu. The encyclopaedia quickly established 
itself as a model for later projects of its kind. It was a liberal and 
wide-ranging, not to say a revolutionary work, which was censored 
in many parts of Europe for its criticism of the Church. But the 17 
volumes of text and 11 volumes of illustrations also contained other 
controversial material, such as detailed descriptions of mechanical 
devices developed by ordinary farmers and craftsmen. The fact 
that such matters were taken seriously in an academic work was 
unheard of at the time, and hinted that it would soon be legitimate 
to study the everyday life of ordinary people. The encyclopaedia also 
contained detailed descriptions of culture and social customs all over 
the world. One of its youngest contributors, Marquis de Condorcet 
(1743–1794), who was to die prematurely in a Jacobin jail, wrote 
systematic comparisons between different social systems, and tried 
to develop a synthesis of mathematics and social science that would 
allow him to formulate objective laws of social development.
The most influential contributor to the Encyclopédie was 
undoubtedly Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778). Contrary to 
his French and British contemporaries (but not unlike Southern 
Europeans such as Vico), Rousseau argued that development was 
not progressive, but degenerative, and that the source of decline was 
society itself. Starting from an initial, innocent state of nature, where 
each individual lived by himself in harmony with his surroundings, 
people went on to found institutions of marriage and kinship, and 
settled in small, sedentary groups. Eventually, these groups grew 
in complexity, and invented priests and chiefs, kings and princes, 
private property, police and magistrates, until the free and good soul 
of man was crushed under the weight of society. All human vices 
were the product of society’s increasing demands on the individual, 
particularly the increasing social inequality that development 
entailed. ‘Man was born free, but is everywhere in chains’, he 
declares in Du contrat social (1762; On the Social Contract, 1978). 
But the false social contract could be replaced by a true one, based 
on freedom and democracy, and this is where Rousseau’s importance 
becomes evident. An individual, says Rousseau, is free if he follows 
a law he has set for himself, and society can freely follow a law 
that was collectively adopted. But society consists of many subjects, 
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each with his own will. The true social contract therefore implies 
a particular relationship of exchange: the individual gives up his 
natural rights in return for rights as a citizen of society, which give 
greater and longer-lasting freedom. But the individual, though good, 
is often stupid. Great leaders are therefore needed, to establish good 
judicial systems, if necessary by subterfuge or force. Here we see 
the inspiration of one of Rousseau’s greatest influences, the Italian 
political philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527).
The paradoxical passage above about the relationship of 
individual to society is packed with insights that would have heavy 
influence on future events. Most clearly this is seen in Karl Marx 
(Chapter 2), who was inspired by Rousseau’s ideas about inequality 
and property, human nature and alienation. Rousseau’s ideas about 
the exchange relation underlying the true social contract inspired 
Claude Lévi-Strauss’ theory of society as a product of exchange 
(Chapter 6). More generally, Rousseau’s elevation of ‘primitives’ 
at the expense of Europe’s corrupted civilisation was an important 
precursor of anthropological cultural relativism, although for 
Rousseau, as for so many others, the ‘primitives’ were primarily a 
mirror image of his own society, a viewpoint that hardly stimulated 
empirical investigations of real (primitive or modern) societies.
Most importantly, though, Rousseau was a mediator between the 
French-dominated Enlightenment and the predominantly German 
Romanticism that took over the leading position in European 
philosophy toward the end of the eighteenth century. Here, 
Rousseau’s admiration for the original human being was further 
developed, the first theoretical concepts of culture were put forth, 
and the outlines of scientific anthropology start emerging.
ROmANTiCiSm
While Enlightenment thinkers saw society as a law-bound association 
of reasoning citizens, Romanticism cultivated the creative, emotional 
individual, and the warm-blooded community of feeling – the 
nation. Romanticism is often said to displace the Enlightenment 
during the years of reaction after the French Revolution. But it 
may be more accurate, as Gellner (1991) suggests, to see the two 
movements as parallel flows, at times diverging or competing, at 
times intersecting and binding together. This is especially true of 
anthropology, which seeks not only to understand cultural wholes 
(a Romantic project), but also to dissect, analyse and compare them 
(an enterprise of the Enlightenment).
Eriksen HOA3 01 text   15 16/04/2013   16:04
16 A HiSTORy Of ANTHROPOlOGy
Romanticism spread everywhere in Europe, but its influence was 
greatest in Germany. In the eighteenth century, when France and 
England were strong, centralised states, Germany was little more 
than a diffuse linguistic area, embracing a medieval patchwork of 
independent principalities, free cities and multi-ethnic landscapes 
that it would take another hundred years to forge into a unified 
nation state. Germans had reason to speculate about what bound 
their nation together. The French could safely invoke the universality 
of human reason, as long as French fashion, language and nobility 
dominated the Western world and defined what reason was. One of 
the most popular German romantics even took a French pen-name: 
Jean Paul. Predictably, the politically fragmented, but culturally 
articulate Germans would at some point react to French domination.
1770 was a seminal year for this movement. It was when the young 
poet Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832) – the soon-to-be 
spiritual father of the German nation – met the philosopher Johann 
Gottfried von Herder (1744–1803), who had recently made a major 
contribution to linguistics. Their meeting is said to be the spark that 
ignited the Sturm und Drang epoch of German cultural history, with 
its sharply reasoned philosophy and its worship of the poet’s solitary 
yearnings and the people’s deep and inscrutable fate. In 1784–91, 
Herder published his magnum opus, Ideen zur Philosophie der 
Geschichte der Menschheit (Reflections on the Philosophy of the 
History of Mankind, 1968), where he presents the ideas that had 
made him famous during the last 15 years as parts of a wider, 
continuous argument. He attacks French universalism as it was 
propounded, for example, by Voltaire, and argues that human 
experience is a totality that cannot be split into separate functions, 
such as reason, sense perception and emotion. Every people (Volk) 
shares a holistic, bodily experience, grounded in common history, 
common dependence on local natural environments and a national 
character (Volksgeist) that expressed itself through language, 
folklore and myths.
According to Herder, cosmopolitanism and cultural intermixture 
damaged the nation’s moral integrity. This notion of Volk added 
fuel to the nationalist ideologies that swept like wildfire through 
nineteenth-century Europe. However, Herder is also considered 
the father of the anthropological concepts of culture and cultural 
relativism. During the many years he spent in Riga, he investigated 
Latvian folk traditions and poetry, and found a Volksgeist buried 
in them that was suppressed by (German-led) internationalism. It 
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is an important paradox that cultural relativism and nationalism 
both trace their origins back to Romanticism. 
The greatest philosopher of the time was Immanuel Kant 
(1724–1804), whose contribution to European thought is too 
pervasive to fit into any philosophical school. Here we consider 
him a German Romanticist in order to highlight how his work 
was continued by the Romanticist Hegel. The Romantic element in 
Kant lies in his overcoming the split between sensual and rational 
knowledge. In his Kritik der reinen Vernuft (1781; Critique of Pure 
Reason, 1991) Kant argued that empiricism and rationalism were 
not opposed, but two sides of the same coin. Knowledge was both 
sensual and mathematical, objective and subjective. The problem was 
not a matter of choosing between extremes, but of demonstrating 
how they presuppose each other. After Kant’s revolution, knowledge 
no longer consisted of mental images that reflected reality as it is in 
itself more or less adequately, but of mental judgements based on 
criteria that are subjective (they exist only in the mind), but also 
objective (they are universally present in every knowing mind).
We argue that these formulations made social science possible. We 
do not imply that Kant single-handedly laid the groundwork for the 
sciences of society. However, Kant established the preconditions for 
a species of social theory that has shaped anthropology deeply. A 
direct line leads from Kant, via Hegel, to Marx, Durkheim, Weber 
and the classical sociology that remains the core of anthropologi-
cal theory to this day. Kant opened up a new field of intellectual 
endeavour by demonstrating that it was possible to produce scientific 
knowledge about society. In all the precursors of social science we 
have seen so far, we sense an underlying uncertainty about the very 
definition of the social. What kind of reality was society? What 
could we know about it? Some (with Vico) were attracted to the 
natural sciences, hoping to discover social laws similar to the laws of 
physics. Others (as Rousseau) saw their role as more artistic. Now 
Kant seemed to offer a third way. Knowledge is self-reflexive, the 
subject must be conscious of itself as a knowing subject in order 
to know the object. To study ‘the world out there’ is to study the 
encounter between the world and myself. Our meeting, gives the 
world a subjectively knowable form, that still is objective, since it 
derives from universal qualities inherent in understanding as such. 
As any anthropologist on fieldwork will tell you: to know the world 
is to contribute to its creation. Suddenly it seemed possible that 
those parts of the world that are not extended in space – Descartes’ 
thought substance – could indeed be investigated scientifically. Still, 
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something hindered the direct application of Kant’s insights to 
social science. This ‘something’ would be only be addressed by his 
successor, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831).
Kant’s critical reasoning shook the foundations of Western 
thinking, and after his death there were many attempts to find 
loopholes in his logical construction and complete the revolution 
he started. Hegel’s goal was to bring together Kant’s idea of the 
universal preconditions of knowledge, and the particularistic 
orientation of Herder and the Romanticists. Kant’s knowing subject 
existed outside context and history. It belonged to no concrete place 
or time. Hegel sought to reinstate it in the world by focusing on its 
‘spirit’ (Geist) – a concept he developed in great and often cryptic 
detail in Die Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807; Phenomenology 
of Spirit, 2000).
Like Kant’s knowledge, Hegel’s spirit is self-reflexive: A subject 
can know another only by knowing itself as a knowing subject. 
Hegel adds intersubjectivity to this picture: A subject can only 
know itself when it is known by another knowing subject. ‘Spirit’ 
is the relationship between the knower and the known – two points 
with no independent existence, their only being is their relation 
(Habermas 1999).
From a social scientist’s point of view, Kant’s revolution was 
now complete. Knowledge of society is knowledge of ‘spirit’, of 
self-reflexive relations and patterns of relations. Hegel refers to this 
pattern as a whole, as the ‘world spirit’ (Weltgeist). It has its centres 
and peripheries, and changes in accordance with evolutionary laws. 
Later theoreticians have described it in various terms, as structure, 
function, solidarity, power, system, aggregate or discourse. Indeed, 
Hegel’s far-ranging discussion of the dialectics of the world spirit’s 
self-expression through history, was not only the first systemic 
description of sociality in motion, but the first systematic vision of 
a truly global humanity (Geana 1995).
But still, this is not social science. The communicative collective 
and the subjects participating in it are too abstract and lacking 
in context. Yet it is here we find the root of the idea of a socially 
constructed reality (Berger and Luckman 1966), which is our most 
important heritage from eighteenth-century European philosophy.
But this idea also had strong affinities with the nationalist 
movements that Herder had inspired, which had spread throughout 
Europe in the decades after 1800. Nations were precisely such 
socially constructed realities (‘imagined communities’, according 
to one modern authority) as Hegel had described, each with its 
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unique style and character. Ideally, the nation was a collectivity of 
the people, ruled by the people, in accordance with the people’s 
deepest longings and needs. But although nationalism was inspired 
by Romantic philosophy, as a social movement it was a product of 
underlying historical processes: the political upheavals in the wake 
of the Napoleonic Wars, the sense of alienation brought about by 
industrialisation, the spread of revolutionary ideals of freedom, 
equality and brotherhood.
It was into this world of upheaval and transition that anthropology 
first emerged as an academic discipline. The first step was the 
establishment of the ethnographic museums. Collections of exotica 
had long existed at the European courts. One of the earliest, founded 
by Danish King Frederik III, dates back to 1650 and would later 
form the basis of the Danish National Museum. But systematic 
collection of ethnographica only started in the 1800s. Large national 
museums were established in London (1753), Paris (1801) and 
Washington, DC (1843), and these would all eventually develop 
influential ethnographic departments. Still, the first specialised 
ethnographic museums were established in German-speaking areas, 
notably Vienna (1806), Munich (1859) and Berlin (1868). This may 
seem surprising, as Germany and Austria had no colonial empires. 
Nevertheless, German academics had, in accordance with Herder’s 
programme, begun to carry out empirical studies of the customs 
of ‘the people’. They collected data on peasant life – folktales and 
legends, dress and dance, crafts and skills. The earliest museums 
were primarily concerned with Volkskunde (the study of peasant 
cultures at home) rather than Völkerkunde (the study of remote 
peoples). Thus, the institutionalisation of anthropology commenced 
in Germany, rather than in France or Britain – a fact that is often 
overlooked in accounts of the history of anthropology.
As the next chapter will show, German anthropology retained 
an important, in some respects a dominant, position throughout 
the nineteenth century, while in Britain a more peculiar ‘Victorian’ 
anthropology emerged.
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Victorians, Germans and a frenchman
Between the Napoleonic Wars (1792–1815) and the First World War 
(1914–18), we see the rise of modern Europe – and of the modern 
world. This was, above all, the age of the Industrial Revolution. In 
the 1700s, profound transformations had taken place in agriculture 
and manufacturing, particularly in Britain. Steam power and 
spinning machines had become widespread, and a growing class 
of landless peasants and urban labourers began to make themselves 
heard. But greater changes were ahead. In the 1830s, the first major 
railways were built; a decade later, steamships crossed the Atlantic 
on a regular basis; in 1838, Samuel Morse demonstrated the first 
functioning telegraph. It was becoming possible, on a scale the 
world had never seen before, to move vast quantities of information, 
raw materials, commodities and people across global distances. 
This, in turn, meant that production could be increased both in 
agriculture and manufacturing. Europe was made able to feed more 
people than ever before – by increasing production and expanding 
imports. In 1800, Britain had 10.5 million inhabitants. By 1901, 
there were 37 million, 75 per cent of whom lived in towns and cities. 
Peasants deserted the countryside, forced out by population pressure 
and rationalisation of agriculture, and migrated to urban centres 
like London or Paris, where they were re-socialised as workers. 
Conditions in the rapidly growing cities were hardly optimal: 
epidemics were common, and when the first British law against 
child labour was introduced in 1834, it affected only children 
under the age of nine. But conditions in the countryside were often 
even worse, as during the Great Famine in Ireland in 1845–52. In 
time, protests against these changes increased in frequency and 
scale. The most dramatic example was the French Revolution, but 
the Chartist revolt in Britain in the 1840s, the French, Austrian 
and Italian Revolutions in 1848–49, the Paris Commune of 1870, 
indicate the potential for violence that industrialisation unleashed. 
Along with the protests, a new, socialist ideology emerged. Its roots 
went back to social philosophers such as Rousseau and the proto-
socialist Henri de Saint-Simon (1760–1825), and to the German 
20
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neo-Hegelians, but its decisive formulation came with Karl Marx, 
to whom we shall shortly return. For the nineteenth century was 
also the century of the working class. In 1867 male British workers 
won the franchise, and soon they would achieve even greater gains 
in the class struggle.
But the success of the labour movement would hardly have been 
possible without the train and the steamship. More than 60 million 
European emigrants were transported by rail and ship to the USA, 
Australia, Argentina, South Africa, Siberia and elsewhere, relieving 
population pressure, and permitting a long-term rise in standards of 
living for those who remained. Meanwhile, in the colonies, admin-
istrations spread European culture and institutions. This grand 
process of diffusion had variable effects. New power relations arose 
– between colonial administrator and Indian merchant, between 
plantation owner and black slave, between Boer, Englishman and 
Bantu, between settler and Australian aborigine. In the wake of 
these new manifold relations of dominance and dependence, new 
philosophies, ideologies and myths rose to defend or attack them. 
The campaign against slavery is an early example, and slavery was 
successfully abolished in the British and French dependencies in 
1833. But racism, which first emerged as an organised ideology 
during the nineteenth century, was a response to the same processes. 
So was the internationalised science that now emerged. The global 
researcher becomes a popular figure – the prototype being Charles 
Darwin (1809–1882), whose On the Origin of Species by Means 
of Natural Selection (1859) was based on data collected during his 
famous six-year circumnavigation of the globe.
EVOlUTiONiSm AND CUlTURAl HiSTORy
Global research demands global communications, hence it is hardly 
surprising that anthropology emerged as a discipline in these years. 
So did sociology. If anthropology was an outgrowth of colonialism, 
sociology arose from the changing class relations that industrialisa-
tion brought about in the West. All the classical nineteenth-century 
sociologists speculated on the nature of modernity and contrasted 
it with premodern conditions. Both disciplines shared a basic 
evolutionist orientation. Both studied society. And empirical data 
on premodern societies were delivered to both by anthropologists.
Despite such common interests, a deep split ran between the 
two subjects throughout the nineteenth century. The split expressed 
itself most profoundly in the German tradition. As we have seen, 
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the first ethnographic museums were established in Germany and 
Austria-Hungary, and this was where the foundations of German 
anthropology were laid. Here, the discipline was defined in 
Romanticist and humanistic terms, as a branch of cultural history 
rather than a social science, and the classical sociology that was also 
emerging in Germany at the time was deemed irrelevant and ignored. 
British anthropology developed later, was less museum-based, and 
identified more closely with the natural sciences. This undoubtedly 
stimulated greater openness toward the social sciences as well; on 
the other hand, little of note was happening in British sociology. 
In the United States the initial situation was similar, then German 
anthropology became the dominant influence, and sociology 
made no impression at all until much later. The split between the 
disciplines was least pronounced in France, and it was a Frenchmen 
who would finally restore the connection between them.
Theoretical discourse also differed markedly, though there were 
points of contact as well. Outside the German sphere of influence, 
anthropologists continued to develop the evolutionary ideas of the 
eighteenth century, proposing ever-new variations on Vico’s theory 
of stages. As we have seen, the idea that non-European societies 
were ‘less developed’ goes back to the 1500s, thus, the evolutionism 
subscribed to by nineteenth-century anthropologists was hardly 
breaking news, though their theories gained in complexity and their 
data in detail. The added stimulus provided by Darwinism after 
1860 did little to change this. We should note that at the time, 
evolutionism was not associated with racism. On the contrary, 
like all the leading anthropologists of the day, the evolutionists 
subscribed to the principle of the ‘psychic unity of mankind’, first 
formulated by the German cultural historian Adolf Bastian (see 
below). This principle states that human beings everywhere belong 
to the same biological species, and genetic differences between 
cultures are cosmetic. In fact, the entire anthropological project 
rests on this tenet. Social evolutionists and cultural historians 
alike based their work on systematic cross-cultural comparison. If 
cultural differences were biologically determined, anthropologists 
were out of a job.
Meanwhile, Continental sociology followed the lead of Kant and 
Hegel, and explored the ‘socially constructed reality’ opened up 
by the two philosophers. The founding sociologists realised this 
project in various ways, but they shared the idea of society as an 
autonomous reality that must be studied on its own terms and 
with its own methods, not as a branch of natural science. Like 
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the anthropologists, the sociologists asserted the psychic unity of 
mankind and deferred to some variant of evolutionist theory. Unlike 
the anthropologists, who classified and compared the external char-
acteristics of societies all over the globe, sociologists were concerned 
with the internal dynamics of Western, industrial society. Unlike 
the anthropologists too, nineteenth-century sociologists engaged in 
a sophisticated discourse on the dynamics of social systems, This 
would have a fundamental impact on anthropology as well, but 
only in the early twentieth century.
Here we shall illustrate the differences between these two 
emerging traditions with the work of two of their most prominent 
pioneers: the American anthropologist Lewis Henry Morgan and 
the German sociologist Karl Marx. 
mORGAN
Lewis Henry Morgan (1818–1881) grew up on a farm in New 
York, in the America of equality and opportunity that the French 
sociologist Alexis de Tocqueville would describe so prophetically 
in 1835 and with such ambivalent feelings. He was educated as a 
lawyer, and became a prosperous and active participant in local 
politics. An early champion of Native American political rights, he 
had been fascinated by Native Americans since his youth. In the 
1840s, he lived with the Iroquois for some time, was adopted into 
one of their clans and given the name Tayadaowuhkuh: ‘he who 
builds bridges’. Morgan may in this sense be considered the first 
anthropological fieldworker.
Morgan witnessed the destruction of Native American society 
– notably their political and economic institutions – as a result of 
the massive influx of European settlers, and believed that most of 
their immaterial culture would soon also be irretrievably lost. He 
considered it a crucial task to document traditional culture and 
social life before it was too late. This attitude, often referred to as 
urgent anthropology, was shared by the second great American 
anthropologist, Franz Boas (Chapter 3), and is widespread in 
research on indigenous peoples.
Morgan had close contact with the people he studied, sympathised 
with their problems, and published detailed accounts of their culture 
and social life. But he also made substantial theoretical contributions, 
particularly in his pioneering work on kinship. Morgan’s interest in 
kinship dated back to his stay with the Iroquois. Later, he discovered 
surprising similarities and differences between their kinship system 
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and others in North America. He devised a large-scale comparative 
study of Native American kinship, eventually including other groups 
as well. Morgan created the first typology of kinship systems (cf. 
Holy 1996), and introduced a distinction between classificatory and 
descriptive kinship that remained unchallenged until the 1960s. To 
simplify greatly – descriptive systems (like our own) differentiate 
kinsmen in ways that closely approximate biological kinship. 
Classificatory kinship (as with the Iroquois) distributes individuals 
among broad kinship categories that may bear little or no relation 
to biological relations. In the first case, your in-laws never become 
family; in the second, they automatically do. But Morgan did more 
than formulate a theory; he grounded it in years of intensive study of 
existing kinship systems around the world. In his influential Systems 
of Consanguinity and Affinity of the Human Family (1870), the 
results of this research are presented, defining kinship, once and 
for all, as a primary anthropological concern.
For Morgan, kinship was primarily a point of entry to the study of 
social evolution. He argued that primitive societies were organised 
on the basis of kinship, and that terminological variations among 
kinship systems correlated with variations in social structure. But 
he also supposed that kinship terminology changed slowly and 
unevenly, and therefore contained clues to an understanding of 
earlier stages of social evolution.
In his magnum opus Ancient Society (1877), Morgan attempts 
a grand synthesis of all this work. He distinguishes three major 
stages of cultural evolution: savagery, barbarism and civilisation 
(with three sub-stages each for savagery and barbarism). His criteria 
for these divisions are mostly technological: his ‘savages’ were 
hunters and gatherers, ‘barbarism’ was associated with agriculture, 
‘civilisation’ with state formation and urbanisation. In hindsight, it 
seems clear that Morgan’s synthesis did not succeed. Even if his basic 
evolutionary scheme is accepted, the details remain hazy. At times, 
isolated technological features are accorded unreasonable weight 
– for example, pottery is the criterion of the transition between 
two sub-stages. Where does that leave the Polynesian chiefdoms, 
with their complex political systems, but not a trace of pottery? 
It is only fair to add that Morgan himself was conscious that his 
conclusions were often speculative, and critical of the quality of his 
(mostly secondary) data.
Morgan had considerable influence on later anthropology, 
particularly on kinship studies, but also on American cultural 
materialists and other evolutionist anthropologists from the 
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mid-twentieth century onwards (Chapter 5). But Morgan was read 
by sociologists as well. When Marx discovered Morgan toward the 
end of his life, he and his collaborator, Friedrich Engels, attempted 
to integrate Morgan’s ideas in Marxian evolutionary theory. The 
unfinished results of this work were published by Engels in The 
Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State, in 1884, a 
year after Marx’s death.
mARX
The scope and aims of Karl Marx’s (1818–1883) work contrast 
sharply with Morgan’s, despite their shared commitment to 
materialist explanation. Marx’s writings on non-industrial societies 
are scattered and tentative. It was through his analysis of capitalist 
society in his foundational work, Das Kapital (vols 1–3, 1867, 
1885, 1896; Capital, 1906), that he made his lasting contribution 
to social theory. Though the political influence of Marxism has 
waxed and waned, Marxian theory has remained an important 
academic influence.
Born in the same year as Morgan, in an inconspicuous German 
town, into a wealthy Jewish family – his parents eventually 
converted to Lutheranism – Marx completed a university education 
in philosophy before embarking on a career as social theorist, 
pamphleteer, editor, journalist, labour organiser and agitator. He 
was actively involved in the revolutionary wave that shocked the 
European establishment in 1848–49, and in the Paris Commune of 
1870. After the Commune, he became known as the leading theorist 
of the international labour movement.
Marx is beyond doubt the most influential social theorist who 
ever lived, and his influence may be traced in innumerable analyses 
in most of the humanistic and social sciences. Simultaneously, Marx 
was a prominent political actor who contributed substantially to 
the formation of the nineteenth century’s labour movements and 
their offspring, from social democrats to Stalinists, in the twentieth 
century. The confluence of social theory and political activism runs 
deep in Marx, and gives his entire project a paradoxical and thought-
provoking character (Berman 1982). Marx was an idealist Hegelian 
before he became a materialist, and his life’s project consisted, it 
is tempting to say, in unifying these contradictory impulses. From 
Hegel he had the idea of development toward a utopian goal, but he 
replaces the evolution of the world spirit with social evolution from 
(simple) classless societies to (complex) class societies, broken by an 
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apocalyptic transition to the new, classless society of Communism. 
Here, it is not difficult to hear Rousseau between the lines. Marx also 
derived from Hegel the idea that evolution is driven by dialectics, 
that is, by conflicts – or ‘contradictions’ – that merge into higher 
unities, which again enter into conflict, and so forth. But in Hegel 
the conflicts are spiritual; in Marx they are material and social: 
between the diverse factors that participate in material production; 
between the social organisation of the system of production as 
a whole (‘infrastructure’) and the ‘superstructure’ of power and 
symbolism that the infrastructure sustains; between classes with 
conflicting relations to the system of production; between differing 
systems of production that collide.
The theory is so ambitious, and in many respects so ambiguous, 
that it was bound to raise problems when confronted with real-world 
complexities. An example is Marxian class analysis. Marx postulated 
that property holders and the propertyless constitute discrete classes 
with particular interests. The objective interest of the working class 
consists in overthrowing the ruling class through revolution. But the 
working class is only partly conscious of being exploited, since the 
true power relations are concealed by an ideology that justifies the 
existing order. Superstructural phenomena such as law, religion or 
kinship are typically infused with an ideological ‘false consciousness’ 
that pacifies the population.
But, asks the anthropologist, is this model applicable to 
non-Western contexts? How does it fit with Morgan’s dictum that 
kinship is the primary organising principle in primitive societies? Is 
kinship part of the infrastructure? How can that be, if kinship is an 
ideology that conceals the infrastructure? Must the entire distinction 
between infra- and superstructure, the material and the spiritual, 
be abandoned? In what sense, if any, is ideology ‘less real’ than 
matter? Such issues have been raised with fervour and sophistication 
in anthropology, and a significant part of Marx’s attraction today 
lies in his ability to generate questions such as these.
Marx himself was not oblivious to such problems. His extensive 
discussion of value formation is proof of this. The value of an 
object in itself, its concrete use value, its correspondence to real 
human needs, is transformed, under capitalism, into an abstract 
exchange value, its value as compared to other objects. ‘Material’ 
objects are transformed into ‘spiritual’ commodities, and the further 
this continues, the more abstract, absurd and alienated does the 
world seem. In such passages, ‘value’ becomes a deeply ambiguous 
concept, in which power and ideology, the material and the spiritual 
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merge seamlessly. Nevertheless, it remains doubtful whether Marx 
actually solved the problem he posed for himself. As anthropolo-
gists we note that his difficulties with bringing materialism and 
(Hegelian) idealism together are reminiscent of Morgan’s problem 
with the materialist causes of kinship terminology. Only in the 1980s 
do we see a concerted effort to resolve this paradox.
BASTiAN AND THE GERmAN TRADiTiON
The decades before and after 1800 saw an unprecedented 
blossoming of German culture and science – in part inspired by 
Kant’s philosophical revolution, in part by the national renaissance 
stimulated by Herder, in part by innovations in linguistics (Herder 
had an impact here too), and in part by Goethe’s overshadowing 
presence as a poet, scientist and cultural paragon. Aside from poet-
philosophers like Fichte and Schiller, the epoch saw many scientific 
advances: the theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834) 
gave the hermeneutic method its first modern formulation; the 
brothers Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm founded folklore studies; 
Alexander and Wilhelm von Humboldt revolutionised German 
natural science and established the basis of modern linguistics. 
The philosopher Friedrich von Schlegel (1772–1829) established 
comparative linguistics, whose success in untangling the history of 
the Indo-European languages was almost as sensational at the time 
as Darwin’s evolutionism.
The common denominator for this milieu was a commitment 
to humanism. Some, with Goethe, sought a unified science, 
whose humanist outlook would provide an esthetic-emotional 
counterweight to ‘hard’ sciences such as physics. In this spirit, 
Schleiermacher expanded hermeneutics, an ancient method for 
interpreting texts, into a method for interpreting the world, equally 
applicable to the natural sciences as to philology.
The Germans were sceptical to evolutionism, with its universalistic 
claims and scientific pretensions. Here, even at its high point, the 
evolution was always seen through the lense of particularism of 
cultural history. This is clearly seen in the work of Adolf Bastian 
(1826–1905), known as the father of German anthropology. In 1851, 
Bastian, a polymath educated as a medical doctor, departed on his 
first great expedition to Central America, Eastern and Southern Asia, 
Australia and Africa. The eight-year journey confirmed Bastian’s 
interest in ethnography, and on his return he published a famous 
three-volume treatise, Der Mensch in der Geschichte (1860, ‘Man 
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in History’; see Koepping 1983), which promoted views on human 
psychology and cultural history that shared little common ground 
with the evolutionists, who studied a universal movement and 
ignored the concrete events of cultural history. Bastian completed 
nearly a dozen great expeditions, accumulating a quarter-century 
of travel that carried him several times around the world. Back 
home, he authored long, learned works, was appointed Professor 
of Ethnology at the University of Berlin, and became Director of 
the Imperial Museum, to which he contributed such rich collections 
from his own expeditions that a new museum, the famous Museum 
für Völkerkunde, was established in 1868 mainly to house them.
Bastian’s travels taught him to respect the particularism of 
cultural diversity; nevertheless, he concluded, universalistically, that 
all cultures ultimately sprang from the same source. He opposed 
the idea of biologically distinct races and formulated the principle 
of the psychic unity of mankind, which, as we shall see, would 
influence anthropology profoundly. Bastian specified this general 
concept by positing that all humans share a limited number of 
elementary ideas – Elementärgedanken. In actual cultures these are 
influenced by local natural conditions and historical events, such 
as migrations – and by evolution, which, according to Bastian, 
proceeded differently in different culture areas. Thus, a few 
elementary ideas were differentiated into a vast number of ‘folk 
ideas’ (Völkergedanken), which in real cultures are woven into a 
unique Kulturkomplex. Through the ‘culture complex’ the folk’s 
character may be glimpsed, its Geist (‘spirit’) – here Bastian’s debt 
to Herder is evident. 
So is his debt to the psychologist Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920), 
at the University of Leipzig. Wundt, who is considered the father 
of experimental psychology, distinguished between individual 
psychological mechanisms (like sense perception) that could be 
investigated in laboratories with methods from the natural sciences, 
and more complex psychic functions that must be researched 
intuitively or by means of statistics. Most complex of all were 
processes of collective psychology. In his vast work, Völkerpsycholo-
gie (ten volumes; 1900–20), Wundt sought to reveal the underlying 
collective psychology of various cultures by means of comparative 
studies of rituals, myths and other culture traits.
Wundt’s ethnopsychology remained incomplete; he never found 
the analytical means to penetrate beneath the surface of cultural 
expression. Yet, his attempt would have great repercussions. 
Prominent names in anthropology, such as Durkheim and Rivers (see 
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below), Mauss and Malinowski (Chapter 3) studied under Wundt 
or were inspired by him. Bastian also came under his spell and was 
led to search for formal differences between cultural expressions, 
and logical rules of transformation that might reveal how universal 
elementary ideas were transformed into local folk ideas. Like Wundt, 
Bastian died without bringing his work to completion.
Elements of evolutionism may be discerned in Bastian’s thought, 
but it would be wrong to describe him as an evolutionist. He 
consolidated a tradition for studies of the cultural history of 
individual groups – as opposed to the abstract generalities of 
evolutionism – that would find a large following among German 
and American anthropologists, and elsewhere. In other respects as 
well, Bastian’s influence was great. In Germany he was attacked and 
venerated by the next generation – the diffusionists (see below). One 
of his students, Franz Boas, would have a fundamental impact as the 
founder of American anthropology (Chapter 3). Bastian’s principle 
of the ‘psychic unity of mankind’ was universally accepted in the 
discipline; when the British anthropologist Tylor appropriated it, 
he made it a basic tenet of British evolutionism. Bastian’s concept 
of elementary ideas would gain a small but celebrated circle of 
admirers. It inspired the Swiss psychologist Carl Jung’s theory of 
archetypes. In American anthropology it was developed by Edward 
Sapir and the ethnolinguists (Chapter 4). And in France, after the 
Second World War, when Claude Lévi-Strauss proposed a theory 
that made systematic sense of the transformations of cultural history, 
Bastian was an inspiration, though the deciding influence came from 
linguistics rather than psychology (Chapter 6).
TylOR AND OTHER ViCTORiANS
The year after the publication of Der Mensch in der Geschichte, 
the Scottish lawyer Henry Maine (1822–1888) published another 
seminal book, Ancient Law (1861). Maine here demonstrates how 
changes in legislation reflect wider social changes, and distinguished 
traditional societies whose legal systems are based on status from 
modern societies where they are based on contract. In status-based 
societies, rights are distributed through personal relationships, 
kinship and inherited rank. Contract society, in contrast, is based 
on formal, written principles which function independently of 
actual persons. The distinction between status and contract is still 
in use today, and many scholars have followed Maine’s lead in 
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distinguishing two ‘ideal types’ – simple and complex societies – and 
have, naturally, been criticised for oversimplification.
Other evolutionist ideas that gained currency in the nineteenth 
century were later unanimously rejected. A prominent example was 
the theory of the original matriarchy, where women supposedly 
reigned, which was launched by the Swiss lawyer Johann Jakob 
Bachofen (1815–1887), in Das Mutterrecht (1861, ‘Mother’s Right’; 
see Bachofen 1968). Though no empirical basis for this theory 
has ever been found, it has remained so resilient that it needed 
to be demolished again as late as the 1970s, when it gained brief 
popularity among feminist anthropologists (Bamberger 1974).
A more central position in the discipline was occupied by Edward 
Burnett Tylor (1832–1917). Tylor grew up a Quaker, and was 
barred by his faith, ill health, and the early death of his parents 
from a university education. While recovering from tuberculosis in 
Central America, he discovered an interest in archaeology and was 
invited to take part in an expedition to the Toltec ruins in Mexico. 
In an era dominated by evolutionism, the step from prehistory to 
anthropology was short, and Tylor’s work as an anthropologist 
would soon gain him (and the discipline) considerable prestige. In 
1896, he was appointed the first British professor of anthropology, 
at the University of Oxford. In 1912, he was knighted. Tylor was 
still a young man when he published his first evolutionist synthesis, 
Researches into the Early History of Mankind and the Development 
of Civilization (1865); and his major work, Primitive Culture (1871), 
followed just a few years later. Tylor here proposed an evolutionary 
scheme reminiscent of Morgan’s in Ancient Society (the two books 
were published in the same year). He shared Morgan’s faith in the 
primacy of material conditions. Like Morgan, too, his knowledge 
of cultural variation was vast (Darwin refers to Tylor several times 
in his work on human evolution from the 1870s). But Tylor did not 
share Morgan’s interest in kinship, and instead developed a theory 
of cultural survivals. Survivals were cultural traits that had lost their 
original functions in society, but continued in use, for no particular 
reason. Such traits were crucial to the effort to reconstruct human 
evolution. Tylor advocated a trait-by-trait comparative method, 
which allowed him to isolate survivals from the larger social system. 
Though influential at its time, the method was abandoned by the 
next generation of British anthropologists. Curiously, it reappeared 
in the mid-1970s, when the sociobiologist Edward O. Wilson, in an 
intellectual venture comparable to Tylor’s, attempted to reconcile 
cultural variation and Darwinian evolutionism (Ingold 1986). 
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Tylor’s most significant contribution to modern anthropology is 
his definition of culture. His much-quoted definition appears on the 
first page of Primitive Culture, and reads as follows:
Culture, or civilization, taken in its broad, ethnographic sense, is 
that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, 
law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by 
man as a member of society. (Tylor 1871: 1)
Since Tylor’s day, anthropologists have suggested many alternatives 
to this definition, but is seems we always fall back on its simple and 
all-embracing formulations. Neither Tylor’s evolutionism nor his 
‘tolerantly paternalising ethnocentrism’ (Stocking 1996: 10) finds 
expression in the definition, which is general enough to apply to 
any society, and neutral enough to pass as politically correct today. 
Where evolutionism distinguished societies on different stages of 
development, the definition of culture unites mankind: all societies 
have something in common – they are cultural. This is the point 
where Bastian’s influence on Tylor is most evident. Tylor was the 
foremost proponent in the British tradition of Bastian’s idea of the 
‘psychic unity of mankind’, and his definition of culture is in fact 
more German than British. Paradoxically, however, it was most 
influential in American anthropology, while the American Morgan’s 
focus on kinship gained a similar following in the UK. As late as 
in the 1970s, Meyer Fortes (Chapter 4) commented that American 
and British anthropology seem to have ‘exchanged ancestors’. But as 
Stocking (1996: 13) points out, this is misleading. Tylor’s definition 
had roots in German anthropology, and when it was accepted in 
the USA it was thanks to another German: Franz Boas (Chapter 3).
In the years between 1840 and 1880, as technological and 
economic change proceeded at unprecedented pace, a whole range of 
new problems was raised by sociologists and anthropologists. While 
Marx developed the first grand theory in sociology, comprising 
modernisation, value formation, power and ideology, and while 
Darwin formulated the principles of biological evolution, anthropol-
ogists were engaged in exploring the ramifications of evolutionism 
and cultural history, and in documenting the empirical variation 
cultures globally.
It was still uncommon for the anthropologist himself to carry 
out field studies, although Morgan and Bastian were prominent 
exceptions. A third exception was the Russian ethnographer Nicolay 
Nicolayevich Mikloukho-Maklay (1846–1888) who, in 1871, carried 
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out a 15-month intensive field study on the New Guinean coast, 
and laid the groundwork for a rich ethnographic tradition in Russia 
that goes unmentioned in most Western histories of the discipline 
(Plotkin and Howe 1985; Kuznetsov 2008). But the vast majority 
of anthropologists gathered their data through correspondence with 
colonial administrators, settlers, officers, missionaries and other 
‘whites’ living in exotic places. Given the uneven quality of these 
data and the authors’ vast theoretical ambitions, such studies tended 
toward the kind of speculation that Radcliffe-Brown (Chapter 3) 
would dismiss as conjectural history. Still, the learned books of the 
Victorians were theoretically focused and empirically grounded to 
an extent that had never been seen before.
The importance of kinship in this phase of the discipline’s evolution 
cannot be overstated. Kinship terminology was a limited empirical 
field; nevertheless, mapping and understanding it was a humbling 
experience. The closer one looked at these strangely formal systems, 
the more complex they seemed. True, to the first practitioners of 
kinship studies, mostly lawyers by profession, the task seemed fairly 
simple. They looked for a ‘legal system’ that regulated behaviour 
in primitive societies, and kinship was the obvious candidate – an 
formalised empirical system of verbalised norms. At the end of the 
century, it was widely held that kinship was a kind of anthropolo-
gist’s Rosetta Stone, that allowed primitive customs to be translated 
into scientific and comparative terms. The many legal scholars that 
were attracted to anthropology in this phase also made a lasting 
impression, and the idea of society as a juridical system governed 
by ‘laws’, ‘contracts’, ‘norms’, ‘rules’, and ‘charters’ remained, long 
after the demise of nineteenth-century evolutionism.
THE GOLDEN BOUGH AND THE TORRES EXPEDiTiON
For a couple of decades after the prolific 1860s and 1870s, little of 
importance was published in anthropology. In sociology too, there 
seems to have been a dearth – a notable exception being Ferdinand 
Tönnies’ Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (1887; Community and 
Society, 1963), which proposed a dichotomy of the traditional and 
modern with more emotional and less juridical accent than Maine’s. 
In the course of these years a new generation made its appearance 
and many of the leading figures discussed so far, including Marx, 
Morgan and Maine, were dead. The ‘young lions’ were waiting in 
the scenes for a cause to champion.
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In anthropology, the first wave of institutionalisation had been 
completed in Germany and the UK, and similar developments were 
under way in France, the Netherlands and the USA. Independent 
national traditions were starting to crystallise, as different 
institutional and disciplinary concerns were raised in each country. In 
Germany, the diffusionists were establishing themselves, as a reaction 
set in against Bastian’s broad programme of cultural history. In the 
USA and Britain, evolutionism remained the dominant paradigm, 
but researchers increasingly immersed themselves in empirically 
based studies of primitive kinship, religion, magic or law. In France, 
a new synthesis of sociology and anthropology was under way. 
Everywhere, however, there was an increasing realisation that the 
greatest obstacle to further development of the discipline was the 
lack of broad, detailed and reliable data. A general flight from lofty 
theories to field methods took place. The problem of data collection 
was not new. As early as in 1857, Tylor had taken the initiative to 
compile the first edition of what was to become the authoritative 
British work on field methods for nearly a century – Notes and 
Queries on Anthropology, which was reissued in four revised, and 
ever more detailed, editions. But the long-awaited methodological 
breakthrough only arrived after the First World War, when a 
radically new conception of anthropological fieldwork emerged.
The last great Victorian evolutionist was James George Frazer 
(1854–1941), a student of Tylor’s who was celebrated far beyond 
anthropological circles for his masterpiece The Golden Bough, which 
was first published as a two-volume set in 1890, and later expanded 
to fill twelve tomes in its final edition, published in 1915. The 
Golden Bough is a comparative evolutionist investigation of myth, 
religion, beliefs and customs, with historical and contemporary 
examples drawn from all over the world. Like so many others, Frazer 
believed in a three-step model of cultural evolution: a ‘magical’ stage 
is replaced by a ‘religious’ stage which gives way to a ‘scientific’ 
stage. In his discussion of magic, Frazer follows a thread laid out by 
Tylor, who emphasised the need to identify patterns and universal 
traits even in ‘obviously irrational’ thinking. This part of his work 
had significant impact on later anthropology, mainly by way of 
Evans-Pritchard’s classical monograph about witchcraft (Chapter 
4). But his influence was greatest outside anthropology; three of his 
warmest admirers were the poet T.S. Eliot, the philosopher Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and the psychologist Sigmund Freud. Yet Frazer’s 
fascinating and ponderous work was never followed up by later 
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research. It stands alone, a majestic monument to the towering 
ambitions and insecure empirical base of Victorian evolutionism.
More in tune with the times were the British participants in the 
Torres expedition, organised from the University of Cambridge in 
1898 to the Torres Straits, between Australia and New Guinea. The 
expedition was to collect data about the traditional population of 
the islands in the area, and included, among others, the zoologist 
Alfred C. Haddon (1855–1940), later a pioneer in the use of anthro-
pological film, the psychologist William H.R. Rivers (1864–1922) 
and the medical doctor Charles G. Seligman (1873–1940). All 
three would become notable anthropologists. In contrast to the 
individualistic anthropological fieldwork ideal that later became 
the norm, nineteenth-century expeditions were typically collective 
efforts with scholars from various disciplines responsible for various 
tasks. The Torres expedition was unique not in this, but in its high 
methodological standards and the excellent quality and impressive 
volume of the data collected. For these reasons, its participants 
are often referred to as the first true fieldworkers. ‘Through their 
work’, writes one commentator, ‘British social anthropology was 
born’ (Hynes 1999; see also Hart 1999).
Haddon planned the Torres expedition as an ‘ideal’ field project, 
where the participants would cover as broad a range of native 
life as possible: ethnography, psychology, linguistics, physical 
anthropology and musicology. He himself would take care of 
sociology and folklore, as well as material culture. Haddon would 
later become the dominant anthropologist at the University of 
Cambridge, where he defined the programme of the department 
where Frazer worked. For Seligman, who in later years became 
a central figure at the influential anthropology department at the 
London School of Economics, the expedition was the beginning 
of a career which would lead to several major field studies in the 
Sudan. He thus contributed to moving the regional focus of British 
anthropology from the Pacific Islands to Africa, which would prove 
to be an ethnographic goldmine. Seligman’s major work from the 
Sudan, co-authored with his wife Brenda Seligman (Seligman and 
Seligman 1932), is still regarded as a classic in its field.
Rivers was perhaps the most intriguing member of the expedition. 
Until his early death in 1922, he was a professor at the University 
of Cambridge where he invested much effort in developing a 
psychological anthropology, a project inspired by Wundt and, like 
his efforts, too far ahead of its time to succeed. Towards the end 
of his life, Rivers, like his later student, Malinowski (Chapter 3), 
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came under the influence of Sigmund Freud’s psychology. During 
the Torres expedition, Rivers concentrated on the mental abilities of 
the natives, especially their use of the senses. In 1908, he published 
a descriptive monograph, The Todas, based on fieldwork among 
a tribe in South India; and in 1914 The History of Melanesian 
Society, a comprehensive overview of the immense cultural variation 
of Melanesia, which he explained as a result of repeated waves of 
migration, an hypothesis that is still accepted, with modifications, 
by present-day archaeologists. Rivers found it difficult to reconcile 
the complexity of Melanesia with Tylor’s evolutionism, and began 
to search for new theoretical approaches. His history of Melanesia 
represented a nearly unique move in Britain, away from evolutionism 
and towards the new German school of diffusionism.
Meanwhile, the institutional development of anthropology in 
Britain had stagnated. Fredrik Barth sums up a survey of the period 
from the Torres expedition to the publication of Malinowski’s first 
monograph as follows: ‘the formal institutional framework for 
the discipline of anthropology remained almost unchanged [from 
1898 to 1922] – in other words,’ Barth continues, with only slight 
exaggeration, ‘such a framework continued to be absent’ (Barth 
2005: 20).
GERmAN DiffUSiONiSm
For many years, Germany was the intellectual powerhouse of anthro-
pological research. Here were the learned cultural historians, the 
subtle theoreticians and the large, modern ethnographic museums 
– Bastian’s Museum für Völkerkunde in Berlin was renowned as 
a model academic institution. As we have seen, linguistics played 
a prominent role in this milieu. Around 1800, Schlegel had 
demonstrated that many European and Asian languages could be 
traced back to the same, ancestral Indo-European root, while words 
were also loaned between languages and language families. With 
the close relations between linguistics and anthropology, it was 
inevitable that anthropologists would try to copy the prodigious 
success of the linguists, all the more so since linguistics offered a 
promising alternative to evolutionism. It was less unilinear and 
ethnocentric. It revealed the past as a complex web of influences 
and inheritances without overruling goals or universal stages. As 
evolutionism failed, the linguistic model gained ground in German 
anthropology and the diffusionist school emerged.
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Diffusionists studied the geographical distribution and migration 
of cultural traits, and posited that cultures were to some extent 
random patchworks of traits with various origins and histories. 
Not all parts of a culture are necessarily linked into a larger whole. 
In contrast, most evolutionists held that societies were coherent, 
functional systems. True, evolutionists also recognised the existence 
of isolated, non-functional cultural traits (Tylor’s survivals) and, 
in practice, these received a disproportionate amount of attention 
(considering they were atypical), since they were the key to 
reconstructing the social forms of the past. When the evolutionist 
perspective collapsed, the idea of societies as coherent wholes 
was also discredited (though it remained strong in sociology, and 
would soon reappear with renewed force in British and French 
anthropology). Now all cultural traits were potential ‘survivals’. 
Like the evolutionists, the diffusionists used them to reconstruct 
the past, but their ‘past’ was no longer a unilinear movement of 
progress, but a tangle of long, crooked, often discontinuous stories 
of cultural encounters, migrations and mutual influences through 
thousands of years.
Technology and ideas have always travelled and people have 
been conscious of this. What was new about diffusionism, as it was 
practised in Germany around 1900, was its stringent and critical 
method. No effort was made toward grand theory; even Bastian was 
criticised as a crypto-evolutionist. Instead, explicit hypotheses about 
specific cases were advanced and discussed on the background of 
detailed and well-documented data. Like Rivers, many diffusionists 
worked in geographically limited regions, where it was possible 
to demonstrate convincingly that specific cultural traits had an 
identifiable history.
The heartland of classical diffusionism was in great museum 
cities such as Berlin, Vienna and Leipzig, from which it spread 
throughout Eastern and Northern Europe. In Britain and France 
(apart from individuals, like Rivers) it had little influence. As we 
have seen, German anthropologists at times worked within a more 
or less explicit evolutionary framework, but here diversity, which the 
evolutionists sought to reduce to a simple schema, was an analytical 
virtue. Scholars like Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904), Fritz Graebner 
(1877–1934), Leo Frobenius (1873–1938) and the Austrian 
Wilhelm Schmidt (1868–1954) developed the most popular strand 
of diffusionism, the culture-circle (Kulturkreis) school. This had 
as its main hypothesis that all cultures had evolved, like language, 
from relatively few, prominent cultural centres (Kulturkreise), whose 
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influences overlie each other like geological or archaeological strata, 
and can be traced empirically. In certain cases, as in Graebner’s 
studies from Oceania, as many as seven overlapping Kulturkreise 
were identified in the same society (Kulturkomplex).
In contrast to the evolutionists, the Kulturkreis scholars rested 
their research on a firm methodological base. This is clearly seen 
in Graebner’s Methode der Ethnologie (1911, ‘The Method of 
Ethnology’). The book was devastatingly reviewed by Franz Boas, 
who disapproved of the new, systematic diffusionism, and has never 
been translated into English. But here, if not elsewhere, Boas was 
clearly mistaken. Diffusionism discusses the mobility of individual 
cultural traits. Graebner deals with objections to this mode of 
enquiry, offers a clear definition of what a ‘trait’ is, and describes 
how it may be recognised as data by the researcher. He defines 
‘trait’ in purely formal terms (the form of the ornament is constant; 
its meaning and usages vary), since form diffuses more easily than 
content. It follows that the best data are traits that have no function 
or meaning; the more arbitrary, the better the chances are that the 
trait comes from elsewhere.
As we shall see in the next chapter, both evolutionism and 
diffusionism were thoroughly thrashed by the next generations of 
anthropologists. But diffusionist research was more sophisticated 
than later anthropologists have generally cared to admit, and in 
the German-language area, particularly in Austria, the Kulturkreis 
programme retained its dominance into the 1950s.
From Germany diffusionism itself diffused, into Eastern and 
Northern Europe, along with German museum culture. In many 
cases, the scope of enquiry was restricted to local conditions, but 
expeditionary traditions were also maintained, most particularly in 
multi-ethnic Russia. Among Mikloukho-Maklay’s many followers, 
three prominent names were Vladimir Ilich Jochelson (1855–1937), 
Vladimir Germanovich Bogoraz (1865–1936) and Lev Yacovlevich 
Sternberg (1861–1927), all of whom were exiled to Eastern Siberia 
by the Czar and used the opportunity to carry out long-term 
fieldwork among the indigenous peoples of the region. Around the 
turn of the century, they participated in a major Russo-American 
expedition to the indigenous peoples around the Bering Straits, 
organised by a German-American by the name of Franz Boas. These 
scholars were traditional cultural historians rather than modern 
diffusionists, but their schooling derived from Germany, where 
diffusionism was at its height, and diffusionism was part of their 
intellectual baggage. Later, these conditions were ‘frozen’ by the 
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communist revolutions and remained so for many years. Hence 
diffusionism remained a respectable, if somewhat cowed, theory in 
post-Stalinist Soviet Russia, with long traditions and high analytical 
and methodological standards. Even today, diffusionist concerns are 
by no means extinct, though ‘modern’ anthropological analysis is 
gaining territory (Chapter 9). In the West, a form of diffusionism 
reappeared in the tradition of imperialism studies that ultimately 
stems from Marx and Lenin, but has been resurrected under such 
headings as ‘dependency studies’, ‘global system studies’ and, most 
recently, ‘globalisation studies’ (Chapters 7 and 9). The Marxian 
influence adds power to the diffusionists’ Herderian brew, with 
more potent and violent results.
THE NEW SOCiOlOGy
The new generation of British anthropologists who will be introduced 
in the following chapter, had good reason to distance themselves 
from evolutionism and diffusionism. They were convinced that they 
had discovered a theoretical alternative with greater potential than 
any previous theory of sociocultural variation. British anthropolo-
gists had discovered Continental sociology.
What is called ‘classical sociology’ in textbooks, usually refers 
to the oeuvre of a handful of (mostly German or French) theorists, 
who produced most of their work between the 1850s and the First 
World War. In the generation after Marx, these included Emile 
Durkheim and Max Weber, and also Georg Simmel (1858–1918) 
and Ferdinand Tönnies (1855–1936). Like Marx, these authors 
are still read for the intrinsic interest of their work (rather than 
as expressions of an historical Zeitgeist). Simmel (who has been 
experiencing a renaissance since the 1980s) is admired for his studies 
of modernity, the city and money. Both Durkheim and Weber are 
still important enough to generate book-length studies. But of 
all the classical sociologists, Durkheim was most significant for 
anthropology – in part because he himself was concerned with 
many anthropological themes and was instrumental in developing 
French anthropology, in part because of his influence on British 
anthropology through Radcliffe-Brown and his followers. In the 
USA, the influence of ‘classical sociology’ only made itself felt many 
years later, and was never as strong as in Europe. As with their 
German founder, Boas, the leading American anthropologists of 
the early twentieth century were oriented towards the humanist 
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disciplines of cultural history, linguistics and psychology rather than 
sociology.
DURKHEim
Like Marx (and Boas), Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) came from a 
Jewish family. He grew up in a small town near Strasbourg, and his 
parents wanted him to become a rabbi. He did so well in school, 
however, that he was admitted to the prestigious École Normale 
Supérieure in Paris, which secured him a later academic career. 
During his education he had lost his religious faith and become 
part of a dynamic and critical intellectual milieu. He studied a 
year with Wundt in Leipzig, and Wundt’s Völkerpsychologie 
would later influence his theory of collective representations (see 
below). Throughout his life, Durkheim was deeply concerned with 
moral issues, and he was a committed advocate of radical social 
and educational reform. In 1887, he was appointed lecturer in 
education and sociology at the University of Bordeaux, becoming 
the first French social scientist to hold an academic position. While 
in Bordeaux, where he stayed until 1902, when he moved to Paris, 
Durkheim wrote two of his most important works, De la division du 
travail social (1893; The Division of Labour in Society, 1964) and Le 
Suicide (1897; Suicide, 1951). He also founded the influential journal 
L’Année Sociologique, which he continued to edit after moving to 
Paris. As professor at the Sorbonne from 1906 till his death in 
1917, Durkheim’s influence on French sociology and anthropology 
was immense. With his nephew and intellectual successor Marcel 
Mauss, he wrote extensively on non-European peoples; a notable 
work in this regard was their co-written Classification Primitive 
(Durkheim and Mauss 1900; Primitive Classification, 1963), a 
study of the social origins of knowledge systems, which draws on 
ethnographic data, particularly from Australia. This book, which 
posits an intrinsic connection between classification and social 
structure, would become an important source of inspiration for 
anthropological studies of classification.
Unlike both diffusionists and evolutionists, Durkheim was not 
particularly interested in origins. He was concerned with synchronic 
(atemporal) rather than diachronic (temporal) explanation. Like the 
diffusionists, but unlike the evolutionists, he was deeply committed 
to an anthropology based on observable, often quantifiable data. 
Unlike the diffusionists, however, he was convinced that societies 
were logical, integrated systems, where all parts were dependent 
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on each other and worked together to maintain the whole. In this, 
he approached the evolutionists, who, like him, drew analogies 
between the functional systems of the body and society. Durkheim 
often described society as a social organism. Like Tönnies and 
Maine, but unlike Marx and Morgan, Durkheim subscribed to a 
dichotomous division of societal types – dropping all talk of ‘stages’ 
and ‘evolution’, he juxtaposed traditional and modern societies 
without postulating that the former would ever evolve into the latter. 
Primitive societies were neither ‘survivals’ from a dim past nor ‘steps’ 
along the path of progress, but social organisms that deserved to be 
studied on their own terms. But unlike Bastian and the Völkerkunde 
school, Durkheim was concerned, not with culture, but with society; 
not with symbols and myths, but with organisations and institutions, 
and, most fundamentally, with the force that held social groups 
together. He referred to this force as solidarity.
The book on the division of labour discusses the differences 
between simple and complex forms of social organisation. The 
former are based on mechanical solidarity. People support the 
existing social order and cohere into groups because they share 
the same everyday life, carry out the same tasks and experience each 
other as similar. In complex social organisations, organic solidarity 
prevails. Here, groups are held together by the fact that people 
are different and fulfil different, but complementary tasks, each of 
which contributes to the whole. Durkheim emphasises that the two 
forms of solidarity must be understood, not as different types of 
society, but as general principles of social integration that coexist in 
all societies. In Suicide, he considers what happens when solidarity 
breaks down. The world is emptied of moral content, the individual 
is disconnected from others and cast into a homeless social vacuum 
without norms (anomie). Marx had described a similar state, 
which he called alienation and traced back to the individual’s loss 
of control over the products of his work. But where Marx sees 
alienation from the physical world, Durkheim sees alienation from 
the moral collective.
Durkheim’s last, and most anthropological work, Les Formes 
élémentaires de la vie réligieuse (1912; The Elementary Forms of 
Religious Life, 1995) was published just five years before his death. 
Here, he grapples with the meaning of ‘solidarity’ itself, of the 
very force that keeps society together. Solidarity, Durkheim argues, 
arises from collective representations. These are symbolic ‘images’ 
or ‘models’ that are shared by a group and embody the group’s 
shared experience. Such ‘images’ develop through interpersonal 
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relationships, but attain a supra-individual collective character. They 
make up an all-embracing reality, which to the members of society 
appear just as real as the material world. Hence, collective repre-
sentations are subjective, they have power over the emotions. But 
they also have an inescapable, objective character. This duality alerts 
us to the fact that Durkheim is describing a ‘socially constructed 
reality’, as in Kant and Hegel. Religion becomes an important object 
of enquiry for Durkheim, because it is here, more than anywhere, 
that the collective representations are strengthened and made 
visible. This happens primarily in ritual, where religion is expressed 
through physical interaction, and the collective representations, 
with the solidarity they promote, are transformed into direct, bodily 
experience. Ritual hedges itself off from profane daily life, drawing 
a protective magic circle around its own, forbidden, sacred domain. 
This demarcation allows the experience of ritual to be intensified 
until an almost mystical union is achieved. When the memory of 
this experience returns to us in everyday life, it brings home to us 
that the world truly is as the collective representations describe it.
Religion had long attracted the attention of anthropologists, 
who had documented it in a wide range of empirical forms. The 
problem of understanding social integration in stateless societies had 
been an important (though often implicit) concern in evolutionism. 
Bewilderment at exotic symbols and customs was the original point 
of departure of anthropological enquiry. Now Durkheim seemed to 
offer an analytical tool that would bring all these interests together. 
The exotic could be understood as a system of collective repre-
sentations that generated social solidarity. And religion, the most 
mystifyingly ‘exotic’ phenomenon of all, was the rational dynamo 
driving this process.
Although the first modern British anthropologists (Chapter 3) 
embraced Durkheim’s theory enthusiastically and found countless 
applications for it, in the study of religion, law and – not least – 
kinship, Durkheim was not alone in reforming sociology around the 
turn of the century. But since Durkheim’s influence was so strong, it 
would take many years before anthropologists started taking these 
alternatives seriously, just as it took time for them to face up to the 
implications of the work of Marx.
WEBER
Max Weber (1864–1920) grew up in a prosperous and authoritarian 
Prussian family, was educated at the universities of Berlin, Heidelberg 
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and Göttingen, and rose rapidly in the German academic world. 
He was appointed professor at the age of 31, and in the course 
of a few years, published several learned works about topics as 
diverse as the fall of the Roman Empire and agricultural problems 
in contemporary eastern Germany. From his mother, who was raised 
in a strict, Calvinist home, he had inherited ideals of asceticism and 
strict work discipline, which he put into practice in his academic 
life. In 1898, after only three active years, he suffered a mental 
breakdown and was able to resume work only after another five 
years had passed. Immediately after his recovery, Weber wrote the 
book that many consider his finest: Die protestantische Ethik und 
der ‘Geist’ der Kapitalismus (1904–05; The Protestant Ethic and 
the Spirit of Capitalism, 1976). This is a work of economic and 
cultural history which explores the roots of European modernity. 
Weber argues that the Calvinists (and other puritan Christians of 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries) formulated a view of life 
that corresponded closely to the image of the perfect capitalist. The 
Calvinists believed that human life was predestined, that certain 
individuals were singled out by God for salvation, but it was beyond 
human comprehension to understand who or why this would be. 
The God of Calvin was stern and demanded obedience, but refused 
to explain his reasons. According to Weber (and we sense that he 
is speaking from personal experience), this ambiguity, coupled to 
the merciless doctrine, created an unbearable tension in the life of 
the Calvinists. Looking for solutions to their self-imposed dilemma, 
it occurred to them that hard work coupled with a frugal lifestyle 
could only bring them closer to God’s grace. Economic success, if 
they attained it, would be proof of this. However, the fruits of their 
labour were not to be enjoyed. Instead, they should be reinvested 
back into the enterprise, to generate a spiral of increasing profits 
to the glory of God. Calvinism gave people a legitimate reason to 
not spend the surplus of their work on personal consumption, but 
reinvest it – and reinvestment is, as Marx pointed out, the prime 
condition of a capitalist economy.
Weber’s point is not that Calvinism was the cause of capitalism. 
There were many reasons why capitalism arose, and reinvestment 
was by no means an invention of Calvin’s. The point was rather 
that the Protestant sects formulated an explicit ideology – a ‘spirit’ 
(Geist) – that justified and even glorified the capitalist ethic.
Weber’s work was deeply influenced by hermeneutics, which since 
Schleiermacher’s day had become an integral part of a well-rounded 
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education in the humanistic German academic milieus. Weber 
sought to interpret human action and describe the motivations 
behind it. In this sense he was an early representative of what has 
later been referred to as methodological individualism. This did not 
mean that he focused on individuals to the exclusion of the social 
whole. Hermeneutics teaches that human attention constantly shifts 
between part and whole, and Weber’s individuals always participate 
in wider social contexts – in states and institutions, and in the 
long-term movements of history. It is the hope of interpreting the 
motivations of action that is expressed in the hermeneutic concept 
of Verstehen (‘understanding, interpretation’). Weber offered an 
interpretive and empathic sociology that put itself in the place of 
actors and immersed itself in the choices they must make, given 
the sociohistorical conditions surrounding them. After the Second 
World War, Weber’s focus on the individual and his interest in 
interpretation would inspire anthropologists as different as Fredrik 
Barth (Chapter 5) and Clifford Geertz (Chapter 6).
The empirical phenomenon that Weber himself was most 
interested in interpreting, was power. Power was an old theme in 
the social sciences. The classic was Machiavelli’s Il Principe (1532; 
The Prince, 2008), which described the logic of power-holders with 
acute realism. Later, Marx established the material and bodily 
basis of power, and in Weber’s lifetime, the philosopher Friedrich 
Nietzsche had described power as an expression of the will to 
live. Weber had read these authors, and was most closely allied 
to Nietzsche. Marx had linked power to control of the means of 
production, and thus with property. Weber instead saw power 
as rooted in the individual. Like Marx – and unlike Durkheim – 
Weber saw social life as full of conflict and in constant change. But 
Marx assumes change is caused by anonymous structural conflicts 
taking place in the deepest, unknowable regions of society, behind 
peoples’ backs, so to speak. This was unacceptable for Weber, 
whose interest was in individuals pursuing values and striving 
for goals. Like his contemporaries, the diffusionists, Weber was 
opposed to abstract generalisations, such as Marx’s structural 
concept of power. It was the particular, the historical coincidence, 
the concrete, lived reality, that attracted his attention. Weber could 
see well enough that power and property were often related, but 
he refused to generalise. Power, he asserted, was the ability to 
make someone do something he otherwise would not have done. 
Property is just one means by which it may be exerted. Weber 
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then goes on to describe, in his second great work, Wirtschaft und 
Gesellschaft (1922; Economy and Society, 1968), three ideal types 
of legitimate power. (The Weberian ‘ideal type’ is a simplified model 
that is applied to the real world to reveal specific aspects of its 
functioning.) Weber’s ideal types of legitimate power are traditional 
authority (legitimised by ritual and kinship), bureaucratic authority 
(legitimised by formal administration), and charismatic authority 
(the power of the prophet or revolutionary). All three types may 
coexist within a single society. Now, the first two types look 
suspiciously like the primitive/modern dichotomy proposed by 
Maine, Tönnies or Durkheim. But the third type is an innovation. 
It bears witness to the fact that Weber, towards the end of his life, 
had read Freud, who, like Nietzsche, emphasised the irrationality 
of the human psyche. There exists a kind of power, Weber tells us, 
that is unpredictable and individual, driven by intuition and the 
command of loyalty, rather than on control of property (Marx) 
or stable norms (Durkheim).
Thus, for Weber, society was a more individual and less collective 
endeavour than for Marx or Durkheim. Society is not, as in 
Durkheim, a stable moral order. Nor is it, as in Marx, a product 
of ponderous collective forces that individuals can neither influence 
nor understand. It is an ad hoc ordering, generated as people with 
different interests and values meet, quarrel, and strive (if need be 
by force) to convince each other and arrive at a course of action. 
Thus, while Marx and Durkheim each developed a distinct brand 
of methodological collectivism, which studies society primarily 
as an integrated whole – Weber announced a methodological 
individualism that accepted that societies could be inconsistent 
and unpredictable.
By the turn of the twentieth century, the Continental sociologists 
were engaged in a lively discourse on issues of social theory, attaining 
levels of sophistication that anthropologists could not pretend to. In 
our own day, Marx, Durkheim and Weber are far more frequently 
cited by anthropologists than Morgan, Bastian or Tylor. Soon, 
the impact of Durkheim would shake anthropology deeply, while 
Weber and Marx still lurked in the scenes, only appearing as major 
influences after the Second World War.
Still, the heritage of nineteenth-century anthropology is richer 
than often supposed. Evolutionism never disappeared completely, 
and has had influential twentieth-century proponents. Diffusionism, 
as we hinted above, is perhaps still a force to be reckoned with. Many 
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concepts have survived and are still in use: Morgan’s classificatory 
kinship, Maine’s contract and status, Tylor’s definition of culture, 
Bastian’s psychic unity of mankind, are all ‘survivals’ (to use a 
native term) of Victorian anthropology. It is nevertheless only with 
the developments described in the next chapter that anthropology 
emerges in the form we recognise today.
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four founding fathers
The peaceful conditions that had prevailed in the West since the 
Napoleonic Wars, the steady advance of democracy and culture, the 
growing colonial empires, the dynamic economy and the scientific 
breakthroughs, had done their part to make ideologies of unilinear 
progress seem plausible, if not inevitable. A mere glance at the 
world seemed sufficient to confirm evolutionism in this age, which 
is called Victorian, after the long-lived British monarch. As Keith 
Hart puts it:
The question Victorians asked was how they were able to conquer 
the planet with so little effective resistance. They concluded that 
their culture was superior, being based on reason rather than 
superstition … (Hart 1998)
By the turn of the twentieth century, optimism was more subdued. 
Freud’s theory of the unconscious from 1900 and Einstein’s theory 
of special relativity from 1905 frame a symbolic gateway to our 
time. These theories challenged the very substance upon which the 
bourgeois, Victorian age was built. In Freud’s hands, the rational, 
free individual, the means and end of progress, dissolved into 
irrational drives and explosive sexuality; Einstein dissolved physics, 
the most prestigiously rational of the sciences, into dithering, 
explosive movement.
The phone, the car and the plane replaced the telegraph, train 
and steamboat. The colonial empires still grew, few things indicated 
that they would soon be supplanted by the postcolonial world (dis)
order that shapes our lives today. The twentieth century transformed 
the world and the people in it. And as cannons roared over the 
trenches of Flanders, and the masses stormed the Winter Palace, 
and the Model T Fords rolled from the conveyor belts of Detroit; 
while the world economy collapsed, and Hitler and Stalin seized 
power, and Western women gained voting rights, and Europe moved 
toward a new war, and jazz became popular in Germany – while 
46
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these and so many other events transpired, anthropology was born 
as a modern social science.
At the turn of the twentieth century, the state of anthropology 
may be described as follows: A number of ambitious theories of 
long-term social change had been advanced, based on historical 
sources or contemporary reports, or (more rarely) on first-hand 
observation. Enthusiasm for these theories was in decline, as a 
pressing need for richer and more precise empirical data made itself 
felt. Meanwhile, sociologists had proposed a range of sophisticated 
social theories with clear implications for anthropological thinking 
– without anthropologists taking notice. Not only Marx, Durkheim 
and Weber were ignored, but the entire sociological field (names 
such as de Tocqueville, Simmel, Tönnies and Veblen come to 
mind). Anthropologists remained largely indifferent even to major 
achievements in science and philosophy. Darwinian evolution, 
Freudian dream analysis, Saussure’s semiotics, Nietzsche’s will to 
power and Husserl’s phenomenology had yet to be impressed on 
the ‘blank slate’ of anthropology. All would be so before the end 
of new century.
The discipline of anthropology as we know it today developed in 
the years around the First World War, and we will uncontroversially 
describe its growth by focusing on four outstanding individuals – 
two in Britain, one in the USA and one in France. There were other 
national traditions, from Russia and Japan to the Netherlands and 
Brazil, and other scholars in the metropolitan countries who may 
have seemed as important at the time. It is only in hindsight we can 
assess the historical importance of past events; their contemporary 
significance may have been otherwise. And there is the flip-side of 
the coin: How many of Mauss’ colleagues died in the First World 
War? How many of Boas’ books were burned by the Nazis? How 
many ethnographers were silenced or killed in the Gulag? Much 
might have been different in anthropology, if not for the killing 
fields of the twentieth century.
The men whose work will form the backbone of this chapter 
were Franz Boas, Bronislaw Malinowski, Alfred Reginald Radcliffe-
Brown and Marcel Mauss. Between them, they effected a near-total 
renovation of three of the four national traditions we have focused 
on so far – the American (led by Boas), the French (by Mauss) 
and the British (by Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown). In German 
anthropology, little changed; cultural history and diffusionism were 
left unchallenged to the point of stagnation. However, Boas was a 
German and Malinowski a Pole, and both brought something of the 
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German tradition with them when they emigrated to the USA (Boas) 
and Britain (Malinowski). Thus, there is reason to argue that the 
four national traditions that arose in the nineteenth century have all 
contributed to the making of twentieth-century anthropology. Nor 
were these traditions alone. Since the end of the nineteenth cenntury, 
institutionalised anthropology had been spreading through Europe 
and beyond, with embryonic scholarly institutions appearing as far 
afield as Helsinki, Zurich and Belgrade, New Delhi and Tokyo, and 
more were soon to come.
The four founding fathers did not perceive themselves as a single 
movement and had no common programme. Both theoretically 
and methodologically the differences between them, and between 
the schools they founded, were great, and it was only after the 
Second World War that French, American and British anthro-
pologists started looking for a common language. Still, all of the 
founders considered themselves anthropologists. There were many 
reasons for this. A professional anthropological identity had been 
established, linked with academic institutions that disseminated 
anthropological knowledge, conducted anthropological research 
and were acquainted with each other’s work. Another reason 
for a common identity was that the traditions were in no way 
hermetically closed. Durkheim’s influence on British anthropology 
is a famous case, but views were exchanged freely in letters and 
journals as the national traditions defined themselves and challenged 
each other. Before 1910, Rivers, in Britain, could conduct a lively 
debate with the American Kroeber on the use of psychological and 
sociological models in anthropology. There was also the shared 
background in nineteenth-century anthropology. Loud consensus 
held that evolutionism had been a dead end, but it was also silently 
acknowledged that evolutionists and cultural historians had laid the 
foundations on which the modern discipline rested.
The transition happened differently in the three countries. In 
Britain, there was a radical break. Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski 
proclaimed an intellectual revolution and debunked their teachers 
mercilessly. In the USA and France, continuity was greater. In the 
USA, Boas remained a father-figure throughout the transitional 
period. In France, there was even less to-do: Mauss continued his 
uncle Durkheim’s work with only slight differences in emphasis. In 
Britain it is sometimes claimed that Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski 
single-handedly created modern anthropology, and there is some 
truth to this. But the story is also a myth, created in the heyday of 
British social anthropology in the mid-twentieth century, when it 
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seemed that Malinowski had created a method and Radcliffe-Brown 
a theory that together defined the project of anthropology.
THE fOUNDiNG fATHERS AND THEiR PROjECTS
In 1886, the oldest of the ‘fathers’, Franz Boas (1858–1942), found 
himself in New York. He was 28 and on his way home to Germany. 
He held a doctorate from Kiel, an academic position in Berlin, he 
had spent a year alone with the Baffin Land Inuit and participated in 
several ethnographic expeditions to northern and western Canada. 
Still, he chose to stay in New York, maybe because of his Jewish 
background; certainly in part because it brought him closer to the 
Native American peoples that fascinated him. He worked first as the 
editor of a scientific journal, later at a small university, and in 1899 
was appointed professor at the prestigious Columbia University in 
New York City, where he remained until his death in 1942. During 
the intervening 43 years, he was teacher and mentor to several 
generations of American anthropologists.
Boas’ message to his students was simple, but fundamental. 
He had been trained by German scholars who were critical to 
evolutionism, and remained until his death a kind of diffusionist, 
though Graebner’s Kulturkreis theory was unacceptable to him 
(Boas 1911) – he claimed that Graebner underestimated human 
creativity. Boas was convinced that culture was extremely complex 
and that social theories were dependent on a firm and reliable 
empirical base, rather than on neat armchair theories that reduced 
reality to schemata. The first task of anthropology was to provide 
the data. Then one could discuss theory. Boas’ respect for empirical 
facts was related to his cultural relativism. Each people, each nation, 
each tribe had its fate, its irreplaceable character, and it was the task 
of the anthropologist, as Boas saw it, to document and defend it 
(Boas was a prominent anti-racist). In this he was a loyal follower 
of Herder and Bastian.
Twenty-four years after Boas made his decision to stay in the 
USA, a young Polish intellectual from an upper-middle-class 
academic family in the venerable town of Kraków, Bronislaw Kasper 
Malinowski (1884–1942), moved from Leipzig to London. A few 
years before, he had defended a highly regarded doctorate in physics 
and philosophy in Krakow, then part of Austria-Hungary (now 
in Poland). In Leipzig, he had (like Bastian, Durkheim and Rivers 
before him) studied under Wundt, who convinced him that society 
had to be understood holistically, as a unity of integrated parts, and 
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that this was best achieved by synchronous (rather than historical) 
analysis. Meanwhile, his reading of The Golden Bough had inspired 
him to investigate ‘primitive’ peoples, and he moved to study under 
Seligman at the London School of Economics (LSE), which had a 
reputation for offering good conditions for exotic fieldwork. Four 
years later, Malinowski did a six-month field study on an island off 
the coast of New Guinea, which he regarded as a failure. After a 
short stay in Australia, spent reflecting on his methods, he returned 
to the same region, this time to the Trobriand Islands, where he 
spent nearly two years. After the war, he returned to Europe to write 
Argonauts of the Western Pacific (Malinowski 1922), possibly the 
single most revolutionary work in the history of anthropology. He 
attracted a small group of accomplished and enthusiastic students to 
the LSE, who would make fieldwork à la Malinowski anthropology’s 
trademark. Malinowski died in the USA, in the middle of a study of 
social change among Native American peasants in Mexico.
Alfred Reginald Radcliffe-Brown (1881–1955) was Malinowski’s 
age, but came not from Central European intelligentsia, but from 
the English lower middle class. He began his career as plain A.R. 
Brown. With economic support from his brother, who had made 
a career in the army, he embarked on medical studies, but was 
encouraged to move to Cambridge and study anthropology by his 
teachers – Haddon and Rivers – who had both participated in the 
Torres expedition. Radcliffe-Brown did fieldwork in 1906–08 on the 
Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal, and published a well-received 
field report in the diffusionist style. Just before Malinowski arrived 
at the LSE, Radcliffe-Brown read an early version of Durkheim’s 
masterpiece, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, and held 
a long lecture series on Durkheim at Oxford, and when his 
monograph, Andaman Islanders, was finally published (in 1922, 
the same year as Argonauts), it appeared more than anything else 
to be a brilliant demonstration of Durkheimian sociology applied 
to ethnographic material.
Radcliffe-Brown’s later career was, like Boas’ and Malinowski’s, 
devoted to institution building. Unlike them, however, he spent long 
periods of his professional life as an academic nomad. He spent 
many years in Cape Town and Sidney, laying the groundwork for 
South African and Australian social anthropology, and his six years 
in Chicago influenced American anthropology profoundly. When he 
finally returned to Oxford to accept a Chair in Social Anthropology 
in 1937, it was as a celebrated exile, rather than an outsider. When 
Malinowski left for the USA a year later, Radcliffe-Brown quickly 
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gathered the reins in his hands and became the leading figure in 
anthropology in Britain.
In 1917, while Malinowski was still in the Trobriand Islands, 
while Boas was busy educating his students in New York, while 
Radcliffe-Brown was serving a short stint as director of education 
in the Polynesian kingdom of Tonga – Durkheim died. His nephew, 
Marcel Mauss (1872–1950), who had been Professor of Primitive 
Religion at the École Pratique des Hautes Études in Paris since 
1902, had cooperated with Durkheim for two decades, and now 
took his place as leader of the Année Sociologique circle. It was not 
the easiest of times. Several outstanding colleagues of Mauss had 
perished in the First World War, and he would spend much of his 
professional energy completing and publishing their manuscripts. 
In 1925, he founded – with the anthropologists Paul Rivet and 
Lucien Lévy-Bruhl – the Institute d’etnologie at the University of 
Paris, which for the first time in France, offered and anthropological 
education. During the same period he published his most influential 
work, Essay sur le don (1923–24; The Gift, 1954). Mauss had 
his background in classical studies and comparative philology. He 
never did fieldwork, but his knowledge of global cultural history 
and contemporary ethnography was comprehensive. In his work, 
which is largely comparative, he cites Boas, Malinowski and Rad-
cliffe-Brown along with a plethora of other authorities, many of 
them learned Germans of the cultural history tradition. Like the 
other ‘founding fathers’, Mauss was an institution builder, and the 
academic community he built seems to have mattered more to him 
than his personal career. He published little during his long lifetime, 
but he posed deep questions, cooperated freely, and bequeathed a 
rich heritage to his many students.
We have pointed out above that the four founding fathers had no 
common programme. However, they agreed on certain basics. They 
believed that anthropology was an holistic discipline. The idea of 
comparing individual culture traits, considered out of context, that 
was so crucial to evolutionism and diffusionism, was unacceptable. 
They agreed that anthropology must become a true science, where 
hypotheses were tested and theories put forth on the background 
of detailed, well-documented data. Natural science was to some 
extent a model, but linguistics and Wundtian psychology were closer 
to home. And they agreed that anthropological methods must be 
revamped. Whether fieldwork was carried out individually, in the 
British-Malinowskian style, or by teams, as was common elsewhere, 
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techniques of observation, interviewing and documentation must 
be critically reviewed and systematically applied.
Here the consensus ended. There was broad disagreement on how 
to realise these laudable goals in practice, and there were plenty of 
conflicts, on theoretical, methodological, institutional and personal 
issues. But here again the differences were great: the rivalry between 
Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown is as legendary as the harmony 
that reigned under the benign dictatorship of Boas, though history 
has no doubt exaggerated both.
mAliNOWSKi AmONG THE TROBRiAND iSlANDERS
Malinowski came to Oceania as secretary for the Torres expedition, 
just before the outbreak of the First World War. It has been claimed 
that he was virtually interned on the Trobriand Islands, since, as a 
citizen of Austria-Hungary, he was technically an enemy of Britain. 
He could have returned to Europe any time he liked, but he had 
a job to do (Kuper 1996: 12). One might gain the impression at 
times that Malinowski was a flighty romantic who ‘just happened’ 
to discover the principles of modern fieldwork. This was very far 
from the truth. He was a thorough and systematic ethnographer, 
with an unusual capacity for acquiring languages and outstanding 
faculties of observation (Firth 1957).
For Malinowski, it was essential to stay long enough in the field 
to be able to use the local vernacular as one’s working language. 
Only thus could one gain direct access to the culture. Interpreters cut 
you off from the informal aspects of communication, in the worst 
case giving access only to information the interpreter consciously 
decides to give. Most anthropologists before Malinowski had been 
in this position.
Malinowski’s ‘participant observation’ set a new standard for 
ethnographic research. No fact was too trivial to be recorded. 
Formal interviews and social aloofness would no longer do. As far 
as practically possible, the ethnographer must take active part in the 
ongoing flow of everyday life, avoiding specific questions that might 
divert the stream of events, and without restricting attention to 
particular parts of the scene. This was hard work: Malinowski lived 
alone in a hut in the middle of a Trobriand village for months on 
end – though he kept his tropical suit and hat immaculately white, 
and though his posthumously published diaries (Malinowski 1967) 
reveal that he often felt homesick, despondent and sick and tired 
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of ‘the natives’. However, Malinowski was too good a fieldworker 
to restrict himself to unstructured methods. He collected accurate 
data on yam yields, land rights, gift exchange, trade patterns and 
political conflicts, and many other things, and carried out structured 
interviews whenever necessary. 
What he did not do to any significant extent was to position the 
Trobriand Islanders within a wider historical and regional context. 
In this, he stands in striking contrast to Mauss, who was a specialist 
on the Pacific, with a broader and deeper knowledge of the region’s 
cultural history than Malinowski, but had never actually been there. 
Virtually everything Malinowski later published drew on his 
Trobriand data. He wrote about economics and trade, marriage and 
sex, magic and worldviews, politics and power, human needs and 
social structure, gardening and aesthetics. His descriptions run over 
several thousand pages, and demonstrate conclusively the potential 
of long-term intensive fieldwork. The sheer number of Trobriand 
institutions, beliefs and practices, showed beyond doubt that a 
‘primitive’, ‘simple’ society, near the bottom of the evolutionist 
ladder, could be a highly complex and multifaceted universe in itself. 
Malinowski’s work revealed, more convincingly than any theoretical 
argument, the absurdity of comparing individual traits. From now 
on, context and interconnection would be essential qualities of any 
anthropological account.
Argonauts of the Pacific, Malinowski’s first major work, remains 
his most famous. The book was prefaced by Sir James Frazer, who 
lavished praise on the young Pole, clearly unaware that he, in an 
academic sense, was signing his own death warrant. It is a long 
book, but fluently written. Following a brilliant introductory chapter 
which outlines the aims and methods of social anthropology (or 
ethnology, as it was still often called), the author leads us through 
a tightly focused and extremely detailed examination of a single 
institution among the Trobriand Islanders, namely the kula trade, 
where symbolic valuables circulate over a large area between 
the islands of Melanesia. Malinowski describes the planning of 
expeditions, the routes followed, the rites and practices associated 
with them, and traces the connections between the kula trade and 
other Trobriand institutions, such as political leadership, domestic 
economics, kinship and rank. A younger contemporary and 
countryman of the novelist Joseph Conrad, Malinowski brought 
home news from ‘the heart of darkness’, in the form of nuanced 
and naturalistic images of the Trobriand Islanders, who in the end 
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emerge as neither spectacular, exotic nor ‘radically different’ from 
Westerners, but simply as distinctive. Never have Herder’s ideals 
been more convincingly realised.
Malinowski’s theoretical views were less enthusiastically received 
than his methods and ethnography. He referred to his theoretical 
stance as functionalism, though in fact he was rather eclectic. 
Social practices and institutions were functional in the sense that 
they fit together in a functioning whole, which they contributed to 
maintaining. But unlike the structural-functionalists who followed 
Durkheim, Malinowski saw individuals, not society, as the system’s 
ultimate goal. Institutions existed for people, and it was their needs, 
ultimately their biological and psychological needs, that were the 
prime mover of social stability and change. This was another 
expression of methodological individualism, and in a collectivist 
academic climate dominated by Durkheimians, it was not favourably 
received. For a few decades after his death, Malinowski’s star 
continued to fade, until disillusionment with ‘Grand Theory’ set 
in during the 1970s, leading to his rehabilitation on both sides of 
the Atlantic. Malinowski’s attention to detail and the native’s point 
of view may seem to exclude high-flying theories, and we note the 
similarity to Boas here, a sign of their common Germanic training. 
Malinowski differed from Boas, however, in his reluctance to engage 
in historical reconstruction. With Radcliffe-Brown he waged an anti-
evolutionary – and anti-historical – campaign that was so successful 
that historical perspectives was more or less banned from British 
anthropology for half a century.
Malinowski called himself a functionalist, but his views differed 
greatly from those of the rival programme of structural-functional-
ism. For the Durkheimian structural-functionalists, the individual 
was an epiphenomenon of society and of little intrinsic interest 
– what mattered was to elicit the elements of social structure. 
These two lineages of British social anthropology – biopsycho-
logical functionalism and sociological structural-functionalism, 
whose roots may be traced to the German and British traditions 
– highlight a basic tension in the discipline, between what has later 
been referred to as agency and structure. The individual has agency 
in the sense that he or she is a creator of society. Society imposes 
structure on the individual and limits his or her options. The two 
viewpoints are, as Giddens (1979) points out, complementary. But 
in interwar British anthropology this was not seen. Malinowski and 
Radcliffe-Brown were considered diametrical opposites. 
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RADCliffE-BROWN AND THE ‘NATURAl SCiENCE Of SOCiETy’
Where Malinowski, following Weber and Nietzsche, saw human 
motives and the logic of action, Radcliffe-Brown, following 
Durkheim, saw abstract mechanisms that integrated society. 
The ‘mechanisms’ that Radcliffe-Brown tried to identify were of 
Durkheimian origin, akin, perhaps, to collective representations, and 
thus to Wundt’s ethnopsychology, whose influence, paradoxically, 
seems underlie both his and Malinowski’s projects. But Radcliffe-
Brown had an explicit hope of transforming anthropology into 
a ‘real’ science modelled on the natural sciences, which neither 
Durkheim nor Wundt shared. Here, in the name of science, we 
see Radcliffe-Brown resisting the German influence in Durkheim, 
as he resisted it in Malinowski. In A Natural Science of Society, 
his last book, based on a lecture series held in Chicago in 1937 
and posthumously published in 1957, he indicates the tenor of 
his hope. Society is bound together by a structure of juridical 
rules, social statuses and moral norms, which circumscribe and 
regulate behaviour. Social structure exists, in Radcliffe-Brown’s 
work, independently of the individual actors who reproduce it. 
Actual persons and their relationships are mere instantiations of 
the structure, and the ultimate goal of the anthropologist is to 
discover its governing principles (which, we remember, are kin to 
collective representations), beneath the veneer of empirically existing 
situations. This formal model, with its units clearly defined and 
logically related, clearly demonstrates the master’s ‘scientific’ intent.
Social structures can further be partitioned into discrete institutions 
or subsystems, such as systems for distribution and inheritance of 
land, for conflict resolution, for socialisation, for division of labour 
in the family, and so on – all of which contribute to the maintenance 
of the social structure as a whole. This, according to Radcliffe-
Brown, is their function and the cause of their existence. At this 
point, we have a problem. Radcliffe-Brown seems to claim that 
institutions exist because they maintain the social whole; that is, 
their function is also their cause. Such ‘tautological’ or ‘backward’ 
reasoning is generally frowned on in scientific explanations.
Such problems might have worried the structural-functionalists, 
anxious as they were to be regarded as proper scientists, but they 
did not. Radcliffe-Brown’s linkage between Durkheimian social 
theory and ethnographic material, and his ambitions on behalf of 
the discipline, generated an attractive new research programme, 
to which talented young men and women flocked, which in turn 
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increased the theory’s prestige. But what tipped the scales decisively 
in the new school’s favour was the potential Radcliffe-Brown saw 
for Durkheimian analysis of kinship. Since Morgan, anthropolo-
gists had been aware that kinship was a key to the understanding 
of social organisation in small-scale societies. However, it was still 
unclear just what this key unlocked. Radcliffe-Brown’s Durkheimian 
use of Maine’s old idea of kinship as a juridical system of norms 
and rules made it possible to exploit the analytical potential of 
kinship to the hilt. A kinship system was easily understood as an 
unwritten constitution for social interaction, a set of rules for the 
distribution of rights and duties. Kinship, in other words, was 
once again becoming a key institution, this time as the engine (or 
heart, to use the biological analogies favoured by Durkheim) of 
a self-sustaining, organically integrated yet abstract entity called 
social structure. 
With key in hand, structural-functionalists set out to study 
primitive societies: politics, economics, religion, ecological 
adaptation, and so on. Durkheimian kinship seemed to unlock it all. 
Kinship was a framework for the creation of groups or corporations 
in pre-state societies. The groups might have collective rights, for 
example, to land or animals. They might demand loyalty in case 
of war. They might settle disputes or organise marriages. It was 
these kin groups and their dynamics that the structural-function-
alists studied, not their ‘culture’. Radcliffe-Brown was not fond 
of the word ‘culture’. The central issue was not what the natives 
were thinking, what they believed in, how they made their living 
or how they had become who they were, but how their society was 
integrated, what ‘mechanisms’ bound it together as a whole.
Radcliffe-Brown’s critique of the ‘conjectural history’ of the 
evolutionists was harsh. In his view, contemporary arrangements 
existed because they were functional today, certainly not as ‘survivals’ 
of a bygone era. They made sense in the present or not at all. He was 
also scornful of the sometimes fanciful reconstructions engaged in 
by cultural historians and diffusionists. Where no evidence existed, 
there was no reason to speculate. Here, Malinowski and Radcliffe-
Brown were in perfect agreement.
As a fieldworker, Radcliffe-Brown was less than notable. As he 
himself admitted, his Andaman material was inadequate. He failed 
to learn the local language and spent the bulk of his fieldwork in the 
town of Port Blair rather than in the forest with the Andamanese. 
His later fieldwork in Australia is linked to Daisy Bates, an eccentric 
Englishwoman who had lived for years among aborigines and had 
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extensive knowledge of them. Though it is unlikely that Radcliffe-
Brown actually stole data from her, it is probable that her aid greatly 
facilitated his work (White 1993).
Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown founded two ‘lineages’ in 
British anthropology, which were in some respects in competition, 
in others, complementary. With the consolidation of these schools 
in the 1930s, British social anthropology was well on its way to 
become an established academic discipline. The ‘lineages’ were 
hardly endogamous. British social anthropology was a small tribe 
where everyone knew everyone else. There were two corporate 
groups; one at Oxford, where E.E. Evans-Pritchard was appointed 
research lecturer two years before Radcliffe-Brown returned 
from Chicago in 1937, the other at the LSE, the stronghold of 
Malinowski, Seligman and, in the next generation, Raymond Firth. 
Nearly all social anthropologists educated in the interwar period 
were associated with one of these centres, but the centres were small 
and the distance between them insignificant, and students moved 
freely between them and followed lectures at both. Most of the first 
generation of students had studied initially with Malinowski, and 
were only later enamoured with the theories of Radcliffe-Brown. 
This group included Evans-Pritchard, Fortes and Max Gluckman. 
Students who remained ‘Malinowskian’ in their orientation included 
Firth, Audrey Richards, Edmund Leach and Isaac Schapera. But 
Malinowski’s field methods were eagerly adopted by both groups, 
and everyone had to relate to Radcliffe-Brown’s concepts of 
structure and function and the ‘kinshipology’ they fostered, for at 
least a decade after his death. Still, patronage was rife: only Firth 
among the Malinowskians attained a tenured position at a British 
university before 1950.
In demographic terms, the expansion of social anthropology was 
sluggish; on the eve of the war, there were fewer than 40 devotees 
throughout Britain, and only a handful held tenured academic 
positions. Nevertheless, the institutional expansion, both at 
home and in the colonies, was impressive. Radcliffe-Brown had 
no small part in this. During his long ‘nomadic’ period, he had 
established social anthropology departments in Cape Town and 
Sydney. During his stay in Cape Town (1921–25), he collaborated 
with an old student of Malinowski’s, Isaac Schapera (1905–2003), 
who would later direct the department there for many years. Later, 
this department would be a critical voice throughout the years of 
Apartheid (1947–94), and though its orientation was increasingly 
Marxian in tenor, Radcliffe-Brown’s influence remained palpable 
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throughout. After all, he had argued that cultural difference were 
not an argument for racial segregation, since the groups inhabited 
the same society, While in Sydney, Radcliffe-Brown stimulated the 
scientific study of aboriginal languages, and established Sydney’s 
role as base camp for fieldworkers active throughout the Pacific. In 
Chicago, from 1931 to 1937, he contributed to the ‘Europeanisation’ 
of part of American anthropology (Chapter 4). Finally, Radcliffe-
Brown’s student M.N. Srinivas was instrumental in founding Indian 
social anthropology as a largely structural-functionalist discipline.
BOAS AND HiSTORiCAl PARTiCUlARiSm
In time, British social anthropology would spread to many countries, 
both in Europe and further afield. Social anthropology was a branch 
of Durkheimian sociology, and its research priorities were social 
structure, social relations and social interaction, kinship, politics 
and economy. Problems that found no room within this definition 
(including all historical questions) were regarded as uninteresting. 
Tylor’s old ‘German’ definition of culture faded into the background. 
As we have seen, Radcliffe-Brown regarded culture as a vague and 
unscientific term, and his lead was followed by most social anthro-
pologists until the 1950s.
In the USA, the German influence was retained, and the discipline 
became known as cultural anthropology. Here, Tylor’s broad 
definition of culture still ruled the field. In the German-American 
(and Tylorian) sense, culture is a far wider concept than society. If 
society is made up social norms, institutions and relationships, then 
culture consists of everything that humans have created, including 
society: material phenomena (a field, a plough, a painting), social 
conditions (marriage, households, the state), body techniques (dance, 
manual skills, sense perception), and symbolic meaning (language, 
ritual, belief). Anthropology was the humanist science, the science 
of humanity, and was, quite literally, concerned with everything 
human. Boas recognised that no individual could contribute 
equally to all parts of this vast subject (though he made heroic 
attempts himself), and advocated a ‘four-field approach’, dividing 
anthropology into linguistics, physical anthropology, archaeology 
and cultural anthropology (which included social anthropology). 
Students were trained in all four fields, later to specialise in one 
of them. Specialisation was thus an integral part of American 
anthropology from its inception, while in Britain and France a 
more generalistic approach remained the ideal, though in Britain, 
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at least, the restriction to ‘society’ was effectively a specialisation in 
its own right. As early as in the 1930s, there existed well-established 
research teams in the United States, specialising, for example, in 
Native North American languages. 
Boas’ own writings covered all four ‘fields’ broadly, with a slant 
towards the fourth field, cultural anthropology. He carried out 
long-term individual field research among the Inuit in 1883–84, 
but also worked with assistants who collected material on the 
north-west coast Kwakiutl and other Native American peoples. 
During fieldwork, he would make use of linguistically proficient 
members of the tribe under study, who would record, discuss and 
interpret the statements of informants. Some of these collaborators, 
notably the prodigious George Hunt (1854–1933), who co-wrote 
several of Boas’ books on the Kwakiutl and supplied him with 
thousands of pages of ethnographic documentation, were later 
recognised as anthropological scholars in their own right.
Fieldwork, as Boas saw it, was often collaborative, and did not 
necessarily presuppose a lone researcher subjected to the long-term 
stresses of continuous ‘immersion’ in the field. Individual field 
stays were often short, and even during longer trips, he travelled 
extensively between local groups (some 5,000 kilometres during 
his year among the Inuit). Projects was frequently ‘long term’ in 
another sense, however, since stays were repeated many times over 
the years, often by a number of people who collaborated on the 
project (Foster et al. 1979; Silverman 2005). This methodological 
strategy had precursors in the German tradition, and was besides 
a natural approach, given that ‘the field’ was close at hand in the 
USA, not continents away, as in Britain.
Unlike his British contemporaries, Boas was not hostile to 
historical reconstruction. Native American cultural history was 
an integral part of his research agenda, and he included physical 
anthropology and archaeology as parts of the holistic anthropo-
logical enterprise. His basic orientation remained that of a cultural 
historian, and the school he is associated with is often loosely 
referred to as historical particularism. Like Bastian, he held that 
each culture had its own values and unique history, which anthro-
pologists could attempt to reconstruct. He saw intrinsic value in 
the plurality of cultural practices and was deeply sceptical of any 
attempt, political or academic, to undermine this diversity. Writing 
about Kwakiutl dance, for example, he says it illustrates the culture’s 
approach to rhythm, and cannot be reduced to a mere ‘function’ of 
society (as the ‘British school’ preferred). One must ask what the 
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rhythm is for the people who dance to it, and the answer can only 
be found by exploring the emotional states that generate and are 
generated by the rhythm (Boas 1927). 
As a tireless critic of racism and the science inspired by it, Boas 
was a highly visible presence in American public debate. Against 
scholars who claimed that ‘races’ had different innate potentials for 
cultural development, Boas argued that culture was sui generis – its 
own source – and that inborn differences could not account for 
the impressive range of cultural variation that anthropologists had 
already documented. The term cultural relativism, which we have 
referred to above, was coined by Boas. In our own day, it is often 
asked whether relativism should be understood as a methodological 
or a moral imperative, and the answer is most often that it is 
method: without relativising your own culture, you can have no 
hope to understand another. To Boas, this would no doubt have 
seemed hair-splitting. For him, method and morality were two sides 
of the same coin.
Boas dominated American anthropology throughout four 
decades, but left no grand theory or monumental work that is 
read by succeeding generations of anthropologists. This reflects 
his distrust of lofty generalisations. During his years with Bastian, 
he was warned against the perils of empty theorising, and he took 
these warnings to heart. In his writings, he tries to identify the 
unique circumstances that generate particular cultures or cultural 
patterns, hardly ever jumping to general conclusions. He was 
cautious in his use of comparison, which all too easily established 
spurious similarities between circumstances that were fundamentally 
different. There is thus a sense in which Boas was a methodological 
individualist, in that he sought the particular instance rather than the 
general scheme. His lifelong scepticism of Durkheim confirms this.
Boas’ students include almost all the important American 
anthropologists of the next generation (with some exceptions, to 
which we shall return). Among them (see below and Chapter 4) 
were Alfred L. Kroeber, who with Robert H. Lowie, his long-time 
colleague and fellow cultural historian, founded the Department 
of Anthropology at Berkeley; Edward Sapir, who founded the 
Department of Anthropology at Yale and the school of ‘ethno-
linguistics’; Melville Herskovits, who established Afro-American 
studies in the United States; Ruth Benedict, Boas’ close friend and 
collaborator who founded the ‘culture and personality’ school; and 
Margaret Mead, the runt of the litter, who continued Benedict’s 
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work, and became perhaps the most influential public figure in the 
history of anthropology.
As this list indicates, the cultural anthropology championed by 
Boas evolved in several directions during his lifetime. Further diver-
sification followed in the 1950s, when Morgan was rediscovered 
and Radcliffe-Brown’s associates at Chicago developed a brand of 
British-style social anthropology. Nevertheless, the legacy of Boas 
remains at the heart of American anthropology.
mAUSS AND THE TOTAl SOCiAl PRESTATiON
One reason why Argonauts of the Western Pacific became such a 
classic was that the conditions it described were perfectly aligned 
with Mauss’ insights in The Gift. The kula trade among the 
Trobriand Islanders was a gigantic example of Mauss’ basic idea, 
that exchange creates mutually binding relationships. The juridical 
laws and moral norms that Radcliffe-Brown took for granted 
could thus be understood as products of an underlying process 
– an exchange of things and meaning that goes on continuously 
in human affairs. The elegance and simplicity of this thesis, and 
its fundamental consequences for our thinking about society, is 
a measure of how far French sociology had by now advanced. In 
contrast, British sociology was underdeveloped; this was perhaps 
one reason why social anthropology was such an instant success.
In France, Durkheim had built up a theoretically innovative, 
empirically based sociological discourse, that was open to 
researchers outside Durkheim’s circle as well. The most famous 
of these outsiders was the learned academic Arnold van Gennep 
(1873–1957), renowned for his book Les Rites de passage (1909; 
The Rites of Passage, 1960), a comparative study of initiation rituals 
(in which persons move from one social status to another). The 
most widespread rites of passage are associated with birth, puberty, 
marriage and death. Anticipating Durkheim’s sociology of religion, 
van Gennep argued that such rituals are dramatised expressions of 
the social order, which strengthen the integration of both initiates 
and spectators into that order. He claimed that initiation rituals 
were universally divided into three stages: separation, liminality and 
reintegration, a perspective to which we will return in discussing 
Victor Turner’s work (Chapter 6).
Another contemporary of Durkheim and Mauss was the 
philosopher Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1857–1939), who opened a field 
of enquiry that has stimulated later anthropologists, from Evans-
Eriksen HOA3 01 text   61 16/04/2013   16:04
62 A HiSTORy Of ANTHROPOlOGy
Pritchard and Lévi-Strauss to Jack Goody and Clifford Geertz. 
Lévy-Bruhl’s thesis was that pre-literate and modern people think 
in qualitatively different ways. Pre-literal thought is not logical, 
but associative and poetical. Although Lévy-Bruhl’s theory, first 
formulated in Mentalité primitive (1922; Primitive Mentality, 
1978), was heavily criticised by his contemporaries, from Lowie 
in the USA to Schmidt in Germany, it framed an analytical field that 
has proven fertile later: the comparative study of thought styles, 
and the problems of intercultural translation associated with them. 
Like Frazer, whose work belongs to the same category, Lévy-Bruhl 
was most influential outside anthropology. He was embraced with 
enthusiasm by the surrealist movement, which equated ‘primitive 
mentality’ with freedom and creativity, and whose idealisations of 
‘primitive peoples’ were not inhibited by empirical facts.
But mainstream French sociology and anthropology sprang from 
Durkheim, to whom lines are easily drawn even today, since there 
are fewer breaks in the French tradition than in Britain or America.
Like Radcliffe-Brown, Mauss based his work on Durkheim’s 
theory of social integration. Unlike Durkheim, Mauss was 
particularly interested in non-European societies. His project was 
to create a comparative sociology, based on concrete descriptions 
of individual societies and institutions around the world – not 
unlike the general project of Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown or Boas. 
But in contrast to Boas, Mauss sought to classify societies and 
establish structural similarities between them, in order to achieve 
a general understanding of social life. And in contrast to his British 
contemporaries, Mauss had no prejudice against historical material. 
The ‘general laws’ that Radcliffe-Brown looked for find no parallel 
in Mauss, who (with Boas) was careful not to generalise on an 
insufficient empirical basis. Though he never carried out fieldwork, 
his graduate courses at the Institute of Ethnology focused heavily on 
methods. Mauss insisted that students had to become ethnographers 
before they engaged in theory.
Mauss commenced his career with studies of religion and 
language, his specialisations were Indian religion and Sanskrit. In 
the decades before the First World War, he participated actively 
in the socio-anthropological milieu that had collected around 
Durkheim, which included several notable young scholars. Robert 
Hertz (1881–1915), who was only 34 when he died in the war, 
wrote seminal articles on death and on the significance of the right 
hand. Henri Hubert (1872–1927) published on sacrifice and magic, 
while Maurice Halbwachs (1877–1945), produced groundbreaking 
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work on social memory. With members of this group, Mauss 
became involved in one of the most ambitious research projects 
on record. Under Durkheim’s leadership, the young scholars set 
out to explore social life in as broad terms as possible, from the 
socialisation of time and space, to embodied cultural categories, 
to the economy. This openness and breadth of scope remained an 
ideal for Mauss. But many participants in the project died during 
the war, and before it was over, Durkheim himself was dead, only 
59 years old. Mauss spent years picking up the pieces, editing and 
publishing his dead colleagues’ work, and continuing some of their 
projects. Like Boas, he left no great monograph or broad theoretical 
synthesis – even The Gift initially appeared as a long article in 
Durkheim’s journal, L’Année Sociologique. But he wrote rich, dense 
essays that opened up entire research fields and are still read avidly 
today. Some of the most famous discuss the concept of the person, 
sacrifice, classification, death, totemism (with Durkheim), the body 
as a cultural category and nationalism. His most influential work, 
however, remains The Gift. 
The basic idea in The Gift is simple: every gift wants something 
in return, every prestation demands a counter-prestation; gift 
exchange thus generates social relations; it is socially integrating. 
Gift exchange has a moral aspect, it binds people together in mutual 
commitment and is instrumental in the formation of norms, it 
appears to be voluntary, but is regulated by firm, if implicit, rules. It 
has a strategic and pragmatic aspect. It is manipulated by individuals 
seeking their own interests: generosity builds reputation, which is 
a resource in politics. Finally, the gift is an animator and meaning-
creator. Things that are given and received become signs of other 
things and conditions than themselves. The ornaments that circulate 
in the kula trade, in themselves useless and meaningless, are said to 
have mana or hau (force, power). They have life, even a personality, 
because they have a history: the history of the exchanges they have 
been through.
Not everything can be exchanged, nor has equal mana. Modern 
money can systematically undermine the mana of some objects, 
while building up that of others through marketing. Compared 
to this, gift exchange clearly plays a subordinate role today. So 
while gift exchange occurs in all societies, its meaning and form 
varies. Mauss was particularly interested in a form of exchange he 
calls préstations totales (‘total prestations’). Such gifts have such 
long and complex histories that they become compressed symbolic 
expressions of the social order as such. Christmas presents, perhaps 
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the closest approximation to préstations totales in our society, evoke 
family, society, community, capitalism, Christendom and paganism, 
among other things. But they are not total prestations in Mauss’ 
sense, since their mana is restricted to a sentimentalised familial 
context. It is not comme il faut to use them as political weapons 
in elections.
The Gift asks how societies are bound together and how they 
are split apart. It discusses the circulation of things and meaning. 
Thus, it builds a bridge across two of the great theoretical divides 
in anthropology during the last 60 years: between structuralist 
and individualist analysis, and between materialistic and idealistic 
explanations. In an unsettling way, Mauss seems to unite the ‘Grand 
Theory’ of the 1970s with the deconstructionism of the 1990s, 
without a hitch.
Although he was not a prolific writer (he found writing hard), 
Mauss has had great influence both in France and abroad. One of his 
most famous students is Louis Dumont (Chapter 6), and in Britain 
he found a warm admirer in Evans-Pritchard, who in the long run 
found Radcliffe-Brown’s restrictive Durkheimianism limiting. In 
Mauss he discovered a Durkheim who was less concerned with 
positivism and laws and more with the Année group’s interpretive 
holism. Evans-Pritchard, too, found his way back to the German 
inspiration.
ANTHROPOlOGy iN 1930: PARAllElS AND DiVERGENCES
By 1930, communities of modern anthropologists were established in 
Britain, France and the USA, with contacts among more traditional, 
German-oriented anthropologists, not only in Germany itself, but 
in Scandinavia, Eastern Europe, Brazil, and elsewhere. Colonies 
of modern anthropologists were established in South Africa, India 
and Australia. The groups were still small. All in all there were no 
more than a couple of hundred professional anthropologists in the 
world, and to speak of ‘schools’ in this context may seem slightly out 
of place. Only eight years had passed since Malinowski published 
Argonauts. Radcliffe-Brown was still in Sydney, and would spend 
most of the 1930s in Chicago. Malinowski had few students, none 
of which had produced anything of importance so far. Diffusionism 
and ‘armchair anthropology’ flourished. Frazer had eleven years left 
as professor at Cambridge. In 1930, it could by no means be taken 
for granted that modern anthropology would survive in Britain, and 
the situation in France and the United States was not very different.
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The founders of modern anthropology belonged to a small group, 
and had much in common in spite of their many differences. Most 
importantly, perhaps, they all sought to ground anthropology in a 
‘detailed study of customs, in relation to the total culture of the tribe 
that practised them’ (Boas 1896, in Boas 1940: 272). The central 
point of this quotation is the idea that cultural traits could no longer 
be studied in isolation. A ritual is not a detached ‘survival’ of an 
hypothetical past. It must be seen in relation to the total society it is 
part of here and now. It must be studied in context. Anthropology 
is a holistic science – its aim is to describe societies or cultures as 
integrated wholes. So far, the four founders agreed, indeed, similar 
ideas were basic to Marxist, Durkheimian and Weberian sociology 
as well, and had gained wide support in academia by the turn of 
the century. We might even claim that the concept that ‘society 
is a system’ is the most fundamental of all sociological insights, 
and it should come as no surprise, therefore, that when it entered 
anthropology, it produced a theoretical revolution in which all four 
founders participated in one capacity or another.
Despite the diminutive size of the discipline, the differences 
between the national traditions were marked; in methods, theory 
and institutional organisation. Later, when the founders were dead, 
certain images of them, and of their mutual relations, took shape 
in the discipline. These images or myths are still widely dispersed 
and tend to allow certain of the more obvious qualities of each of 
the four men to overshadow all others. The reader should therefore 
bear in mind that academic relations among anthropologists are 
no less complex than human relations in general (Leach 1984). 
Thus, Boas and Mauss both agreed that there was no deep conflict 
between cultural history and synchronic studies, and both therefore 
retained an interest in diffusionism, while Radcliffe-Brown and 
Malinowski regarded such interests as ‘unscientific’. This division 
clearly mirrors the fact that the two British anthropologists were 
engaged in a ‘revolution’, while there was a far greater sense of 
continuity in France and the United States. But other divisions were 
equally important. Radcliffe-Brown and Mauss agreed that their 
studies were part of a large, comparative sociological project, while 
Boas, the least sociologically inclined of the four, was suspicious 
of the ‘French science’ that Radcliffe-Brown preached in Chicago, 
and distrusted the comparative method deeply. Malinowski, for 
his part, seems to have avoided comparison altogether. In this 
case, the German heritage of Malinowski and Boas clearly unites 
them against the ‘French school’. But this unity is also incomplete. 
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While Radcliffe-Brown and Mauss were committed methodological 
collectivists who delved into the secrets of ‘society as a whole’, Boas 
and Malinowski were (German) particularists. But Malinowski’s 
particularism focused on the bodily needs of the individual, while 
Boas believed in the primacy of culture.
The purely personal qualities of the four men also influenced 
the new science of society. Boas effortlessly assumed the role of 
the benevolent father figure of American anthropology. Indeed, 
his popularity was so great during his long career that his obvious 
blind-spot, his distrust of generalisation, became the blind-spot of 
a generation. With few exceptions (including, famously, Benedict 
1934), wide-ranging generalisations were absent from twentieth-
century American anthropology until after the death of ‘Papa 
Franz’ and the end of the Second World War. In Britain, there was 
no such consensus. Well into their careers, Radcliffe-Brown and 
Malinowski were co-activists in the ‘functionalist revolution’ but, 
as their common enemy receded, their mutual antagonisms came 
to the fore, and their students (and students’ students) eagerly 
reproduced their conflict (Chapter 4); Radcliffe-Brownians would 
speak derisively of the ‘Malinowskian’ monograph – packed with 
boring details, but with no workable ideas; while the Malinowskians 
would chide their Oxford colleagues for producing models that were 
so coherent as to be incompatible with the facts.
Finally, there were systematic differences between the three 
national traditions that were neither academic nor personal. Due 
in part to the prestige of Boas, in part to the fact that research money 
was more accessible in the United States, American anthropology 
quickly became a larger and more established discipline than in 
Europe. When the American Anthropological Association (AAA) 
was formed in 1906, it already had 175 members. As late as 1939, 
however, there were only some 20 professional anthropologists in 
the entire British Empire, and when the British Association of Social 
Anthropologists (ASA) was established in 1946, it had only 21 full 
members (Kuper 1996: 67; Stocking 1996: 427).
In France, the situation was different. The French academic 
system was more centralised than in the two other countries, and 
Paris attracted a large, talented and dynamic intellectual elite, which 
enjoyed considerable prestige. Membership in this elite was more 
important than disciplinary boundaries, and anthropologists were 
therefore involved in close cooperation and debate with sociologists, 
philosophers, historians, psychologists and linguists. Although 
anthropology was being institutionalised here as elsewhere, there 
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was not the same strong feeling of a new and revolutionary discipline 
taking form, defining itself as distinct from its predecessors, from 
other disciplines, and from other anthropological schools. Thus, 
French anthropology was in a sense both the most open-minded 
and the most elitist of the national traditions.
By the early 1930s, the three first schools of modern anthropology 
were firmly established. In the space of a short decade, the Victorian 
anthropology of Tylor and Frazer, the materialism of Morgan and 
the diffusionism of Graebner had collected a thick layer of dust. 
Much earlier theory still lay dormant, to be rediscovered by later 
generations, most notably the work of Marx and Weber; but as 
a whole, the enterprise of anthropology was perceived as fresh, 
new and exciting, as a key to a true understanding of the human 
condition. The groups in each country were small and highly 
motivated, in some cases (we have Mauss’ and Radcliffe-Brown’s 
followers in mind) almost reminiscent of religious cults.
In Europe outside France and Britain, the transformation 
of anthropological research made less progress. In Germany, 
diffusionists held sway until well after the Second World War, and 
it was only in the 1950s that social anthropology was established 
in Scandinavia and the Netherlands (see Hannerz and Gerholm 
1982; Vermeulen and Roldán 1995, for partial histories of European 
anthropologies), although individual Dutch scholars had set their 
mark on the discipline since the nineteenth century. Cultural history 
in a vaguely diffusionist or evolutionist vein remained the norm, in 
Europe as elsewhere; at times sprinkled with ethnocentric prejudice 
and nationalist aspirations, at times advocating the dignity and 
rights of indigenous peoples and minorities. 
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Expansion and institutionalisation
Jazz and Stalinism, Kristallnacht and Al Capone, blood on the 
horizon and bread-lines in the street, the consolidation of colonial 
empires and the birth of mass media, the crash of stock markets and 
rise of the welfare state. The 1930s quiver like an arrow waiting 
for release. Then war rolls across Europe and the world, a war 
even more terrible than its predecessor. Science gave us Hiroshima. 
Nationalism gave us Auschwitz. Now, if not before, the idea of 
the infinitely perfectible, rational individual was dead and buried. 
Or was it?
The war obliterated the last vestiges of the world in which the 
Victorians had lived and believed. The rational individual of the 
Enlightenment and the emotional community of the Romantics 
now seemed equally naive. Soon, the great colonial empires would 
also crumble, and with them their raison d’être, the White Man’s 
Burden and la mission civilisatrice, the assumed obligation to spread 
European civilisation to every corner of the world.
Curiously, perhaps, it was in these years that anthropology 
blossomed into a mature discipline. The 1930s were a productive 
decade, when the founders’ first students started making their mark 
on the field, and the founders themselves were still active. Neither did 
the Second World War seriously disturb this upswing. In the USA, 
university life went on nearly as before, and in Britain, too, scholars 
continued to work. Evans-Pritchard volunteered for military service 
in 1940–45 in Sudan and North Africa, but managed to collect data 
while in uniform, and even to publish a little-known monograph 
(1949) based on this work. Even in occupied France the situation 
was not intolerable, and the territories most affected by the war, 
the ‘Bloodlands’ occupied first by Stalin, then by Hitler, then again 
by Stalin (Snyder 2011) were marginal to the new anthropology 
anyway. Nevertheless, some questions were postponed ‘for the 
duration’ and funding for research and new positions was scant. 
After 1945, a new wave of radical reform would sweep through 
anthropology. The war coincided with the retirement of Mauss and 
Radcliffe-Brown (in 1939 and 1946), and the death of Malinowski 
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and Boas (both in 1942). With the old world gone and the founders 
out of the way, the time was ripe to state one’s mind loud and clear. 
This story will be told in the next chapter, but first, we return to 
the 1930s. 
A mARGiNAl DiSCiPliNE?
Anthropology was now faced with immediate challenges generated 
by its own success. ‘The revolution’, as Radcliffe-Brown and 
Malinowski called it, had been going on for more than a decade. 
The methodological, theoretical and institutional foundations of 
the refurbished discipline had been laid. Research programmes 
were defined, applications sent and funding obtained; professional 
friendships, enmities and alliances were built. The task now was 
to demonstrate the long-term viability of the discipline. Students 
had to be educated, journals edited, competent publishers found 
for monographs, conferences organised, the media addressed, 
politicians and planners convinced, and – not the least task – 
employment must be found for the growing number of graduates 
and researchers. In order to achieve this, the energy of the revolution 
had to be disciplined and channelled into predictable institutional 
routines. In Adam Kuper’s history of British social anthropology 
(1996), the chapter dealing with this period is called ‘From charisma 
to routine’, quite as Weber might have put it: after a charismatic 
awakening, routinisation is bound to occur, however reluctantly. 
In anthropology, the period of consolidation lasted from the 1930s 
until the end of the 1940s. In Britain, the lead was taken by Rad-
cliffe-Brown and his students; in the USA, Benedict, Mead, Kroeber 
and others ensured the continuation of Boas’ sprawling programme, 
while in French anthropology glamorous figures such as Marcel 
Griaule and Michel Leiris lent the discipline an avant-gardistic and 
experimental touch.
As noted above, the new anthropology had a marginal identity 
from the outset. The founding fathers were themselves ‘outsiders’, 
and many of their successors ever since have been, like Radcliffe-
Brown, nomadic, ‘global scholars’ who restlessly shuttled between 
universities and between home and field. Surprisingly many 
were also personally marginal. Some were of foreign origin, like 
Malinowski and Boas – or Kroeber, Sapir and Lowie, who were also 
from German-speaking countries. Some came from the colonies, 
like Fortes, Gluckman and Schapera from South Africa, Firth 
from New Zealand and Srinivas from India. Many, like Mauss, 
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Sapir or Alexander Goldenweiser, were Jewish. Several were 
women at a time when the academy was still a distinctly male 
domain – Mead and Benedict are well known, but Malinowski’s 
students Audrey Richards (a pioneering Africanist) and Hortense 
Powdermaker (author of a classic on field methods), belonged to 
the same generation.
Unlike nineteenth-century evolutionism, twentieth-century 
anthropology was also marginal in the sense that it placed ‘dirty 
heathens’ on an equal footing with middle-class Westerners. 
Malinowski’s holistic field method, Boas’ cultural relativism and 
Radcliffe-Brown’s search for universal laws of society suggested 
that all societies, or cultures, could be studied by the same methods 
and were essentially equivalent. Studying ‘from below’ had already 
become the hallmark of anthropological fieldwork. As opposed to 
the other social sciences, which often worked with large groups and 
aggregate populations, anthropologists studied the point of view 
of people on the ground, and were almost by instinct sceptical of 
decisions taken ‘from above’, by politicians and bureaucrats, who 
had no idea what life ‘on the ground’ was actually like. Nine out of 
ten anthropologists were, it seems, politically radical in one sense 
or another. The impeccable gentleman Radcliffe-Brown was known 
as ‘Anarchy Brown’ in his student days, due to his fascination with 
the Russian anarchist Kropotkin. Malinowski enjoyed comparing 
Trobriand Islanders favourably with Englishmen. Boas was an 
outspoken anti-racist, and even Mauss was an active socialist, 
though of a non-Marxist kind.
In fact, Boas’ pacifism and his sustained (and successful) attack 
on academic racism made him unpopular among politicians and 
the senior administration at Columbia University (Silverman 
2005: 264). At one point, his outspokenness seems to have led 
to a temporary freezing of funds for new positions at Columbia 
(Silverman 1981: 161). Boas had a towering position in American 
academic life. His student Margaret Mead’s books, comparing 
middle-class Americans to Pacific Islanders, became bestsellers, 
and influenced American feminism and cultural radicalism deeply. 
And when Malinowski received standing ovations from packed 
auditoriums for his lectures about life in the Trobriand Islands 
during his 1926 tour through the USA, the message was clear: the 
potential of anthropology for cultural criticism and advocacy on 
behalf of native peoples was considerable.
It has been argued that particularly British anthropologists 
tacitly accepted the oppression of native peoples in Africa, Asia 
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and Oceania, and even that they cooperated actively with colonial 
administrations in return for research funds (see Asad 1973). In a 
scrupulously researched attempt to dig out the truth of this matter 
once and for all, Jack Goody (1995) concludes that the accusations 
are unfounded, and George Stocking (1995, ch. 8), the most 
authoritative historian of British anthropology, supports his view, 
as does Kuper (1996, ch. 4). They point out that several leading 
social anthropologists were explicitly critical of colonialism. Goody 
further shows that the Colonial Office and the various colonial 
administrations neither funded nor in other way encouraged 
anthropological research in particular areas or among particular 
groups. Funding for fieldwork was often obtained from American 
foundations. It is true that a handful of colonial administrators 
received some training from Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown and 
the Cambridge anthropologists, and a few scattered examples 
exist of research commissioned by the Colonial Office. On the 
whole, however, colonial administrators were indifferent towards 
anthropology, and vice versa.
It might still be maintained that British anthropologists tended to 
pursue research interests that directly or indirectly legitimised the 
colonial project. The interest in political organisation in Africa, for 
example, seems a perfect match for the administrators of indirect 
rule (though there is little evidence of this research ever being 
taken seriously or put to use). The near-total absence of an interest 
in politics and economics among Boas’ students may similarly 
reflect the fact that the Native North American tribes had seen 
their sociopolitical organisation destroyed; symbolic culture and 
memories were all that was left to study. It has always been the 
case, and remains a fact that research agendas are constructed in 
particular historical contexts, and that they themselves bear the 
imprint of these contexts, consciously or not.
The marginal position of anthropology is perhaps easy to 
understand. The discipline recruited a particular kind of person, 
who could thrive on (or at least tolerate) long-term fieldwork 
under uncomfortable or unglamorous conditions. Ever since 
Malinowski’s stay among the Trobriand Islanders, this was the 
name of the game. Anthropology’s subject matter was itself rather 
off the beaten track: kinship systems in Africa, exchange networks 
in Melanesia and North American ritual dances did not seem to 
belong to mainstream science.
With all the marginalising and individualistic tendencies, it 
is quite impressive that anthropology, during the years we are 
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now surveying, achieved respectable academic status. In the end, 
charisma was successfully converted into routine and institutional 
power. In the following we shall turn to how this process unfolded.
OXfORD AND THE lSE, COlUmBiA AND CHiCAGO
In 1930, there was effectively only one academic centre of the 
new anthropology in Britain, at the LSE, where Malinowski 
presided under Seligman’s benevolent gaze from 1924 to 1938. 
At the LSE, Malinowski taught nearly the entire next generation 
of British anthropologists: Firth, Evans-Pritchard, Powdermaker, 
Richards, Schapera, Fortes, Leach and Nadel are some of the most 
famous names. The dependency on a single person made the milieu 
vulnerable, but after Malinowski’s departure for the USA, continuity 
was secured through Firth, a Malinowskian functionalist, who had 
been at the LSE since arriving there from New Zealand as a student 
in 1923. At Oxford, the old guard reigned until the mid-1930s, 
when Evans-Pritchard and later Radcliffe-Brown himself arrived to 
build up a more theoretically oriented environment. At Cambridge, 
once a powerhouse of anthropological scholarship, anthropology 
was almost extinct by 1930: after Haddon’s retirement in 1926, only 
Frazer, an old and shy man, remained until the Second World War, 
and the new social anthropology was not properly introduced until 
the appointments of Fortes, Jack Goody and Leach in the 1950s.
In 1930, however, this was all in the future. Evans-Pritchard 
was on fieldwork in the Sudan, and would later take up a post 
in Sociology at the University of Cairo. Radcliffe-Brown was still 
in Sydney and would soon move on to Chicago, where he would 
spend six years. The most important institutional development 
in British anthropology in the 1930s was the founding of the 
Rhodes-Livingstone Institute in Livingstone, Northern Rhodesia 
(now Zambia) by a group of young scholars under the leadership 
of Godfrey Wilson. Among the first research fellows was a South 
African, Max Gluckman, who would in the coming decades direct 
a series of pioneering studies of social change in Southern Africa 
(Chapter 5).
Radcliffe-Brown’s stay in Chicago in the 1930s was a fruitful 
one in that it stimulated the formation of a group of non-Boasian 
anthropologists at an excellent American university. The department 
he worked in was a combined department of sociology and 
anthropology founded in 1892, where the influence of European 
sociology (Weber, Simmel) was prominent from the start, and 
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pioneering studies of urban life, migration, ethnic relations and 
peasants had been carried out, using ethnographic methods, since 
before 1920. Radcliffe-Brown’s sociologically inclined anthropology 
was met with great interest in this group, and he was a major source 
of inspiration for, among others, Robert Redfield, Sol Tax, Fred 
Eggan and Ralph Linton (Chapters 5 and 6).
The undisputed centre of American anthropology was nevertheless 
still in New York City, at Columbia University, where Boas 
presided. In 1930, he had just finished training his second batch 
of students. Of the first group, who had taken their doctorates 
in 1901–11, the German Kroeber and the Austrian Lowie had 
left for California to establish the Department of Anthropology 
at Berkeley. Another, the Ukrainian Alexander Goldenweiser, had 
found employment at the New School of Social Research in New 
York. A fourth, the German-born Edward Sapir, had founded eth-
nolinguistics and become professor at Chicago – and a fifth, the 
Pole Paul Radin (1883–1959), moved from university to university, 
writing innovative ethnographies where the informants were given 
space to express their views, and becoming a post mortem icon of 
postmodernist anthropology in the 1980s..
In contrast to this motley crew of European immigrants, 
Boas’ second batch of students were by and large born-and-bred 
Americans. The most influential of them were Ruth Benedict, 
Melville Herskovits and Margaret Mead.
But the discipline was larger and more diverse in the USA than 
in Britain. The dominance of Columbia was far from complete, 
and, many influential anthropologists with no connection to Boas 
appeared in the country during the 1930s and 1940s. Robert 
Redfield (1897–1958) was one of them. His speciality was peasant 
studies, which he and his students pursued in Latin America, India 
and Eastern Europe. Another was Leslie A. White (1900–1975), 
whose teachers included Sapir and Goldenweiser. White established 
himself at the University of Michigan in 1930, where he developed 
a materialist neo-evolutionist theory in direct opposition to Boas. 
Around the same time, the sociologist Talcott Parsons (1902–1979) 
was employed at Harvard, where he would work for more than four 
decades on a grand synthesis drawing on both Weber and Durkheim, 
which would eventually involve some prominent anthropologists 
as well. Ralph Linton (1893–1953), a Polynesianist educated at 
Harvard in the 1920s, took exception to Boas for his pacifism 
and Benedict for her focus on emotions, and developed a social 
theory somewhat similar to that of Radcliffe-Brown. In 1937, 
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George P. Murdock (1897–1985) began his magnum opus at Yale 
University: the Human Relations Area Files (HRAF), an enormous 
database of cultural traits worldwide, which has been used and 
criticised by researchers for half a century. 
As political conditions in Europe deteriorated and the Second 
World War approached, established European scholars appeared in 
the USA, and not just Jews from the Nazi-dominated areas, though 
they may have been the most numerous group. One was Malinowski 
himself, who spent a few years at Yale before his death in 1942, the 
same year as Boas. Another was the British anthropologist Gregory 
Bateson (1904–1980), who forged early links between structural-
functionalism and the psychologically oriented anthropology of 
Benedict and Mead. Yet another was the Hungarian economic 
historian Karl Polanyi (1886–1964), who moved to New York 
in 1940 and was employed as an historian at Columbia, where 
he would inspire Julian Steward, a student of Kroeber and Lowie 
from Berkeley, to develop a materialist, historically oriented brand 
of neo-evolutionism at Boas’ old department. Finally, the young 
Claude Lévi-Strauss fled from Vichy France and spent the war years 
in New York, where he developed his immensely influential theory 
of kinship (Chapter 6).
We will later discuss some of these events in greater detail. First, 
however, we must take a look at developments in France, where 
Mauss and his colleagues were realising their grand programme 
in practice.
THE DAKAR-DjiBOUTi EXPEDiTiON
Institutionalisation came late to French anthropology. It was only in 
1926 that systematic training in the discipline started, when Mauss, 
Lévy-Bruhl and the South Americanist Raul Rivet (1876–1958), 
founded the Institute of Ethnology at the University of Paris. Among 
the first students, Marcel Griaule (1898–1956) deserves note. After 
participating in an expedition to Ethiopia in 1928, Griaule initiated 
and led the ambitious Dakar-Djibouti expedition (1931–33), 
financed by the French government, in which an interdisciplinary 
group of researchers traversed French colonial Africa from Senegal 
to Ethiopia. The expedition collected materials for the new Musée 
de l’Homme, which was opened under Rivet’s leadership for the 
World Exhibition in Paris in 1937. The expedition brought home 
vast materials, and in this sense was a success.
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But Griaule was dissatisfied with the methods used. He was 
the first French anthropologist to advocate long and intensive 
field studies of individual societies. During the Dakar-Djibouti 
expedition, Griaule had met the Dogon people in Mali, and this 
is where he decided to realise his fieldwork ideas in practice. The 
research group he started maintained a constant presence among 
the Dogon for 25 years, thanks to which they are among the most 
thoroughly studied peoples in the world. In 1938, Griaule published 
Masques Dogons (‘Dogon Masks’), a complex book that is in part 
an empirical documentation of myths, masks and funerary rites, in 
part an analysis of the relationship between these and other aspects 
of Dogon society, culminating in a discussion of their notion of the 
person, one of Mauss’ favourite themes.
In 1946, Griaule met an old hunter who initiated him into 
Dogon cosmology, a theme that would occupy Griaule for the 
rest of his short life. Before his death he had time to publish his 
conversations with the old hunter, in Dieu d’eau: entretiens avec 
Ogotemmêli (1948; Conversations with Ogotemmêli, 1975), a 
lively mix of interviews and ethnographic material that became a 
bestseller. But the full cosmology was only completed and prepared 
for publication posthumously, by his close collaborator, Germaine 
Dieterlen (1903–1999).
Griaule was the first French anthropologist to do full-fledged 
fieldwork, and from his position as the first professor of ethnology 
at Sorbonne he contributed greatly to raise the quality of methods in 
French research. He argued for long-term fieldwork. But this did not 
imply, as it did for Malinowski, that the ethnographer must work 
alone in the field. Griaule maintained the old expeditionary ideal of 
interdisciplinary teamwork. How otherwise could the Dogon have 
been studied so comprehensively? He was also an early advocate for 
audiovisual techniques that could register data in finer-grained detail 
than would otherwise be possible. The photographic and filmic 
documentation of the Dogon continued after Griaule’s death and 
offers a unique picture into the changes their society went through 
over nearly 30 years.
Griaule’s influence in French anthropology was fundamental. An 
entire generation was brought up with his methodological ideals, his 
focus on aesthetics, his interest for visual anthropology and Africa. 
This was where the French cinéma vérité school of ethnographic 
film originated. This school, led by Griaule’s student Jean Rouch 
(1917–2004), produced films that showed the dialogue between film 
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team and informants and thus made the conditions of knowledge 
production explicit. Again, this is postmodernism avant la lettre.
Griaule’s most original student was Michel Leiris (1901–1990) 
who, after studying ethnology, was drawn into the surrealist 
movement in the 1920s, later becoming part of the anti-surrealist 
circle around the philosopher Georges Bataille, and joining the 
Dakar-Djibouti expedition as Griaule’s secretary. On his return from 
Africa, Leiris wrote L’Afrique fantôme (1934, ‘Invisible Africa’), a 
philosophical and ethnographic account, full of sharp insights into 
the role played by the anthropologist in the field. In 1937, Leiris 
and Bataille joined up with another ethnologist and ex-surrealist, 
Roger Caillois (1913–1978), a former collaborator of Mauss’, to 
form the legendary Collège de Sociologie that organised seminars 
and authored articles on power, mythology and the sacred, which 
would later inspire the French materialist anthropologists (Chapter 
7), but also the experiments conducted by Leiris and Caillois in 
the borderland between anthropology, literature and psychology.
Thirty years before the Dakar-Djibouti expedition, and nearly 15 
years before Malinowski’s visit to the Trobriand Islands, Maurice 
Leenhardt (1878–1954) spontaneously embarked on one of the 
longest field studies in history, among the Kanak of New Caledonia 
in Melanesia. Leenhardt went there as a missionary in 1902 and 
remained until 1926, combining systematic field studies with zealous 
defence of Kanak culture against the destructive effects of alcohol 
and imperialism. Back in France, with the support of Mauss and 
Lévy-Bruhl, he was awarded an academic position in Paris, and in 
1941 appointed to a professorship at the École pratique des hautes 
études. Leenhardt’s work is remarkable not only for its comprehen-
siveness and ethnographic detail, but also for its subtle discussions 
of intercultural translation, a theme that received little attention in 
Anglophone anthropology until the 1970s.
In this institution-building phase, anthropology in France evolved 
with hardly any reference to developments in Britain or the USA. 
It is worth note, however, that French anthropologists played a 
key role in the establishment of modern anthropology in several 
Latin American countries. Alfred Métraux (1902–1963), a Swiss 
student of Mauss and a prominent South Americanist, founded the 
Institute of Ethnology at the Universidad Nacional de Tucumán 
in Argentina in 1928. And Mauss’ colleague, Paul Rivet, spent 
the Second World War establishing anthropological institutions in 
Columbia and Mexico. In these countries, where the US influence 
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was also strong, French and American traditions met and merged 
at an early date.
CUlTURE AND PERSONAliTy
While Boas had very wide-ranging interests, his students tended 
to specialise. Each followed up a part of the master’s total project, 
and could equally claim to be true Boasians. Yet it is often said 
that the direct line of succession goes from Boas to the culture and 
personality school of Ruth Benedict (1887–1948) and Margaret 
Mead (1901–1978). Benedict was a close friend of Boas and 
associated with him both institutionally and academically. She 
spent her academic life at Columbia and was de facto head of 
department for the last year before Boas’ retirement, in 1937. She 
was bypassed for Boas’ Chair, however, in favour of Ralph Linton, a 
former military man, whom the university administration preferred 
to a radical Boasian who was also a woman. Mead, based at the 
American Museum of Natural History in New York City, also 
taught at Columbia. Like Boas, both women were highly visible 
public figures. The books they wrote were read by millions all over 
the world, and contributed significantly to giving the new discipline 
of anthropology a public face. Mead was also an able lecturer to 
popular audiences, which increased her fame further.
Like many of Boas’ students, Benedict and Mead paid little 
attention in their research to the political and economic issues that 
were so central to British structural-functionalist anthropology, 
converging instead on issues of psychology (personality, emotions, 
‘character’) and culture (socialisation, gender roles, values), which 
were mostly ignored by their British counterparts. When Benedict 
argued that emotions and culture were connected, she was, from 
one viewpoint, merely following up Wundt’s old interest in Ethno-
psychologie and extending the tenure of German Romanticism in 
American anthropology, from another point of view, however, she 
was taking a radical step. It was commonly held, not least in British 
anthropology, that emotions had nothing to do with society. Culture 
was a collective phenomenon, while emotions were assumed to be 
individual. Mead and Benedict nonetheless argued that patterns of 
emotion could be shared, they were also parts of culture. Although 
much in their work has been criticised, there can be no doubt that 
they took the first effective steps towards establishing psychological 
anthropology as a recognised anthropological sub-field.
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Benedict came from a solid, if unhappy, middle-class background, 
and it was not until she turned 30 that she took up anthropology, 
under the tutelage of Boas and Goldenweiser. She carried out some 
fieldwork among Native North Americans, but her influence derives 
mainly from two books which are not ethnographic monographs, 
but large-scale comparisons: Patterns of Culture (1934) and The 
Chrysanthemum and the Sword (1946). In Patterns of Culture, 
Benedict developed the idea that culture may be analysed as a mac-
ropsychological pattern. Rather than cataloguing the substance of 
cultures, she sought to identify the configuration of its collective 
‘personality’, the ‘emotional style’ or ‘aesthetics’, which permeated 
action, emotion and thought. Benedict referred to this as ethos.
One of the main empirical contrasts in Patterns of Culture 
is between two Native North American tribes, the Zuni and 
the Kwakiutl. The Zuni had a strong sense of group solidarity, 
political leadership was non-authoritarian, rituals undramatic and 
child-rearing practices mild. The Kwakiutl, in contrast, were a people 
of excess and exaggeration – their famous potlatch institution, for 
example, to which both Boas and Mauss had devoted attention, 
was an aggressive, spectacular and boastful gift-giving competition. 
Benedict referred to the ethos of these ambitious, hedonistic 
individualists as Dionysian, while the serene Zuni were Apollonian 
(both concepts derived from Nietzsche, a nod to the German roots 
of her thinking). Benedict also attempts to explain how ethos relates 
to social practices and institutions, and in these passages her holism 
comes close to that of the structural-functionalists.
During the Second World War, Benedict was commissioned 
to write a report about Japanese national character. Her second 
bestseller, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, was based on this 
material, and is to this day quite well regarded among East Asianists. 
The book describes the ethos of Japanese culture, and posits a 
fundamental psychological tension in this culture, between violence 
and aestheticism. With Mead, Benedict developed a methodology of 
‘studying culture at a distance’ (by means of written sources, visual 
and artistic media, and interviews with émigrés), for use in cases 
where fieldwork was impossible (Mead and Métraux 1953). After 
the war, Benedict and Mead co-directed a large-scale comparative 
project based on this methodology, the Columbia University 
Research in Contemporary Cultures Project, funded by the US Navy, 
which engaged some 120 researchers in studies of seven Western 
and non-Western cultures. The premise of this work was that entire 
nations developed ‘personality types’ – national ethoses. This notion 
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was controversial in Mead’s time, and is even more so today. Still, 
the idea of Herderian national character has never disappeared from 
anthropology, and it resurfaced in the new research on nationalism 
that began in the 1980s (Chapter 8).
Mead’s parents were social scientists, and she grew up in a liberal 
family of intellectuals, constantly moving from place to place. 
While Benedict was a shy and sometimes self-effacing personality, 
Mead was a self-assured young woman of 24 when she embarked 
on fieldwork to Samoa. This study and the resulting monograph 
may have been the first Malinowskian, participant-observation-
based field study leading to a holistic monograph carried out by 
an American anthropologist (Silverman 2005: 268). Mead would 
later do fieldwork in New Guinea, after which she married Gregory 
Bateson (see below). The meticulous photographic study from Bali, 
which Mead and Bateson conducted together (Bateson and Mead 
1942), was an attempt to describe and analyse body language. The 
authors assumed that the ‘collective emotions’ of ethos would be 
expressed in body language, and that their study would add empirical 
substance to Benedict’s claims. In the late 1970s a similar idea was 
proposed (and backed up with greater theoretical sophistication) 
by the French anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu, who referred to it, 
with a term from Mauss, as habitus.
 Like Marx, Mead was simultaneously a researcher and an activist, 
and these two strands of her life were inextricably intermeshed. The 
comparison with Marx, far-fetched as it may seem, is not completely 
gratuitous. Mead was a guiding light of American feminism, and 
her ideas inspired American – and Western – liberal opinion in the 
postwar decades. Her work from the Pacific told young Americans 
that there were many solutions to the challenges of living, and young 
American women that gender roles could be changed (Marcus and 
Fischer 1986).
As an activist, Mead’s message was simple: if culture shapes 
personality, then personality can be changed by changing culture. 
In her first bestselling book, Coming of Age in Samoa (1928), she 
compared the ‘free’ style of socialisation in Samoa with the strict, 
authoritarian style of the American middle class, arguing that 
Samoan girls were happier than their American counterparts. Along 
with Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies (1935), her 
Samoan book belongs, with The Golden Bough, Patterns of Culture, 
The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, Gregory Bateson’s Steps to an 
Ecology of Mind (1972) and Lévi-Strauss’ Tristes Tropiques (1955), 
among the most widely read books ever produced by anthropologists.
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Among colleagues, the reaction to Mead’s work was often less 
than enthusiastic. However, the scholarly debate on Mead was 
complicated by political issues. Her (and Benedict’s) foremost 
contemporary critic in the United States, Linton, was, as we have 
mentioned, politically opposed to the liberal agenda of Boas and his 
students, and his appointment to Boas’ Chair at Columbia created 
long-lasting conflicts in American anthropology, which continue 
to confuse the debate to this day. Further afield, in Britain, Mead’s 
(and Benedict’s) books were augustly criticised for being unscientific: 
making unwarranted inferences about mental states and generalising 
on the basis of inadequate data. But even here, extraneous issues 
intruded. Evans-Pritchard most likely echoes the Oxford pub-talk 
of the time accurately when he describes Coming of Age in Samoa 
as ‘a discursive, or perhaps I should say chatty and feminine, book 
with a leaning towards the picturesque, what I call the rustling-
of-the-wind-in-the-palm-trees kind of anthropological writing, for 
which Malinowski set the fashion’ (Evans-Pritchard 1951b: 96). As 
the quote implies, Mead was in part criticised because she was a 
(extremely successful) woman. In part, she was attacked as a crypto-
Malinowskian, and the German influence underlying both her and 
Malinowski’s psychological inclinations, lends credence to this 
view. Such issues have (Chapter 7) continued to occlude the more 
material questions: whether Mead’s fieldwork was superficial and 
her substantial conclusions misleading, and whether her consistently 
culturalist version of psychological anthropology is valid.
Psychological anthropology was not only promoted by Benedict 
and Mead. Linton, who is best remembered today for his work in 
microsociology, also developed a form of psychological anthropology, 
in collaboration with psychoanalyst Abraham Kardiner. In The 
Individual and His Society (1949) they rejected Benedict’s idea 
that cultures are ‘personalities writ large’ and proposed that 
specific child-rearing practices generate personality problems that 
are expressed in social organisation, which, in turn, amplifies 
the original problems. Critical of Radcliffe-Brown’s teachings at 
Chicago, which he considered reductionist, Linton defended a wide 
definition of culture, in which psychology figured prominently.
CUlTURAl HiSTORy
While Benedict and Mead followed up Boas’ and Wundt’s 
psychological interests, others continued his work in cultural history. 
A prominent example was Alfred L. Kroeber (1876–1960), who 
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came from an upper-middle-class German Jewish family in New 
York, and was Boas’ first student. After founding one of the great 
American anthropology departments in 1901 and building up one 
of the world’s leading ethnographic museums, Kroeber continued to 
work at the University of California at Berkeley until his retirement 
in 1946. Like Boas, Kroeber was an anthropological jack of all 
trades, but his main interest was in cultural history, and he wrote 
several voluminous historical studies of European and non-European 
civilisations. Kroeber’s long-time colleague at Berkeley, Robert 
H. Lowie (1883–1957), shared this interest, but added a hint of 
materialist evolutionism which would soon inspire their prominent 
student, Julian Steward, to more controversial conclusions.
In the course of his long academic career, Kroeber collected vast 
amounts of data on Native North Americans. His Handbook of 
the Indians of California (1925) is a 1,000-page ethnographic 
volume, and in his later work, Cultural and Natural Areas of Native 
North America (1939) he emphasises the importance of history to 
an understanding of the native cultures. Kroeber had at an early 
stage declared his dissatisfaction with the trait-by-trait comparative 
method that the evolutionists had pioneered and that was still in 
common use, particularly in German anthropology (even Boas used 
it at times). Trait-by-trait comparison was a superficial approach. 
Cultures were organic wholes (in a nearly Durkheimian sense) that 
could not be disassembled into their component parts without 
losing their meaning. Kroeber referred to the cultural whole as the 
superorganic, an integrated system that was more than biological 
yet seemed to have its own innate dynamics, almost to live its 
own life. Kroeber is often considered an extreme methodological 
collectivist. In his article ‘The superorganic’ (1917, reprinted in 
Kroeber 1952), he points out that innovations are often made 
simultaneously by different people in different locations. This, he 
argues, in a near-Hegelian vein, is evidence that cultures ‘live their 
own life’ and their Zeitgeist unfolds independently of individuals.
Though Boas had argued along similar lines back in 1896, both 
he and several other colleagues thought that Kroeber went too far. 
Culture was not an object independent of human beings. It must not 
be reified. Kroeber must have taken this criticism seriously, since he 
suggested a compromise towards the end of his career.
In the 1950s, Kroeber worked on several collaborative projects 
(with Parsons and others), and his last contribution to American 
anthropology was a large, interdisciplinary research programme, 
where anthropologists would study ‘culture’, while sociologists 
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studied ‘society’ (Kuper 1999). This project included among its 
participants two young men, David Schneider and Clifford Geertz, 
who will be introduced more fully in Chapter 6.
ETHNOliNGUiSTiCS
Another branch on the Boasian trunk was the synthesis of linguistics 
and anthropology established by Edward Sapir (1884–1939). Sapir 
was yet another German-Jewish immigrant to the United States, 
though he arrived as a child. He studied several Native American 
languages, spent 15 years at the Canadian National Museum in 
Ottawa, and was in charge of the ethnographic collections at 
the University of Chicago. He then moved to Yale University, 
where he founded and directed a new anthropology department 
until his early death. Sapir is regarded as the father of modern 
ethnolinguistics, and his Language (1921) is still a standard work 
of linguistic anthropology.
With his student and later colleague, Benjamin Lee Whorf 
(1897–1941), Sapir developed the so-called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis 
on the relationship between language and culture. It states that 
languages differ fundamentally in syntax, grammar and vocabulary, 
and these differences imply more profound differences in the 
language users’ ways of perceiving and living in the world. A 
Hopi-speaker perceives another world than an native English-
speaker. Hopi language is poor in nouns and rich in verbs, and 
promotes a worldview rich in movement and process, but poor in 
things. European languages, in contrast, have more nouns and fewer 
verbs, which would bias them in favour of a worldview focused 
on objects. The viewpoint has often been criticised, and some of 
the critique is reminiscent of the criticism levelled at Lévy-Bruhl’s 
‘primitive mentality’. As Bateson once pointed out, the main 
problem with the hypothesis may be that it cannot – on some level 
or other – not be true. Obviously, language influences thinking; the 
question is only to what extent and in what ways that influence 
is expressed.
With Sapir, the study of language and culture, originally a 
German interest, passed on to America, and for years it remained 
an almost purely American specialisation in anthropology. But since 
the war, and particularly since the 1980s, the field has expanded 
dramatically. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis first became an issue in 
British anthropology in the early 1960s, during the ‘rationality 
debate’ (Chapter 6). More recently, many ethnolinguistic issues have 
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cropped up in modified form in the burgeoning field of cognitive 
anthropology (Chapter 6 and 9).
Sapir was a mediator between American and European traditions. 
He was well-read in classical sociology and befriended both Rad-
cliffe-Brown and Malinowski during their years in the USA. Among 
Boas’ successors, Sapir was a source of theoretical inspiration. His 
view of culture would influence both Kroeber, Benedict and Mead, 
and through them most of American anthropology. While culture, 
for Boas, had been an integrated whole mostly in name, Sapir laid 
the groundwork for a concept of cultural integration similar to 
that of linguistics. He pointed out that cultural integration does 
not mean that members of a culture agree about anything, but that 
they share a common ground for disagreement. It is like language. 
We speak with the same grammar, even when we quarrel. The role 
of the anthropologist, as for the linguist, is to reveal what is hidden 
and taken for granted, beneath the visible expressions of culture. 
Here, we sense Sapir’s debt to European sociology, and note that 
he anticipates ideas that Lévi-Strauss, among others, would soon 
take much further. In the great American debate about the concept 
of culture that started in the 1960s and continues today, the critics 
gladly thrash Benedict or Boas, but as a rule stay away from Sapir, 
who is less easily demolished.
THE CHiCAGO SCHOOl
In Boas’ lifetime, a range of research projects had thus been set 
in movement, which in one way or another continued his ideas. 
Some would in time diverge from Boas’ own convictions – this was 
particularly true of the neo-evolutionist movement of the 1950s and 
1960s. But even when the students disagreed with the master, his 
mark was still visible, at least indirectly, on most of what they did. 
Boas’ interest in cultural history, archaeology, diffusion, language, 
symbols and psychology made American anthropology far more 
varied than the European traditions.
But, as we noted above, there were quite a few anthropologists 
in the USA whose intellectual lineage did not include Boas. The 
prime example was the group of social scientists that established 
itself in Chicago under the auspices of Robert E. Park (1864–1944) 
and William I. Thomas (1863–1947) and their collaborators in the 
interwar years. The urgent challenge for the Chicago sociologists 
was to understand ethnic relations in the seething cauldron of 
metropolitan Chicago – black people from the South, Jews, 
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Irishmen, Scandinavians, Italians, Poles, Lithuanians. Theoretically, 
the Chicago school addressed this issue by means of ‘ecological 
theory’: the city was approached as a microcosm inhabited by social 
groups and institutions. Methodologically, the challenges of the city 
were addressed by ethnographic method. The anthropologists here 
inhabited a milieu where interdisciplinary cooperation was the order 
of the day. Retrospectively, this research seems decades ahead of 
its time (Hannerz 1980). It was urban anthropology and migration 
studies at a time when anthropology was still synonymous with the 
study of small ‘remote’ communities; and it was ethnicity studies 
before the term ‘ethnicity’ had even been coined.
Apart from studies of the metropolis, the Chicago school is 
best known for its research on peasant societies in Latin America, 
Eastern Europe, and – somewhat later – India. Peasant studies 
had its roots in studies of rural communities by German and East 
European sociologists, historians and economists. Among these was 
the Russian Alexander Chayanov (1888–c. 1938), who developed 
a theory of peasant economics around the time of the First World 
War. Chayanov, who died in one of Stalin’s purges, was almost 
unknown in the West until the 1950s. In part of his theory he 
asks why it is so difficult to get peasants to produce for profit, and 
concludes that they have a marginal, subsistence economy which 
makes them unwilling to take risks. Simple as it may seem, this 
formulation has had fundamental consequences for anthropological 
studies of underdevelopment. Another important East European, 
who directly influenced the Chicago school, was the Polish poet 
and rural sociologist Florian W. Znaniecki (1882–1958). Znaniecki 
and Thomas developed a close collaboration, and while Znaniecki 
was in Chicago, they finished their great cooperative effort, the 
monumental five-volume The Polish Peasant in Europe and America 
(1918–20). Polish sociology would later become known for its 
pioneering use of ethnographic methods.
In 1934, the first of Thomas and Znaniecki’s successors was 
already in place in Chicago, Robert Redfield (1897–1958). Redfield, 
who was virtually born and bred in the Chicago school, was first 
influenced by the Boasians during Sapir’s stay in Chicago from 
1925 to 1931, and later by Radcliffe-Brown. Redfield did fieldwork 
in Mexico, and directed several projects in Central America. 
Theoretically, his research concentrated on two questions: first, 
could peasant societies be said to have their own culture, or is 
their way of life a mere product of economic necessity? Redfield 
responded that peasants had cultures, just like anyone else, and he 
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did not see their hybridised ways of life as any less authentic than 
other cultures.
Second, Redfield asked how data about local peasant life could 
be integrated with data about processes on the national, regional 
or global level. Since the term ‘peasants’, as used in anthropology, 
denotes communities of subsistence agriculturalists who are also 
marginal participants in non-local processes of politics and exchange, 
their communities cannot be studied as if they were isolated and self-
sustaining. Redfield initially proposed to deal with this situation 
by means of a simple dichotomy between folk culture and urban 
culture, or ‘little traditions’ (local, orally transmitted) and ‘great 
traditions’ (non-local, literate). This classification was based on 
cultural criteria, and was hardly concerned with the economic and 
political aspects of peasant life, a fact that was criticised by the more 
materialistically oriented students of peasants who surfaced in the 
1950s. In a famous controversy in American anthropology, Oscar 
Lewis undermined Redfield’s conclusions by performing a re-study of 
the Mexican village where he had conducted fieldwork and arriving 
at very different conclusions (Redfield 1930; Lewis 1951). 
Redfield would eventually modify his views, suggesting that folk 
and urban culture were not dichotomous, but opposite poles of a 
continuum, and incorporating processes of migration and cultural 
modernisation (individualisation and secularisation) into his model. 
However, he was not willing to abandon his emphasis on symbolic 
culture, a view he shared with many other American anthropolo-
gists. In fact, Redfield’s view of culture was not very different from 
Benedict’s. He was concerned with showing how the peasant way 
of life created a particular ‘cultural character’ or ethos, not, for 
example, with unearthing the power structures that dominated 
the peasantry.
In the postwar years, Chicago was would become the birthplace 
of the ‘Second Chicago School’, with its microsociological tradition 
that focused on detailed analyses of person-to-person interaction in 
limited, often short-term settings (for instance, within an institution). 
This approach, often referred to as symbolic interactionism, 
was developed by sociologists, two of whom would later exert 
considerable influence on anthropology. These were Erving Goffman 
(Chapter 5), known for his subtle studies of interaction ritual and 
role play, which would soon become part of the anthropological 
canon; and Raymond Birdwhistell (1918–1994), a pioneer in the 
study of cross-cultural communication and body language, who 
followed up Bateson and Mead’s interest in these themes.
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Why was the rest of the anthropological community so slow in 
taking up these new research interests? At one level, the answer is 
simple. Neither Chicago immigrants, semi-urbanised Polish peasants 
nor the staff of a modern hospital could be said to have a ‘true’ 
culture, and they were therefore ‘unsuitable’ as objects of anthro-
pological enquiry. Long after the majority of anthropologists had 
lost their interest in grand theories about the ‘original state of man’ 
(as in Rousseau or Morgan), the notion that some cultures were 
more ‘authentic’ than others lived on. African tribes and threatened 
Native Americans were more attractive for anthropologists than 
the hybrid cultures created by modernisation. This preference was 
not explicit, and Radcliffe-Brown – for one – greatly admired the 
work of the Chicago school. But when all was said and done, the 
‘real primitives’ carried greater professional prestige. And there 
were good reasons for such priorities. ‘Real primitives’ were rapidly 
disappearing from the face of the earth, and it was a pressing task 
to document their way of life before it was too late. One may still 
sympathise with this motivation today, since all generalisations 
about the human condition are dependent on the widest possible 
range of comparative data.
‘KiNSHiPOlOGy’
Despite the breadth of American research, it is not primarily this we 
associate with the anthropology of the 1930s and 1940s. Instead, 
we remember the great British structural-functionalists and their 
classical monographs, which not only stuck to ‘real primitives’, but 
described the structural principles underlying their lives in a manner 
that, in its formal elegance, was eminently ‘civilised’. The authors 
of these studies were mostly former students of Malinowski’s, some 
of whom were closer to Radcliffe-Brown than others. Until the 
1950s, a few of the most prominent men (none of the women) 
in this group were appointed to leading positions at prestigious 
British universities. Most – particularly Firth’s and Malinowski’s 
loyal students – had to wait until the next decade.
One of Malinowski’s star students, who would later become the 
main advocate of Radcliffe-Brown’s structural-functionalism, was 
Meyer Fortes (1906–1983), a South African Jew, originally educated 
as a psychologist. Fortes’ break with Malinowski in the 1930s was 
dramatic, and not exclusively motivated by academic differences. 
For example, Malinowski apparently asked Fortes in 1934 to make 
a written statement where he confirmed that he had borrowed all 
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his ideas from Malinowski himself (Goody 1995: 37). Whereas 
Firth, the mild-tempered New Zealander, reacted to Malinowski’s 
outbursts with stoicism and a pinch of salt, Fortes was personally 
offended. At any rate, by the time of the publication of the seminal 
African Political Systems (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940), it had 
become evident that Fortes’ interests were far closer to Radcliffe-
Brown’s than to Malinowski’s. His speciality was kinship, a topic 
Malinowski never wrote about in detail, although for years he had 
kept promising a book on kinship among the Trobriand Islanders. In 
1932, Fortes began his first major fieldwork in the Gold Coast (now 
Ghana), and in the 1940s and 1950s he would publish widely on 
two of the largest and socially most complex peoples in this country, 
the Ashanti and the Tallensi. His The Dynamics of Clanship among 
the Tallensi (1945) is considered one of the high points of structural-
functionalism. It was largely due to Fortes’ efforts that the British 
anthropology of the period was often spoken of disparagingly as 
‘kinshipology’. Many, not least among the Americans, felt that all 
the attention lavished on kinship betrayed the holistic ambitions 
of the discipline.
In 1946, Radcliffe-Brown retired, just as his life’s work, struc-
tural-functionalism, was reaching its zenith. Radcliffe-Brown had 
seen kinship as the engine driving primitive society, the glue that held 
it together and the moral universe in which it lived. This view was 
confirmed and strengthened through Fortes’ studies, which – while 
based on massive ethnography – focused on Radcliffe-Brownian 
‘mechanisms’ and structural principles. Fortes’ close professional 
ally and friend, Edward E. Evans-Pritchard (1902–1973), who in 
1946 succeeded Radcliffe-Brown as professor at Oxford, shared 
Fortes’ commitment to structural-functionalist kinship studies in 
the first half of his career, but struck off in a different direction 
during the 1950s (Chapter 6). Like most British anthropologists 
of his generation, Evans-Pritchard had studied with Malinowski 
at the LSE, but his teachers also included the Sudan specialist 
Charles Seligman, of the Torres expedition. It was under Seligman’s 
supervision that Evans-Pritchard carried out his field studies in the 
Sudan during the 1930s, mainly among the Azande and the Nuer. 
Evans-Pritchard and Malinowski were never close. Malinowski 
revelled in poetic, detailed and evocative descriptions of Trobriand 
life, while Evans-Pritchard had a passion for social theory and sharp, 
elegant and logically coherent intellectual analysis. Evans-Pritchard 
was an exception to the rule that the early anthropologists were 
‘outsiders’. This ‘very English Englishman, despite his Welsh name’, 
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as Leach (1984) describes him, indeed seemed to personify the 
British upper classes (though his father was indeed a Welsh-speaking 
clergyman), from which Malinowski, as a foreigner (though an 
upper-class foreigner), was forever barred.
Back in 1931, Evans-Pritchard had been duly impressed by Rad-
cliffe-Brown, who had stopped briefly in Britain en route from 
Sydney to Chicago. However, he was never a mere student of the 
Durkheimian master. When Radcliffe-Brown returned to Oxford 
as professor in 1937, Evans-Pritchard already held a lectureship 
there, and had not only done extensive fieldwork among several 
peoples in the Sudan, but had worked for three years as professor 
of sociology in Cairo. His first book, Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic 
among the Azande (1937), was published in the year of Radcliffe-
Brown’s return, and immediately recognised as a masterpiece. 
The monograph deals with witchcraft and related beliefs among 
an agricultural people in southern Sudan, and the thrust of its 
analysis, one of the most celebrated and discussed in anthropology, 
is two-pronged: on the one hand, witchcraft is seen as a ‘safety valve’ 
that redirects social conflicts into harmless channels, an integrating 
device in the best Durkheimian tradition; on the other hand, it is a 
bold attempt to make sense of an alien world of thought, presented 
in its own terms. What is remarkable is the way it knits these two 
approaches together into a seamless whole. The belief system not 
only stabilises and harmonises the social order, but is rational and 
consistent, given the logical presuppositions of Zande thought. 
Evans-Pritchard emphasises the prosaic, self-evident and practical 
side of these beliefs. Thought and faith are not abstract, outside the 
concreteness of everyday life, but an inseparable part of that life. 
Some commentators (Winch 1958) have made much of the struc-
tural-functionalist dimension of Evans-Pritchard’s work, arguing 
that he reduces witchcraft beliefs to their ‘social functions’. Others 
(Douglas 1980; Feyerabend 1975) have emphasised the opposite, 
that Evans-Pritchard demonstrates that knowledge and belief are 
social products anywhere.
Evans-Pritchard’s second major work appeared in 1940, the 
same year as the publication of the volume on African political 
systems that he edited with Fortes. The Nuer, a study of the political 
organisation of a patrilineal pastoralist people living just north 
of the Azande, is written more in Radcliffe-Brown’s spirit. The 
book sets out to address a central problem in the anthropology 
of acephalous (‘stateless’, literally ‘headless’) peoples, namely 
how large-scale political mobilisation can occur in the absence of 
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centralised leadership. The book, which vividly evokes the lifeworld 
of the Nuer, is also a tour de force of ‘kinshipology’. Conflicts 
are organised along kinship lines. The principle of segmentary 
organisation – ‘it is me against my brother, me and my brother 
against our cousins, brothers and cousins against third cousins’, 
and so on – was central to the analysis, which also demonstrated 
the conflict-reducing influence of relationships (such as marriages) 
that cut across the patrilineal system – an aspect fully exploited 
in a reanalysis by Gluckman (1956). In the final chapter, Evans-
Pritchard elaborates his view of social structure, which he defines 
along the same lines as Radcliffe-Brown, as an abstract system of 
social relationships which continues to exist unchanged in spite of 
changes of personnel. The continuity from the Azande monograph is 
also notable. Evans-Pritchard considered kinship and witchcraft as 
two examples of ‘modes of thought’, and in both cases is concerned 
to show how thinking is related to what Pierre Bourdieu (1990) 
would later call ‘the logic of practice’.
Fortes’ and Evans-Pritchard’s monographs on the Tallensi, the 
Ashanti, the Azande and the Nuer, were, after Seligman’s pioneering 
work, crucial in transferring the regional focus of British social 
anthropology from the Pacific to Africa, but it should be kept in 
mind that other important British anthropologists also worked in 
Africa at the time – Richards among the Bemba, Schapera among 
the Tswana, Gluckman among the Zulu, Forde among the Yakö. 
African Political Systems, which included contributions from about 
a dozen British anthropologists, was a powerful demonstration of 
this new regional emphasis. In their much-quoted introduction, the 
editors distinguished three types of African societies: egalitarian, 
small-scale societies (largely hunters and gatherers); state societies 
(such as the Buganda kingdom); and the interesting, intermediate 
type, the lineage-based segmentary society, of which the Nuer 
became the paragon, which is decentralised but able to form large, 
cooperative groups for specific purposes (such as war). As we shall 
see, segmentary society preoccupied anthropologists for decades, 
and not only in Britain (see Sahlins 1968). During the great debates 
on kinship the 1950s and 1960s, the model presented in African 
Political Systems was subjected to criticism from many quarters. 
Some felt that it was simply too neat to fit the complexities of real 
life. Others disparaged it as evolutionism in disguise. Yet others 
(most prominently Lévi-Strauss) rejected its exclusive focus on 
descent as the main principle of kinship.
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But neither was structural-functionalism a static doctrine; it was 
a theory that evolved and ultimately transcended itself. The 1940s 
open with the publication of two important books on African 
kinship – The Nuer and African Political Systems. The decade ends 
with three equally important publications, from the same region and 
with the same subject matter – Fortes’ The Web of Kinship among 
the Tallensi (1949), Radcliffe-Brown and Forde’s African Systems 
of Kinship and Marriage (1950), and Evans-Pritchard’s Kinship and 
Marriage among the Nuer (1951b). The virtuoso self-assurance of 
the two first books contrasts sharply with the volumes that appeared 
in 1949–51. All three books distinguish, in Evans-Pritchard’s words, 
between kinship and descent. Kinship belonged to the domestic 
sphere. Descent was public and jural. The kinship system stood 
as a stable corpus of categories that connected the domestic with 
the public. But the categories were not real, as Radcliffe-Brown 
had supposed, but ‘ideal types’ (in Weber’s terms). They might be 
changed, reinterpreted or replaced, and the public and domestic 
spheres both contained factors that invited people to manipulate 
the system in their own interests: the man I claim as my cousin 
today, when my family needs help to tend the fields, may be distant 
kin tomorrow, when my father’s inheritance is divided. The new 
studies of domestic kinship thus brought to the fore the tension 
between household-external and household-internal forces, between 
the strategic play of politics and everyday demands. The change 
was fundamental, and Radcliffe-Brown evidently never accepted 
it (Kuper 1996: 92). His stable, positivist social structure had 
become a web of forces and counterforces, ambivalent categories 
and criss-crossing loyalties. The sharp focus on political structure 
around 1940 was giving way to a broader understanding of the 
complex interaction between local and super-local processes.
One of the most important contributions of lineage research 
was that it made the informal aspect of political organisation 
and leadership explicit. Informal politics are not reserved for 
lineage-based societies, but play a role everywhere in the modern 
world. In the 1940s, anthropologists still resisted this generalisation. 
But views were changing. Kinship studies had commenced their long 
journey toward the intricate and self-reflexive subfield they are today.
fUNCTiONAliSm’S lAST STAND
In 1930, the undisputed centre of British anthropology was at the 
LSE, where Malinowski presided with his many gifted students, 
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under the tolerant auspices of Seligman. In 1940, Oxford had become 
a Radcliffe-Brownian preserve and was rapidly moving towards 
hegemony. By 1950, Radcliffe-Brown’s protégés had secured jobs 
at Cambridge, Manchester, and University College London, and the 
Malinowskians seemed to have lost the competition for academic 
control. But Malinowski’s heritage was not dead. The LSE remained 
a Malinowskian stronghold, and many of Malinowski’s talented 
students were active and respected voices in the field; the most 
famous, no doubt, besides Firth, being Edmund Leach (Chapter 5).
It was above all Raymond Firth (1901–2002) at the LSE who 
secured the direct continuity of Malinowski’s programme. After 
initial work on the Maori of his native New Zealand, Firth arrived 
in London to study economics, but transferred to anthropology after 
attending Malinowski’s very first seminar (Stocking 1995: 407). 
He did pioneering work in economic anthropology, which would 
later have considerable influence. But in spite of his theoretical 
contributions (Chapter 5), Firth was first of all an empirical 
researcher. Like his mentor, he regarded interaction and the ongoing 
flow of social life as more fascinating (and more ‘real’) than abstract 
structures. He published eleven books about the Tikopians, the 
inhabitants of a Polynesian island where he carried out long-term 
fieldwork on three occasions. His most famous monograph, We, 
the Tikopia (1936), is a 600-page volume which typifies both the 
strengths and the weaknesses of Malinowskian anthropology. 
Structural-functionalists were full of disdain for Firth’s allegedly 
wishy-washy, all-inclusive accounts, which made no attempt to 
develop elegant models or even to accord some institutions priority 
over others. However, the book’s long, detailed ethnographic 
descriptions documented the actual complexity of ‘primitive’ life 
far better than the stringent structural-functionalist accounts.
Firth’s monographs are typical Malinowskian studies, along 
with Reo Fortune’s work from Dobu Island (near New Guinea), 
Isaac Schapera’s books from Bechuanaland (Botswana) and Audrey 
Richards’ work from Northern Rhodesia (Zambia). These works all 
assumed that society was an integrated, functional system, but rarely 
specified the mechanisms of its integration in detail. The emergent 
Oxford anthropology appeared more polished, more scientific, 
more coherent and in every way theoretically superior. However, 
the last word had not yet been said: Firth, like Malinowski, was a 
methodological individualist who focused on the daily life of living 
people rather than on the abstract, legal (Radcliffe-Brown) or logical 
(Evans-Pritchard) principles that governed it. The ever-changing, 
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tactical play among individual actors is Firth’s main concern, and 
this made him popular as an ancestor figure for the generation 
of methodological individualists that came to the fore in 1950s 
and 1960s.
SOmE BRiTiSH OUTSiDERS
British anthropology was a tight-knit little community, closed, elitist 
and full of conflicts. Yet, in the course of few years, it produced some 
of anthropology’s greatest classics. But the milieu was indeed closed, 
and tended to marginalise anyone who did not belong to either the 
structural-functionalist or the functionalist camp. A good example 
is A.M. Hocart (1884–1939), whose work on Pacific societies in 
the interwar years, influential at the time, was later forgotten, but 
has occasionally been rediscovered more recently. Hocart carried 
out research in the Pacific in 1909–14, primarily in Fiji, but also 
in Tonga and Samoa. His concerns were both historical and subtly 
structural, and he was far removed from both Malinowski’s brisk 
pragmatism and Radcliffe-Brown’s search for simple ‘laws’ and 
‘mechanisms’. His chief interest lay in ritual and social hierarchies, 
and he developed a comparative method that has more in common 
with French anthropology than with his British contemporaries. 
His innovative book on caste (Hocart 1938) was published in 
French translation before it appeared in English, and is more often 
cited in French than in Anglophone literature. Hocart never found 
academic employment in Britain, but succeeded Evans-Pritchard as 
Professor of Sociology in Cairo in 1934, where he remained until 
his early death.
Other outsiders include the Austrian Siegfried Nadel (1903–1956), 
a musicologist and Africanist, and a pioneer of psychological 
anthropology in Britain, who ended as professor at the Australian 
National University in Canberra. Another was Daryll Forde 
(1902–1973), who was even more marginal than Nadel, having 
studied archaeology in Britain and later cultural anthropology 
with Kroeber and Lowie at Berkeley. Returning to Britain with an 
unfashionable penchant for ecological studies, he found a powerful 
ally in Evans-Pritchard, and was appointed as Chair at University 
College London in 1945. 
However, the most interesting young British outsider of the 
interwar years was Gregory Bateson (1904–1980). Bateson came 
from an academic, upper-middle-class family. His father, the 
famous biologist William Bateson, had named his son after Gregor 
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Mendel, the founder of genetics. Bateson was studying to become a 
biologist, when Haddon, during a conversation on a train bound for 
Cambridge, converted him to anthropology (Lipset 1982: 114), and 
he soon embarked on fieldwork in New Guinea. After an unsuccessful 
attempt at fieldwork among the Baining, Bateson studied the Iatmul, 
a lowland people whose naven ritual formed the backbone of his first 
(and only) ethnographic monograph, Naven (1936).
While in New Guinea, apparently in a canoe on the Sepik river, 
Bateson met Reo Fortune and his wife, Margaret Mead, who were 
doing fieldwork in the area. The description of this meeting (Mead 
1972; M. Bateson 1984) has become a classic in the history of 
anthropology. The encounter was intense in every way. The three 
eagerly discussed anthropology and life in general, argued about the 
differences between the peoples they were studying, and fearlessly 
analysed their personal relationships. When the dust settled, Fortune 
and Mead were divorced, while Bateson married Mead and moved 
to the United States in 1939.
The meeting of Mead and Bateson highlights the relationship 
between British and American anthropology in these years. 
Bateson’s admiration for Radcliffe-Brown’s elegant intellectualism 
was challenged by Benedict’s insight into psychology and emotions. 
What was the role of the anthropologist – to uncover sociological 
principles or describe the subtleties of human communication? Did 
the one exclude the other? Or did there exist a common language 
that could encompass both? Bateson’s monograph is an expression 
of these dilemmas. The naven ritual of the Iatmul, involving gender 
reversal by both sexes and spectacular homosexual displays by the 
men, was approached by Bateson from three distinct analytical 
perspectives. The first was ‘sociological and structural’, inspired by 
Radcliffe-Brown. The second he called ‘eidos’ (a culture’s cognitive 
and intellectual style), and the third ‘ethos’ (from Benedict). He 
found it very difficult to reconcile, not to say synthesise, these three 
approaches, and eventually abandoned the effort. Naven, as it was 
originally published in 1936, thus stands as an unsolved riddle. 
Only in 1958 did the book come in a second edition, with a long 
appendix, where Bateson tried to tie the disparate strands together.
Bateson’s monograph was an ambiguous work that had little 
impact on contemporary anthropology. His British colleagues 
did not know what to make of it (Kuper 1996), but its prestige 
has increased as it has become clear that it anticipated several of 
the changes that have occurred in the discipline since the 1950s. 
Thus, Bateson is critical of the idea of ‘function’, which, in his 
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view, is teleological (it implies that the effect precedes the cause). 
Functionalist explanations should always be examined closely, to 
see whether they in fact specify all the links by which the ‘purposes’ 
and ‘needs’ of the whole are communicated to the individual actor. 
This will lead us to focus on process and communication rather 
than function and structure.
Bateson was an exceptional intellectual who still elicits admiring 
commentaries, some of them book-length (such as Harries-Jones 
1995). After the war, his concern with communication and process 
would bring him into contact with brilliant scholars on the 
frontlines of many fields: psychiatrists, psychologists, ethologists, 
mathematicians, ecologists, biologists, and so on. He soon became 
an interdisciplinary figure, who made significant contributions to 
subjects such as psychology and communications theory (Bateson 
1972), and pioneered the use of cybernetic models in anthropological 
explanation. Even before the Second World War, his ‘photographic 
fieldwork’ with Mead on Bali indicated his willingness to explore 
the limits of anthropology. During the war, Bateson contributed to 
Benedict and Mead’s studies of ‘national character’ and started work 
on an influential theory of communication, both in anthropology 
and elsewhere (Chapter 6).
It seems appropriate to end this chapter with a few words about 
Bateson’s early career. An iconoclast and an eccentric throughout 
his life, Bateson’s first stab at theoretical synthesis was an attempt to 
bridge the gap between interwar American and British anthropology. 
He himself regarded it as a failure. This should remind us that the 
gulf between the two traditions was very real. While Americans 
steeped in Boasian cultural anthropology studied cultural history, 
collective psychology and ethnolinguistics, the British zoomed in 
on social life, status relationships, kinship systems and politics. 
Dominant tendencies in French anthropology followed a third path, 
to which we shall return in Chapter 6. Although every self-respect-
ing historian of anthropology will claim that anthropology was, 
after all, one discipline, the Atlantic, and even the English Channel, 
were effective lines of demarcation in 1945. And while it would be 
simplistic to claim that these boundaries remained intact throughout 
the second half of the century, it would be naive to assume they 
had disappeared. The three national traditions continue to mark 
anthropology to this day, albeit increasingly enriched by mutual 
contact with other national traditions of anthropological enquiry – 
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some old and established, as in Russia, China, South Africa or the 
Netherlands; some more recent, as in Brazil, Scandinavia or Japan. 
In the next two chapters, the chronological structure of this book 
will be temporarily upset. Both chapters deal with the 20-odd years 
between the end of the Second World War and the new radical 
movements that caught on in the late 1960s. While Chapter 5 
presents the mounting critique of the established paradigms on both 
sides of the Atlantic and some new, less collectivistic, alternatives, 
Chapter 6 shows how the power of symbols and rituals became 
an issue in all three national traditions, bridging old divisions and 
creating new ones in the process.
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The guns are silent, the bombers grounded. Millions of refugees 
pick their way through Germany’s ruined cities, across the scorched 
earth of Russia, Poland, Belarus and the Ukraine. France and Britain 
have been deeply shaken; their great empires will soon be only a 
memory. By contrast, the American economy is just settling down 
into superpower gear, wheeling out an ever-increasing plenitude of 
pink Cadillacs, TV sets, film stars and nuclear weaponry. To the 
East of Europe, the Soviet Union will compete successfully with 
‘the free world’ in the production of military hardware, while the 
production of Cadillacs (pink or otherwise) lags ever further behind. 
McCarthy looks for communist spies; Beria looks for capitalist 
spies. The atmosphere is tense, as people peer into an unprecedented 
future, which, against the background of the horrors of the recent 
past, promises progress and Formica kitchens, or threatens with 
global annihilation.
Not only in the economy, but in most of the sciences as well 
– including anthropology – the USA was becoming the leading 
superpower, with more academics, larger research funds, better 
facilities, more journals and conferences than anywhere else. In 
the 1950s, academics in countries like Norway, who had hitherto 
published in German to reach an international audience, switched 
to English.
The racist views of Nazism had been discredited, and many felt 
that it was about time to abandon the concept of race in science 
as well. Almost, but not quite all, geneticists and biologists agreed 
that racial differences were not comprehensive enough to have any 
effect on culture. Virtually all social and cultural anthropologists 
held this view, as indeed they might, since their discipline had since 
Bastian and Tylor rested on the premise of the ‘psychic unity of 
mankind’. When international anti-racist proclamations came to be 
written and signed, it seemed reasonable to involve anthropologists 
in the paperwork. In this way, a British émigré to the USA, Ashley 
Montagu (1905–1999), a Boasian with a PhD from Columbia, 
became the secretary at a United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
96
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Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) conference about race in 1950. 
The resulting document, ‘Statement on Race’, in no uncertain terms 
proclaimed that biological factors were of negligible importance in 
shaping human nature.
The winds of change following the Second World War were 
emphatically universalist; they announced the unity of mankind 
and equal human rights. To the extent that anthropologists related 
to this ideological trend – and many did – they were ambivalent. On 
the one hand, the culturalist, anti-racist views promoted not least 
by Montagu in a series of popular and influential books were by 
and large seen as uncontroversial, even trivial. Most anthropologists 
were probably also in favour of decolonisation, another universalist 
project. On the other hand, anthropologists steeped in cultural 
relativism found it difficult to accept the unwarranted missionary 
zeal seemingly inherent in the new, universalist rhetoric, whether it 
emanated from anti-colonial movements, the US State Department 
or the United Nations. In 1947, the American Anthropological 
Association (AAA) made a lengthy statement, published in American 
Anthropologist and written mainly by Melville Herskovits, which 
amounted to a warning against the cultural imperialism ostensibly 
inherent in the incipient Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(AAA 1947). This statement indicates the strong position of the 
Boasian programme in American anthropology at the time (Wilson 
1997; Wilson and Mitchell 2003). But the Americans were not alone. 
As late as in 1976, Lévi-Strauss stated that the Western concept of 
freedom was an historical project without universal relevance. In 
1948 he attacked the Universal Declaration of Human Rights for 
being meaningless outside the West (Pace 1986).
Anthropologists were also sometimes co-opted by American 
government interests, and some delivered strategic knowledge to 
the CIA. Although far from uncontroversial, these practices – unlike 
politically radical views – rarely denied anyone tenure.
Shortly after the war, a powerful alternative to the Boasian 
consensus would develop in the USA. Its obvious debt to Marx 
was rarely acknowledged explicitly, since being a Marxist in the 
postwar USA was not a smart move for an academic who wanted 
tenure and research grants. Instead, its originators tended to look 
to Morgan as a founding father.
The year 1946 may be seen as a gateway to the lively, 
expansive period that anthropology now entered. The Norwegian 
anthropologist Fredrik Barth started his studies in that year, in 
Chicago. Decades later, he describes the atmosphere as electric, 
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with the university flooded with returning soldiers studying on 
GI grants, who supplied an influx of new blood into American 
academia that was unprecedented (Eriksen 2013). It was the year 
when the British formed the Association of Social Anthropologists 
(ASA), the year when Evans-Pritchard succeeded Radcliffe-Brown at 
Oxford and Kroeber retired from Berkeley after having taught there 
for 45 years, and it was also the year in which Julian Steward began 
to teach at Boas’ old department at Columbia. ‘The revolution’ in 
the discipline was over, the initial phase of institutionalisation was 
perhaps over too, and change was again in the air. In the space of a 
few years, Steward’s neo-evolutionist programme would challenge 
Boasianism on its home turf; Evans-Pritchard would repudiate 
structural-functionalism; Gluckman would become professor at 
the new anthropology department at Manchester, soon to be known 
for its political radicalism and its interest in social change; and 
Lévi-Strauss’ great study of kinship, published in 1949, would 
change anthropology’s discourse on its favourite institution forever.
Although anthropology branched off in many directions in the 
decades following the war, it also became more tightly integrated 
than before, thanks to the continuation – and internationalisation 
– of core debates. Differences remained, but mutual knowledge 
across national boundaries was becoming more widespread. The 
annual meetings of the AAA gradually turned into global meetings, 
and familiarity with each other’s journals was increasingly taken 
for granted.
It would be futile to impose a simple linear narrative upon the 
complexities of the two decades following the war. It was a period 
when the New Guinean highlands replaced Africa as the most 
fashionable place to go for young fieldworkers, when the Caribbean 
and Latin America came into their own as ethnographic regions, 
when structuralism became a power to reckon with, interpretive 
anthropology had its breakthrough, and new forms of symbolic, 
political and economic analysis made their entry.
In this book, we have divided our treatment of the 1950s and 
1960s into two thematic chapters. The present, and longest, deals 
with a turn that took place in British and American anthropology, 
toward the practical, often material, circumstances that are the 
precondition of social life. The next chapter will deal with an 
opposite turn, toward symbolic communication and meaning, 
which was most strongly expressed in France, but had important 
repercussions for the two other traditions as well. While this editorial 
separation reproduces a debatable dichotomy between society and 
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culture, it also highlights divergences and confluences among the 
evolving national traditions. American anthropology, for a while 
nearly synonymous with Benedict-Meadean studies of ‘culture’, 
sprang from an original holistic impulse, a Tyloresque ‘culture’, in 
which, naturally, both social organisation and the material world 
played a considerable role. Now, this breadth reasserted itself 
with the new materialists. French anthropology, which Durkheim 
had defined in a wide, sociological sense, had, through Mauss, 
arrived at the fascinating problem of exchange. Exchange, usually 
thought of in economic terms, can – pace Mauss – be redefined as 
communication. Enter Lévi-Strauss, and the focus of the discipline 
seemed to move from sociology to semiotics. Finally, the British, 
who stubbornly clung to the sociological definition of their subject, 
once again imported a French theory, as they had done before with 
Durkheim. There was continuity and change in these movements. 
The distinctions between the national traditions began to blur, but 
were not erased.
NEO-EVOlUTiONiSm AND CUlTURAl ECOlOGy
Although the emergent materialist school in American anthropology 
was explicitly opposed to Boas, several of Boas’ own collaborators 
and students were closer to the new thoughts than one might think. 
At Berkeley, Kroeber was at least non-committal, and his colleague 
Lowie even expressed sympathy for the evolutionist project, though 
his most famous book, Primitive Society (1920), contains a scathing 
critique of Morgan’s Ancient Society. Like Boas himself, Lowie 
was primarily a cautious, empirically oriented scholar, with an 
overwhelming respect for the facts. He was also a learned cultural 
historian, who rejected Benedict’s ideas of ‘national character’ 
as vague and speculative, and regarded diffusionism as a more 
attractive explanation of cultural change than evolutionism, since 
its assumptions were simpler and easier to test against fact. But 
Lowie did not reject evolutionism completely. Though he declined 
to generalise on the subject, he appears to have accepted that 
cultures, in some cases, evolve along the same general lines, a view 
ambivalent, if not exactly opposed, to Boas’ historical particularism. 
Lowie also introduced the term multilinear evolution, a concept later 
recycled to good effect by his student, Steward. Contrasting it with 
the unilinear evolution typical of nineteenth-century anthropology, 
Lowie held that evolution might proceed along different paths. 
Between these paths there were certain rough similarities, but also 
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considerable variations. When Steward embarked on his project of 
modernising evolutionism, he could thus draw on his teacher for 
inspiration and – at least tacit – support.
As Jerry Moore (1997: 166) points out, historical and evolutionist 
perspectives were more easily accepted in the USA than in Britain, 
where social anthropology had come to mean synchronous studies 
exclusively. Social change was not a concern either there or in France, 
where it would enter anthropology only in the 1960s through the 
British-inspired work of the Africanist Georges Balandier and his 
students. And, with the exception of Daryll Forde at University 
College London, a single, brilliant chapter in The Nuer, and Barth’s 
1956 article on ecology and ethnicity in Swat, ecology was also 
almost completely absent from British anthropology.
When neo-evolutionism came to the fore in the USA in the 
1950s, this was largely due to the work of two men: Julian Steward 
(1902–1972) and Leslie White (1900–1975). Unlike most of his 
contemporaries, White, who taught for 40 years at the University 
of Michigan (1930–70), rejected the cultural relativist idea that 
cultures cannot be ‘ranked’ on a developmental scale, though he 
also emphatically rejected the moral connotations that the Victorian 
evolutionists had associated with such schemes. White was interested 
in general laws of cultural evolution. Like Malinowski, he held a bio-
functionalist view of culture but, as he saw it, the function of culture 
was not to provide individual need satisfaction, but to ensure the 
survival of the group. His methodological collectivism might remind 
us of Radcliffe-Brown, but White did not believe in Durkheim’s 
tenet that societies were autonomous entities with their own, self-
sufficient dynamics. Societies were integrated in their ecological 
surroundings. White distinguished between technological, social 
and ideological aspects of culture (he was later to add ‘emotional 
or attitudinal aspects’ – a nod in Benedict’s direction; see Sahlins 
1976). The technological dimension was crucial; in fact, he argued 
that it determined the social and ideological aspects of social life 
(White 1949).
The originality of White’s theory was modest, although his 
single-minded technological determinism was often expressed in 
original ways, as when, in The Science of Culture (1949), he defined 
the level of cultural development as the amount of energy harnessed 
by each inhabitant, measured through production and consumption. 
Such quantitative ambitions had been absent in nineteenth-century 
evolutionism and in Boasian cultural anthropology, but would 
become prominent among the new American materialists.
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White’s views met with considerable resistance. More than once, 
he was identified as a possible Communist during the McCarthy era 
of the 1950s. Among cultural anthropologists, White’s ambition to 
turn anthropology into an accurate science of cultural evolution and 
the sociocultural effects of technology, was regarded as irrelevant. 
Nevertheless, White developed an excellent department at Michigan, 
and his students included luminaries like Marshall Sahlins (who 
later went to Columbia to study with Steward), one of the great 
figures of late-twentieth-century American anthropology.
Lowie, the crypto-evolutionist, had strong reservations about 
White’s technological determinism, but encouraged Steward 
to pursue a version of materialist evolutionism, which, though 
less deterministic, had much in common with White’s. Steward 
himself, after completing his PhD at Berkeley – a standard Native 
American study in the culture-and-personality style – worked as 
an archaeologist for years, before transferring to Washington, 
DC, where he directed the Institute of Social Anthropology at the 
prestigious Smithsonian Institution and edited the seven-volume 
Handbook of South American Indians, to which the French 
anthropologist Alfred Métraux made major contributions. Steward 
refined his theoretical approach during the 1930s and 1940s, and 
when he arrived at Columbia University in 1946, he brought along 
a mature theory which provoked his colleagues and inspired his 
students. During his six-year stay at Columbia (which coincided 
nearly exactly with Karl Polanyi’s years there), Steward supervised 
a truly impressive group of graduate students, who were soon to 
put the mark of a new materialism on American anthropology. 
Elman Service, Stanley Diamond, Morton Fried, Eric Wolf, Sidney 
Mintz, Eleanor Leacock, Marvin Harris, Robert Murphy, Marshall 
Sahlins, Andrew Vayda, Roy Rappaport and others, all studied 
under Steward (or under his successor, Fried) and some participated 
in his many large and ambitious projects.
Steward was dissatisfied with the lack of theoretical ambition 
among Boasian anthropologists, and, like White, saw a potential 
for development of general theory in the study of technology and 
ecological conditions. Like Lowie, however, he was unenthusiastic 
about unilinear cultural evolution. Furthermore, where White 
distinguished three cultural subsystems, Steward opposed the 
cultural ‘core’ to ‘the rest of culture’. The core consisted of 
technology and the division of labour – which corresponds nicely 
to Marx’s definition of infrastructure, an influence that Steward, like 
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White, did not advertise too loudly. It would be their students who 
made the link with Marxism explicit in the less totalitarian1960s.
Steward’s influence may have been even more powerful in 
archaeology than in anthropology, but at least three of his 
contributions have had a lasting impact, particularly on American 
anthropology. First, Steward founded modern cultural ecology. 
Though White, too, included environmental factors in his 
explanations, Steward regarded the totality of a society and its 
biological surroundings in roughly the same way as an ecologist 
regards an ecosystem. He saw society through the eyes of an ecologist. 
Adaptation was a core concept with Steward, who searched for 
institutions that concretely furthered a culture’s survival in a given 
ecosystem. Some of these institutions were strongly determined by 
ecology, technology and population density; others were relatively 
unaffected by material conditions.
Second, Steward developed a theory of multilinear evolution, 
based on archaeological, historical and ethnographic evidence. 
Under particular conditions, such as irrigation agriculture in arid 
regions, he held that the cultural core would develop along roughly 
the same lines in different societies. By limiting his generalisations 
to a few important aspects of the cultures he studied and restricting 
the scope of his theory to societies with comparable natural 
preconditions, he succeeded in building up an evolutionism that did 
not lead to speculative generalisations that could easily be falsified. 
Neither Steward nor White regarded all aspects of the superstructure 
or symbolic realm as materially determined, unlike some of their 
predecessors as well as successors, Marxist and non-Marxist alike.
Third, Steward was, along with Redfield (whose orientation was 
definitely non-materialist) an important pioneer in peasant studies. 
Peasants (defined as subsistence farmers in complex societies who are 
partly integrated into non-local economies) have until recently made 
up the largest population category in the world. The lack of interest 
in them in pre-war anthropology confirms that the discipline was 
still hunting for the exotic at the expense of the typical. Steward’s 
peasant research reached a high point during the large-scale Puerto 
Rico project he organised in the late 1940s. The project was one of 
the first area studies in anthropology, and was unique at the time for 
its integration of local and regional analysis. Here, for just about 
the first time in the history of anthropology, the nation state and 
the world market figure actively in the analysis. Steward’s students 
would continue and refine Steward’s interest in peasant societies 
in the coming decades, and make decisive contributions in turning 
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mainstream anthropological attention towards the Caribbean and 
Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s.
The most important result of White’s and Steward’s theoretical 
efforts was not their evolutionism, but the interest they inspired 
in the relationship between society and ecosystem. The emerging 
school of cultural ecology has often been described as just another 
form of functionalism, where the ecosystem replaces the social 
whole as the prime functional imperative. But this critique is 
only partly justified. The cultural ecologists were interested in 
cultural change, and, with the passage of time, developed a more 
sophisticated model of society than their British predecessors. In 
this, they were assisted by the great advances made in (biological) 
ecology during the 1950s, particularly as a result of the application 
of cybernetic models to problems of adaptation. In the 1960s, 
cultural ecology would prove a diverse source of inspiration among 
anthropologists. Bateson drew on models and ideas from cultural 
ecology in his contributions to general systems theory. Clifford 
Geertz, later known for his Weberian interpretive anthropology, 
published Agricultural Involution in 1963, a book on Javanese land 
tenure strongly influenced by Steward. Sahlins, who would also 
later move towards symbolic anthropology, began his career with 
several books which elaborated Steward’s (and White’s) interests, 
and, in a famous article on political leadership in the Pacific, saw 
the contrast between Melanesian big-men and Polynesian chiefs in 
evolutionist light, drawing on an analysis of household economy 
in accounting for political variations. The most consistent (and 
persistent) of Steward’s and White’s successors was nevertheless 
Marvin Harris (1927–2001) who, during the 1960s, developed his 
own brand of materialist evolutionism, which he referred to as 
cultural materialism (Harris 1979). 
The high point of cultural ecology was, perhaps, Roy Rappaport’s 
monograph Pigs for the Ancestors (1967), which quickly became a 
classic. Rappaport (1926–1997), a student of Fried’s at Columbia 
and a friend and associate of Bateson and Mead, carried out 
fieldwork among the Tsembaga Maring of the New Guinean 
highlands in the early 1960s. He was particularly concerned with 
understanding a complex ritual cycle, involving warfare and mass 
slaughter of domesticated pigs, along with colour symbolism and 
the ceremonial planting of a rumbim tree. Applying a cybernetically 
inspired ecological analysis to the ritual, he demonstrates the 
intimate connections between Tsembaga adaptation to their 
surroundings (nature, but also neighbouring human groups) and 
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their worldview. Starting with the White-inspired premise that the 
availability of energy sources determines cultural adaptation, he 
ends with a subtle (and non-deterministic) analysis of the aesthetic 
language through which the Tsembaga conceptualise the ecology 
they inhabit. Many critics considered the book a kind of ecological 
structural-functionalism, with little space for individual motivation 
and independent cultural dynamics. Rappaport responded with a 
long postscript in the book’s 1984 edition.
Another climactic point of cultural ecology movement, which 
also made manifest its great breadth and scope, was the ‘Man the 
Hunter’ symposium organised at the University of Chicago in 1966 
(Lee and DeVore 1968). Concentrating chiefly on contemporary 
hunters and gatherers, most of the contributors – largely American 
cultural anthropologists – saw culture chiefly in terms of ecological 
adaptation. They argued that since hunting was the original 
livelihood of humanity, any general theory of society and the nature 
of Man would presuppose a close knowledge of the hunter’s way 
of life. In addition to highlighting the familiar tension between 
culturalist and materialist accounts of culture and society, the 
symposium indicated how far from Boas and Benedict parts of 
American cultural anthropology had by now moved.
fORmAliSm AND SUBSTANTiViSm
The emergent interest in material conditions was also expressed in 
other ways than through cultural ecology, and not only in the USA. 
From the 1940s onwards, economic anthropology was developed 
as a sub-discipline, in many cases in close tandem with peasant 
studies (Wolf 1966).
Anthropological studies of economics had a venerable history. 
Malinowski’s Argonauts of the Western Pacific, Mauss’s The Gift, 
and many lesser works focused directly on economic relations. 
Still, the pioneer in establishing economic anthropology as a 
sub-discipline was Raymond Firth (Chapter 4). Firth, who was first 
educated as an economist, had written detailed studies of the Maori 
and Tikopia economies (Firth 1929, 1939), which emphasised the 
pragmatic strategies of individuals. During the 1950s and 1960s, 
Firth continued this work, adding a theoretical emphasis to it that 
is often referred to as ‘formalism’ (LeClair and Schneider 1968). 
Formalism, which argues that classical economic theory may be 
applied cross-culturally, did not, however, crystallise into a distinct 
‘school’ before it was challenged by ‘the substantivist revolution’.
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If Firth was the first formalist in economic anthropology, the 
apical ancestor of substantivism was the Hungarian economic 
historian and political reformer Karl Polanyi (1886–1964). After 
his exile he lived some years in London, then he moved to the 
USA in 1940, where he spent six years as professor of economics 
at Columbia (1947–1953) that coincided with Steward’s term at 
the anthropology department there. In The Great Transformation 
(1944), Polanyi argues that what we call ‘the economy’ does not exist 
in pre-capitalist societies at all, and that classical economic theory 
can therefore legitimately be applied only to capitalist economies.
The heated debate between formalists and substantivists involved 
anthropologists, historians and economists, and continued well into 
the 1970s, when it concluded inconclusively with the rather banal 
realisation that the schools were complementary. Nevertheless, 
the issues raised were fundamental, and, in various guises are 
still around today. Roughly speaking, the formalists assumed that 
an economy might be described as a particular kind or ‘form’ of 
action that individuals have everywhere and are always engaged 
in – action in which the individual strives to achieve the maximal 
benefit for himself or his household. As long as we are dealing 
with maximisation, we are dealing with economic phenomena. 
Moreover, since maximisation is not limited to specific empirical 
contexts, but can occur in any kind of social interaction, the 
economy may be regarded as a universal aspect of human social life. 
This attitude, which (despite its universalist definition) is compatible 
with methodological individualism, would be embraced by many of 
the critics of structural-functionalism in the 1950s and 1960s. In 
contrast, substantivism argues that the economy is not a universal 
‘form’ of action, but is defined by its substance. In Polanyi’s 
words, it is an ‘instituted process’ (Polanyi 1957). The economy 
is contained by and limited to specific, historical institutions, the 
main categories of which are production, circulation (exchange) 
and consumption.
The strength of formalism was its emphasis on the pragmatic 
choices of individuals – which brings the variable and unpredictable 
aspects of economic action to the fore. The strength of substantivism 
lies in its ability to describe economic systems as being of different 
kinds and having different economic rationalities (formalism only 
accepts one economic rationality: maximisation). Substantivists 
would be more open to theories of historical watersheds, fundamental 
differences between cultures and irreversible change. Formalists 
would be more gradualistic. Polanyi himself, in a typology that 
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was later expanded by Sahlins (1972), distinguished three basic 
types of economy: reciprocity, redistribution and market exchange. 
In reciprocity, which is typically found in small, non-hierarchical, 
kinship-based societies, there is no short-term calculation of profit 
or loss, and – as Mauss pointed out in The Gift – it is the giver 
rather than the receiver who wins prestige. In redistribution, typical 
of traditional chiefdoms, goods are collected at a centre, from which 
they are distributed to the population on the basis of the centre’s 
priorities – often in conspicuous displays of ‘generosity’; here 
again, the giver wins. Only in market exchange, typical of capitalist 
societies, is this relationship reversed: the receiver wins, accumulates 
value and reinvests it in an endless cycle of profit maximisation, in 
which money plays a pivotal role. Each of these three ‘ideal types’ 
is based on particular institutions (kinship, the state, money), and 
may be found mixed with the others in empirical societies. There are 
elements of market exchange in kin-based societies, just as there are 
elements of gift exchange in our own economy. Polanyi, however, 
focused particularly on situations in which one or the other type of 
economy was dominant, and thus arrived at a vaguely evolutionist 
model of social development incorporating three stages (a common 
model, as we saw in Chapter 2).
To the formalists, like Firth and Herskovits, this evolutionist 
tendency was anathema (Frankenberg 1967), and they tried to show 
that maximisation regulated economic activities everywhere. The 
substantivists regarded this as ethnocentric (Sahlins 1972), and their 
favourite classic was Mauss, who had emphasised the differences 
between dominant logics of action in different types of society.
The controversy fizzled out as Marxian economic thinking (which 
sought to incorporate both substantivist and formalist approaches) 
gained currency. But analogous controversies have continued to 
surface in other parts of anthropology, for example in discussions 
of ritual, where Leach (1968) defined ritual not (substantively) 
as confined to a particular kind of institution, but as a formal 
communicative aspect of any action. Similarly, the debate on alliance 
and descent theory (Chapter 6) opposed a view of kinship as a 
(formalist) ‘alliance building activity’ to an idea of kinship as a 
method of formation of (substantial) ‘corporate groups’. It might 
even be argued that postmodernism (Chapter 8) was a peculiar type 
of formalism, inasmuch as it sought to do away with essentialisa-
tion – the tendency to regard diffuse formal aggregates of process 
as distinct (substantive) ‘things’.
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THE mANCHESTER SCHOOl
By 1950, thanks to institutional expansion and retirements, the 
leading figures in postwar British social anthropology were nearly 
all firmly in place at central academic institutions: Firth succeeded 
Malinowski at the LSE in 1944; Daryll Forde became professor at 
University College London in 1945; Evans-Pritchard at Oxford in 
1946, Gluckman at Manchester in 1949 (a couple of years after 
leaving the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute), Fortes at Cambridge in 
1950, and Schapera at the LSE, also in 1950. Leach was appointed 
to a lectureship at Cambridge in 1953.
There were important differences within this elite, which must 
nevertheless have seemed a tightly integrated clan seen from the 
outside, not least from the sprawling field of American anthropology. 
In a debate with Firth in 1951, George P. Murdock accused the 
British of closing ranks and refusing to engage in the discourse 
of global (by which he perhaps meant American) anthropology 
(Stocking 1995: 432ff.). However, the internal differences in British 
anthropology were real enough. Fortes, Evans-Pritchard and Forde 
remained associated with structural-functionalism, although the 
latter two increasingly chose alternative paths – Evans-Pritchard 
repudiated Radcliffe-Brown’s ideals of a ‘natural science of society’ 
(Chapter 6), while Daryll Forde, who was drawn to ecological 
anthropology during his student days at Berkeley, pursued this 
interest at University College London, where he founded and led 
a department that was unique in Britain for its ecological and 
material orientation. Firth, Richards and Leach developed very 
different brands of Malinowskian functionalism; in Leach’s case 
with a structural twist. Finally, Gluckman and Schapera occupied 
a middle ground. They were self-declared structural-functionalists, 
but their thematic interests were closer to those of Leach and Firth, 
who, like them, were vitally concerned with the study of social 
change. Of these leading figures, Gluckman, Leach and Evans-
Pritchard would be most directly involved in changing the face of 
British anthropology.
The 1950s and 1960s saw fundamental changes in the British 
tradition. Some of the most important, notably the turn ‘from 
function to meaning’, will be dealt with in the next chapter. Here 
we shall concern ourselves with a second change of importance, the 
turn ‘from structure to process’.
As we saw above (Chapter 4), structural-functionalism had, 
during the 1940s, undergone a transformation. Social change was 
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no longer a non-theme, nor were conflict or process. Nevertheless, 
some scholars were dissatisfied with the slow pace at which this 
reorientation proceeded, others were simply overwhelmed by the 
reality of change among the peoples they studied. There was a 
growing consensus that structural-functionalism, for all its virtues, 
was just not very good at giving meaning to change. And change, 
as became increasingly evident, was everywhere, not only in the 
colonised societies, where it was all too obvious: even uncontacted 
primitive groups (for example, in New Guinea) existed in a state of 
imperfect cohesion and instability. Change seemed to be an essential 
part of the human condition.
It is hardly surprising that the issue of social change first came to 
the fore in British anthropology among scholars studying people who 
were themselves undergoing rapid, unpredictable and irreversible 
change. The prime example of this was the research conducted at 
the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute (later also at the University of 
Manchester), which focused on the effects of urbanisation, labour 
migration and rapid population growth in Africa. This research 
was pioneering, both in its methods and its subject matter, and was 
in no small measure responsible for the demolition of structural-
functionalism – ironically, perhaps, since the school’s main theorist, 
Gluckman, was a self-proclaimed protégé of Radcliffe-Brown.
The Rhodes-Livingstone Institute (RLI) was founded by 
Godfrey Wilson (1908–1944) in 1938 and led by him until he 
was forced to resign by the colonial administration (due to his 
radical political views and his pacifism) in 1942. He was succeeded 
by Max Gluckman, another radical. Wilson is best remembered 
for his discussion of ‘acculturation’ in Essay on the Economics 
of Detribalisation in Northern Rhodesia (1941–42). He predicted 
that colonialism would ultimately result in massive cultural change 
and ‘detribalisation’. Years later, several leading anthropologists at 
the RLI would argue against this view, claiming instead that the 
effect of urban life on identity was re-tribalisation (Mitchell 1956; 
Epstein 1958), since the migrants were, in the new complex setting, 
continuously reminded of their identity as members of one group as 
opposed to the many others surrounding them in their new, urban 
environments. Like Wilson, many scholars at the RLI studied the 
mining towns of Northern Rhodesia’s (now Zambia’s), Copperbelt. 
Their research, proceeding over many years, demonstrated 
conclusively that traditional social forms, such as kinship, might 
be maintained and even strengthened under conditions of rapid 
change – ‘returning to life’ in the modern world, pregnant with 
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new meaning. A famous study in this genre was Peter Worsley’s 
The Trumpet Shall Sound (1957), an analysis of messianistic cargo 
cults in Melanesia, which he describes as creative responses to the 
sudden and short-lived Western influence that many of the islands 
in the region experienced during the war. Similar perspectives have 
later proved useful in studies of ethnicity and nationalism (Chapter 
7). Worsley, a card-carrying member of the Communist Party, was 
denied a research permit, first to Africa ,then to New Guinea, and 
had to base his study on existing literature.
Under the successive leadership of Wilson and Gluckman, the 
RLI opened up several new research fields associated with social 
change. The transformation of tribal life was investigated – many 
fieldworkers followed the same tribal groups both in town and in 
their traditional settings. They studied ethnicity or ‘re-tribalisation’ 
(Mitchell 1956; Epstein 1958). They investigated race relations in 
the mining towns, at a time when racial discrimination was still 
considered the domain of sociologists in British anthropology. They 
also engaged in applied research, which was unheard of at the 
metropolitan departments.
The methods employed were equally innovative, indeed, it may 
be argued that the methodological contribution of the Manchester 
school was the most significant in anthropology since Malinowski. 
The practical problems of studying social life in the disorganised, 
conflict-ridden mining towns were formidable, and Malinowski’s 
magisterial fieldwork on the tiny Trobriand Islands offered few clues. 
Some scholars experimented with quantitative methods, hitherto 
uncommon in anthropology: James Mitchell, Arnold Epstein and 
Elizabeth Colson used statistics and regression analysis in attempts 
to generate accurate data on social distance and network structure. 
‘Network analysis’, pioneered by John Barnes (1954) was designed 
to trace the changing formal and informal relationships between 
people who were not firmly localised. The idea of ‘scale’, formulated 
by Wilson, allowed data to be sorted as relevant to local, regional, 
national or global levels of social organisation. The most important 
innovation was undoubtedly Gluckman’s own ‘situational analysis’ 
(see below), which his student Jaap van Velsen (1967) formalised 
under the sobriquet ‘extended case method’. These essential tools 
of anthropological methodology remain in active use today.
The parallels to the Chicago school are striking, and the British-
Rhodesian researchers were perhaps aware of their work. But they 
were still primarily British social anthropologists. The success of 
the Manchester school was premised on the fact of colonialism 
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– which Wilson and Gluckman both actively opposed – and on 
the opportunities it opened up for alliances between metropolitan 
university departments and key research stations in the periphery. 
The department in Manchester could offer many of its students 
three-year research fellowships at the RLI (similar arrangements 
existed between the University of Cambridge and the East African 
Institute of Social Research at Makerere in Uganda, led successively 
by Aidan Southall and Audrey Richards).
What the Manchester anthropologists demonstrated, above all, 
was that change was not a simple object of study. One could not, 
as the structural-functionalists seem to have assumed, understand 
change simply by describing the social structure as it existed before 
and after the change, and postulating simple transformational rules, 
which ‘explained’ what had happened in the meantime. Gluckman 
and his colleagues showed that when local effects of global processes 
are investigated empirically, they dissolve into complex webs of 
social relations, which are in ceaseless change and influence each 
other mutually. This was the idea behind Barnes’ social networks 
(ultimately derived from Georg Simmel), as opposed to Radcliffe-
Brown’s Durkheimian (and far more static) ‘social structure’. Thus, 
an idea of change as rule-governed transformations between given 
states was slowly giving way to an idea of change as fundamentally 
unpredictable – a result of countless individual relations, each of 
which was reflexive and variable.
Max Gluckman (1911–1975) had taken his PhD at Oxford under 
Evans-Pritchard and Fortes. He came to the RLI in 1939, and served 
as director there from 1942 to 1947, when he was denied entry to 
Northern Rhodesia for his radical views and his championship of 
miners’ rights, and returned to England. Gluckman’s background, as 
a left-leaning Jew from South Africa, did not give him much in the 
way of automatic support from the British academic establishment, 
and it was thanks to Evans-Pritchard’s and Fortes’ support that 
he gained the Chair at Manchester in 1949. Much of Gluckman’s 
research in southern Africa dealt with legal and political conflicts and 
their resolution (Gluckman 1965). After his move to Manchester, 
Gluckman’s influence on the RLI continued throughout the 1950s, 
and for several years after Zambian independence. 
Gluckman’s theoretical orientation was a unique blend. As his 
student Bruce Kapferer (2006) puts it, he was primarily a structural-
functionalist and a Durkheimian, in that he, like Durkheim and 
Radcliffe-Brown, sought the underlying structures of social life, and 
the ‘logics of action’ imposed by them on human consciousness. To 
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this Durkheimian basis, Gluckman added the notion of the critical 
event, the turning point, the crisis. In this he was inspired by the 
Austrian psychologist Sigmund Freud, whose detailed descriptions 
of atypical critical cases revealed underlying motivations in the 
subject, and by Marx, whose ideas of contradiction and resolution 
(dialectics) added historical context to the critical event. The crisis 
could either be resolved (as in carnivalistic rituals that allow people 
to air their frustrations in a controlled environment), or it could 
resist resolution, resulting in irreversible changes, in which, however, 
the past always continued to play an active role. In either case, 
Gluckman emphasised, change was incessant and omnipresent, 
only coming to a point in crises. This theoretical stance implied a 
particular and innovative methodology – situational analysis – which 
became the hallmark of the entire Manchester school: a crucial event 
or situation is isolated and examined in increasing detail and over 
ever-widening ‘scales’ of context, to produce a ‘bottom-up’ view on 
the large-scale dynamics of macrosocial units (regions, nations, the 
world market) that were inaccessible to Malinowskian fieldwork.
Gluckman’s relationship to Malinowski was ambiguous. He 
acknowledged the master’s eye for detail and his methodological 
flair, but was critical of the lack of generalisation and historical 
depth in his work (Kapferer 2006). He shared the Malinowskians’ 
concern with social change, but saw change more as a product 
of confrontation between disparate elements of structure than as 
brought about by the tactical choices of individuals. While change 
for Malinowski himself was merely disruptive, Gluckman saw 
structures in change that contained the seeds of a new order. Thus, 
in his contribution to African Political Systems, he focused on the 
tensions between the traditional political system of the Zulu and 
the colonial administration imposed upon them, and asked what 
were the results of this critical conjunction. Unlike many of his 
contemporaries, Gluckman was acutely aware of the conflict-ridden 
nature of all societies, which were kept in one piece imperfectly and 
through hard work. Adam Kuper (1996) notes that Gluckman’s 
and Malinowski’s lineages practically converged in the late 1950s, 
through the remarkably similar work of Frederick Bailey and 
Fredrik Barth on political strategies. Characteristically, however, 
the (Manchester-schooled) structural orientation in Bailey’s work 
(1960) on caste-climbing and local politics in Orissa, India, is absent 
from (Cambridge-schooled) Barth (see below).
Gluckman’s interest in the crisis led him to do important research 
on ritual. The idea that ritual can contain crisis and strengthen 
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social cohesion is present as early as in Durkheim’s sociology of 
religion. In Gluckman’s work, and still more pointedly in that of 
his student, Victor Turner (Chapter 6), this basic idea inspires a 
notion of ritual as a locus of dynamic processes of meaning-making 
and social change.
mETHODOlOGiCAl iNDiViDUAliSTS AT CAmBRiDGE
The Manchester school was important in reorienting British 
anthropology – from integration to process, from continuity to 
change. Still, no one had yet confronted structural-functional-
ism head-on. The mainstream were cautious. Their intellectual 
lineage stemmed from Durkheim, and the metaphor of society 
as a functionally integrated organism was implicit in their work 
throughout the 1950s, however innovative it otherwise might be. 
Malinowski’s students, unhampered by axiomatic notions of social 
integration, had an easier time with social change. Malinowski 
himself had given the individual primacy over society, leaving more 
room for improvisation, variation and creativity than in structural-
functionalism, which was increasingly seen as a straitjacket as the 
1950s drew on.
Like his teacher, Raymond Firth was not primarily a theorist, but 
an ethnographer, and it was as such he maintained the need for a 
theory of social change. Wherever he went on fieldwork – among 
Maoris in New Zealand or Tikopians in Polynesia, among Malay 
fishermen or Englishmen in London – he saw social change taking 
place, and he saw the individual as the crucial agent of change. In 
his major theoretical work, Elements of Social Organisation (1951), 
Firth tries to nudge social anthropology towards a more flexible view 
of society. The ‘kinshipology’ of Radcliffe-Brown’s students was at 
the height of its prestige. Evans-Pritchard was still a loyal structural-
functionalist, and all major departments except at the LSE were 
directed by anthropologists of structural-functionalist persuasions. 
It would have been impossible for Firth to ignore these facts. He 
therefore nods critically, but respectfully, to the core notions of 
‘function’ and ‘structure’. He does not exclude the possibility of 
a stable social structure, but proposes a complementary concept, 
to capture the dynamic, shifting character of social action. That 
concept, borrowed from none other than Radcliffe-Brown, is social 
organisation. While social structure refers to the stable arrangements 
of society, social organisation is the actual flow of social life, in 
which individual interests meet, conflicts and compromises grow, 
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and the pragmatics of everyday life may deviate very considerably 
from the normative social structure without destroying it. Or in 
other words, action does not follow directly from norms, but passes 
first through a filter of tactical and strategic choice.
The discrete and diplomatic Firth was the mediator of his 
generation. He bridged gaps within the British school, gently 
preparing the ground for the more aggressive assaults on struc-
tural-functionalism that were to come, while maintaining an active 
dialogue with American anthropologists during a period when 
sustained contacts across the Atlantic were rare.
It was Cambridge that became the hotbed of the radical 
Malinowskians, who would eventually not only question the idea 
that society is inherently cohesive, but try to shift the attention 
of the discipline away from social wholes and towards individual 
action. Cambridge, a backwater of British anthropology until 
Fortes accepted the Chair in 1950, would for the next two decades 
simultaneously be a stronghold of structural-functionalism – 
primarily through Fortes and his student Jack Goody (1919–) – and 
a centre of radical innovation. In 1949, Fortes published the article 
‘Time and social structure: an Ashanti case study’, a structural-
functionalist tour de force, which showed that while the social 
structure of households unfolded over time, structure would seem 
to change while in fact merely repeating a well-known movement. 
(Here Fortes is expanding on the interest in ‘domestic kinship’ 
that we noted in Chapter 4.) In 1958, the cue was taken up by 
Goody in his edited volume The Developmental Cycle of Domestic 
Groups, which explores the mutual influence of kinship, resources, 
and structural changes imposed by the changing composition of 
households in the course of their development. Goody had done 
fieldwork in Ghana, but made his name by his bold, provocative – 
and increasingly unfashionable – comparative syntheses. Fortes and 
Goody both responded to the spirit of the times: even if the change 
they described was illusory, it was still (in the short term) change.
Edmund Leach (1910–1989), perhaps the most formidable 
personality among the young Cambridge anthropologists, pursued 
very different interests. A former student of Malinowski and 
Firth, Leach was educated as an engineer before he became an 
anthropologist. He was appointed to his position at Cambridge in 
1953. In 1956, another influential student of Malinowski’s, Audrey 
Richards (1899–1984), also came to town, to direct the new Centre 
for African Studies. Richards, who had done extensive fieldwork 
among the Bemba of Northern Rhodesia, had been an early critic 
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of Evans-Pritchard’s work on the Nuer, arguing that the facts on the 
ground were too complex to fit his models. Like Firth, Richards did 
pioneering work in economic anthropology before the war (Richards 
1939); her early work on nutrition makes her one of the founders of 
medical anthropology (Richards 1932); and in the year she went to 
Cambridge, she published an influential study of female initiation 
rituals (Richards 1956). It was through Richards’ offices that the 
connection between Cambridge and the East African Institute at 
Makerere in Uganda was forged (see above). Other anthropolo-
gists associated with Cambridge in the 1950s included Gluckman’s 
student, John Barnes, later professor at Canberra, and Fredrik Barth 
(1928–), a Norwegian who spent two years at Cambridge, where 
he took his PhD and wrote the classic Political Leadership among 
Swat Pathans (1959), a title echoing Leach’s own seminal Political 
Systems of Highland Burma (1954). There was, in other words, a 
group of political anthropologists at Cambridge in the 1950s who 
had a weak sense of loyalty towards the dominant orthodoxy.
The focus on politics (a subject rarely foregrounded in Fortes’ 
and Goody’s domestic kinship-oriented work) was part of the legacy 
of structural-functionalism (Chapter 4). It could be argued, in 
retrospect, that in stressing the importance of political institutions, 
structural-functionalism was digging its own grave. Politics is ‘the art 
of the possible’, not ‘the art of the legal’. It is about stretching rules – 
and breaking them, when opportune – not about stable allegiance to 
shared moral norms. Sooner or later, political anthropology would 
have to come to terms with the inherently manipulative dimensions 
of politics.
At Cambridge, Leach and Barth both saw this point, but in a 
somewhat different light than their colleagues at Manchester. Barth 
wrote about politics in Swat, north-east Pakistan, as a process 
fuelled by individuals’ interests and strategies. His approach drew 
on the then new science of cybernetics (see below), which described 
complex systems in formal terms such as ‘generative process’ and 
‘feedback’. Barth eloquently demonstrates how the individualis-
tic choices of antagonistic leaders maximising their own interests, 
generate a stable system of two alliances ranged against each other, 
while individuals, for tactical reasons, constantly defect from one 
block to the other. Social structure here has no primacy at all. 
It is a mere epiphenomenon of individual choice subject to the 
practical constraints of kinship, household structure and ecology. 
A comparison of Political Leadership and The Nuer indicates the 
shift that had occurred in British anthropology over the interim 
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20 years. Both books deal with stateless societies and the problem 
of integration; both discuss the politics of segmentary societies. 
However, the analyses differ in almost every other respect: Evans-
Pritchard saw social structure as an overarching principle; individual 
maximisation is the only principle for Barth. Evans-Pritchard 
portrays his people with the aesthetics of a still life; Barth with 
that of a bustling tableau.
Leach’s monograph, upon which Barth’s was in some respects 
modelled, represents yet another approach to this theme. Political 
Systems of Highland Burma was based on fieldwork among the 
Kachin and Shan of northern Burma. Fieldwork was interrupted 
by the Second World War, when Leach enrolled in the Burma army 
and his fieldnotes were lost. The book, accordingly, contains few 
verbatim statements by informants and few accounts of actual 
people. However, whatever it loses in empirical detail it gains in 
analytical focus, and it is perhaps the most influential of all the 
monographs of the 1950s.
Political Systems, like Political Leadership, is a book about tension 
and conflict in politics. Leach thus shares the interests of his main 
antagonist in British anthropology, Max Gluckman, though their 
approaches differ radically. Leach was not the first anthropologist 
to study the relationship between myth and political process, but 
he was probably the first to argue that both are unstable and open 
to widely differing interpretations. The Kachin operate with two 
distinctive models of the political order; one egalitarian (gumlao), 
the other hierarchical (gumsa). Leach showed that the political 
organisation of Kachin villages oscillated between these poles in the 
long term, and that ambivalent elements in their marriage system, 
their economic organisation and their myths could be invoked 
and exploited to justify both. Malinowski had not been wrong in 
assuming that myths are ‘social charters’. But in Leach’s version, 
they were charters for trouble.
In the first chapter of his book, Leach made an important 
distinction between models and reality that was pertinent at a time 
when the validity of Evans-Pritchard’s models of Nuer society was 
the object of heated debate. Models, Leach argued, are idealisations. 
They may be useful in analysis, as simplified points of reference for 
more realistic – and dynamic – descriptions. But even in wholly 
‘traditional’ (and presumably stable) societies, norms cannot be 
translated directly into action, as Evans-Pritchard ostensibly claimed. 
The norms were focal points of ambiguity and stress produced by 
the meeting of opposed interests, and used by them to further their 
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own purposes. Leach is not entirely clear regarding the distinction 
between models devised by the anthropologist and native models, 
and this gives his conclusions a somewhat speculative flavour. 
The book nevertheless delves into the complex interrelationship 
of myth and power, revealing the space for individual manoeuvre 
that their intersection opens up. Leach demonstrated that social 
life is intrinsically volatile, that cultural categories are contested 
and open to interpretation, and stressed the legitimating functions 
of myth in politics, as Malinowski had done before him. The book 
played a pivotal role in establishing a research programme that is 
still very much alive as we write.
Towards the end of the 1960s, the atmosphere at Cambridge 
lost some of its edge, as the many talented students left to start 
their own careers. After Richards’ departure, in 1967, only Leach, 
Goody and Fortes remained of the original group. Leach’s interests 
had migrated from politics to symbolism (Chapter 6), Goody 
pursued his large-scale comparisons, with emphasis, by now, on 
literacy and the state. Fortes was approaching retirement. Barth 
had moved to the University of Bergen, Norway, in 1961, where 
he founded and led the Department of Social Anthropology at 
the recently established University of Bergen, and spent the 1960s 
building up a group of researchers devoted to the actor-oriented 
analysis he had pioneered, and in the process laid the groundwork 
for contemporary Scandinavian anthropology. The contributions 
of this department would range from studies of development 
issues in the Sudan to studies of entrepreneurship in northern 
Norway, and – increasingly – to ethnic relations. In 1966, Barth 
published a booklet called Models of Social Organization, a 
spirited attempt to demolish the Durkheimian concept of society 
once and for all. He argued that social structure is nothing but 
an aggregate generated by ‘transactions’ – pragmatic, strategic 
exchanges between maximising individuals. On the one hand, the 
constant negotiation of transactions generates a value consensus, 
on the other, it generates statistical regularities in the distribution 
of various kinds of action: ‘social forms’, Barth called them, which 
was the closest he ever came to a concept of social structure. This 
work, heavily inspired by the formal modelling techniques that 
were gaining currency in economics and political science at the 
time, was probably the harshest attack on structural-functionalism 
to date, and created considerable debate. In 1967, Barth convened 
a conference that would lead to the book for which he is most 
widely known today: Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (Chapter 7).
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ROlE ANAlySiS AND SySTEm THEORy
The study of social interaction, which had always been a mainstay 
of British anthropology and became even more prominent with the 
new methodological individualists, had never attained the same 
position in the USA, where culture occupied centre stage. As noted 
earlier, however, there were important exceptions. The work of the 
Chicago school and the formalist economic anthropologists come 
to mind, as well as the psychologically oriented contributions of 
Ralph Linton (Chapter 4). It was Linton (1937) who introduced 
the later common distinction between status and role, which (at the 
level of the individual) corresponds closely to Firth’s later distinction 
between social structure and social organisation (on the level of 
society). Status, in Linton’s terminology, is defined by moral norms, 
expectations from other individuals, and the actor’s formal position 
in a structure of relations. Role, in contrast, is the enactment of 
status in actual behaviour. While the status is static, a given, much 
like the script of a drama, the role is dynamic. It rests on status, as 
the actor’s performance rests on the script, but cannot be reduced 
to it. Role enactment demands and enables active interpretation 
and inventive departures from the norm. Linton was also the first 
to write systematically about the difference between acquired and 
ascribed status and about role conflict.
Nevertheless, the social theorist who is best known for his role 
theory is the Chicago microsociologist Erving Goffman (1922–1982), 
who carried out detailed studies of interaction and communication 
in small-scale settings in modern society, and developed a subtle 
conceptual apparatus for describing the rituals and routines of 
everyday life. In contrast to Parsons – the dominant sociological 
theorist in the USA at the time – Goffman consistently focused on the 
actor, on his or her motivations, strategies, decisions and concerns. 
In The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959) he introduced 
his dramaturgical perspective, which took the metaphor of an actor 
on a stage much further than Linton ever did. Adding terms like 
role distance, stigma, under- and over-communication, deference 
and demeanour, frames and interaction ritual to the vocabulary of 
the social sciences, Goffman showed how each actor had ample 
room for manoeuvre within the constraints laid by status. His subtle 
observations of people interacting in everyday situations while 
observing, interpreting and communicating their (spontaneous, 
self-conscious or faked) intentions and reactions to themselves and 
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each other – raised to new heights our understanding of the intense 
reflexivity that characterises human social life (Goffman 1967).
Unlike much of the work undertaken by American anthropolo-
gists in the 1950s and 1960s, Goffman’s fresh, lucid and often 
provocative writings crossed the Atlantic quickly, where they were 
happily deployed in the war against structural-functionalism, though 
Goffman’s thinking is often very close to Durkheim’s. In the USA, 
in contrast, his influence was at first largely confined to sociology.
Another innovation of the early postwar years had a somewhat 
similar fate. Cybernetics, the theory of complex, self-regulating 
systems (computers are a prime example), was developed in the 
late 1940s by an interdisciplinary group under the leadership of 
the mathematician Norbert Wiener (1948), and gained instant 
practical importance in computer design. Ecologists, biologists, 
psychologists, economists and scholars in a number of other sciences 
quickly put the theory to use. Cybernetics entered anthropology 
at an early stage, thanks to Bateson, who was associated with 
Wiener’s group. Cybernetics focuses on relationships of circular 
causation or feedback, where ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ mutually influence 
each other. It studies the flow of information in such circuits. By 
linking circuit to circuit with ‘logical switches’ (which direct the 
flow along specific paths), a vast, interconnected web conveying 
meaningful impulses is formed. The ecosystem and the body are 
examples of such webs, and, as Bateson realised, there is in principle 
no reason why society should not be described in the same way. The 
result is a kind of functionalism, and indeed, it may be claimed that 
cybernetics renders at least part of the criticism against functionalist 
tautology obsolete. Cybernetically inspired anthropology differs 
from functionalism, however, in that all the internal connections 
of the system must be specified explicitly.
In a number of articles that were later collected in Steps to 
an Ecology of Mind (1972), Bateson devised a theory of human 
communication that he applied (at times, whimsically) to such 
diverse subjects as aesthetics, ecological flexibility, animal 
communication, schizophrenia and the constitution of the Self. An 
important contribution was his concept metacommunication, which 
denotes messages embedded in normal communication that inform 
the recipient that he is receiving information of a specific kind. By 
framing our messages in this way, we define for each other the 
context to which they belong (this is love; this is play; this is politics).
In this aspect of his thinking, Bateson resembles Goffman, and like 
Goffman, he was ignored by most American anthropologists in his 
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day. However, and again like Goffman, he would exert an unfocused 
but pervasive influence on anthropologists in most countries during 
the rest of the twentieth century and into the new millennium.
A changing world demands theories tailored to the study of 
change. This was the basic challenge faced by anthropologists, both 
in Britain and in the USA. In both cases too, the challenge emerged 
against a background of hegemonic social theories that described 
an idealised image of society (social structure) or culture (ethos). 
Both groups of innovators therefore reacted with a focus on the 
practical side of life. However, if they shared an interest in the 
practical, material processes of change, they disagreed deeply as to 
how these processes ought to be studied. In the USA, the rediscovery 
of Marx and Morgan implied a focus on institutions, structural 
analyses of inequality, the conditions for development and underde-
velopment, and other aspects of large-scale change. From Benedict’s 
individualist, psychological anthropology, Steward, White and their 
students moved toward large-scale historical processes. In Britain, 
the opposite was the case: attention moved from the collective to 
the individual. The leading orthodoxy, structural-functionalism, 
was collectivist in its orientation, and was attacked not only for 
offering a static, frozen image of the world, but also for not leaving 
the individual space for manoeuvre. While in the American analyses, 
change proceeded from institutional and historical processes, the 
typical agent of change in Britain was a calculating strategist or an 
innovative entrepreneur. Moreover, while the American evolutionists 
saw power (with Marx) as an outcome of global economic dynamics, 
the British interactionists (with Weber) saw it as a political resource 
subject to individual competition. Thus, the movement towards 
‘change’ was far from uniform.
If this chapter has shown how economics and politics were 
reconceptualised during the 1950s and 1960s, the next chapter 
will discuss how new theories of symbolic meaning transformed the 
subject. Here, too, developments in the USA and Britain differed, 
though the problems raised were similar. Yet the single most 
important theorist was French.
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The Power of Symbols
In the first decades of the twentieth century, the younger generation 
of anthropologists carefully distanced themselves from the search for 
historical origins that was characteristic of the nineteenth century. 
They sought an anthropology based on synchronous analysis 
and meticulous observation. By the 1950s, a new generation was 
rediscovering change, either as an evolutionary movement (in the 
United States) or an outcome of individual action (in Britain). All 
the while, other anthropologists were looking for new ways to study 
meaning and symbolism.
Research on the meaning of symbols was nothing new. In the 
United States, in particular, the ‘discovery’ was not at all subversive. 
The most important young American symbolic anthropologists, 
Clifford Geertz and David Schneider, who worked together at 
Chicago until Geertz moved to Princeton in 1970, saw themselves 
as inheritors of the Boasian tradition, who had added Parsonian 
system theory to Boas’ concern with symbolic culture. In Britain, 
the situation was very different. There, the study of meaning was 
still associated with Frazer, who had explored the meaning of magic 
and the evolution of belief in The Golden Bough. Durkheim had 
studied religion, but chiefly in its ritual aspect, rather than as a 
meaningful system: the organisational practice of religion, rather 
than its content. Weber’s interpretive sociology, notably his studies 
in the sociology of religion, was not well known. The study of 
meaning, in the British context, was tainted with evolutionism and 
best avoided. Culture, as a meaningful system, was widely seen as a 
footnote to the more fundamental workings of social organisation. 
The great exception was Evans-Pritchard, who had followed Frazer 
in his study of Azande witchcraft, before he became a prime mover 
of structural-functionalism. In 1950, he would turn apostate and 
lead British anthropologists into a new future. In France, a third 
path was taken. When Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism became known 
in the 1950s, it was widely hailed as the crowning achievement 
of the tradition from Durkheim and Mauss. But was it? French 
intellectuals would spend years discussing this question.
120
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fROm fUNCTiON TO mEANiNG
We turn to the British situation first. It would be wrong to say 
that the interest in meaning was absent from British anthropology. 
After all, rituals, myths and kinship were studied, none of which 
were intelligible without attention to their meaning. Many scholars, 
however, saw beliefs and symbols as mere expressions of social 
structure. A late but influential example of this approach is the 
widely cited article by Jack Goody and the literary theorist Ian 
Watt, ‘The consequences of literacy’ (Goody and Watt 1963), which 
argued that the introduction of writing irreversibly changed both 
the social structure and the structure of reasoning (or cognitive 
style; Bateson would have called it eidos) of society. This article 
and the edited volume it introduces (Goody 1963) are definitely 
concerned with meaning, but largely with its social and political 
implications, not as an independent system with its own dynamics. 
Evans-Pritchard’s interests were more radical than this.
He could afford to be radical. When he succeeded Radcliffe-
Brown to the Chair at Oxford in 1946, he had already authored 
two hugely influential monographs and co-edited a book – African 
Political Systems – that defined the mainstream research agenda of 
British anthropology for two decades. Ten years later, the companion 
volume, African Systems of Kinship and Marriage, edited by Rad-
cliffe-Brown and Forde, had much less impact. Evans-Pritchard was 
beyond doubt the most powerful social anthropologist of the time. 
He was president of the Royal Anthropological Institute, a member 
of most committees of importance and knew everyone. When, in his 
Marett lecture, ‘Social Anthropology: Past and Present’ in 1950, he 
repudiated structural-functionalism and distanced himself from his 
teacher, this was headline news that was impossible to ignore for the 
anthropological community. In the lecture he claimed, on the one 
hand, that it would be nonsense to believe that synchronous studies 
could yield insights of the same complexity and depth as historical 
studies; on the other, that in terms of method, social anthropology 
had more in common with history than with the natural sciences. He 
was rejecting two of the mainstays of structural-functionalism. In his 
later work, Evans-Pritchard abandons the search for ‘natural laws of 
society’ and attempts, more realistically, to understand the meaning 
of particular social institutions. His second Nuer book, Kinship 
and Marriage among the Nuer (1951b), was more descriptive and 
less theoretically focused than The Nuer. The elegant but simple 
models of The Nuer had in no small measure provoked the turn 
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from structure to process described in the previous chapter. The new 
book went deeper, its conclusions were more ambiguous – and it 
never received the same attention.
In 1958, the philosopher Peter Winch published The Idea of a 
Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy, a book that would 
exert considerable influence on anthropological self-reflection, 
especially in the UK. Winch argued that it was impossible to 
establish objective knowledge about cultural phenomena, since 
their meaning was defined by the cultural universe of which they 
were a part. He adopted a strongly relativist position, arguing that 
there exists no context-independent point of reference from which 
to compare and evaluate other cultures, except for our common 
experiences of universal bodily processes, such as ‘birth, copulation 
and death’ (Winch quotes T.S. Eliot at this point). Anthropology 
was, in Winch’s view, a Western cultural oddity on a par with the 
institution of witchcraft among the Azande, and anthropologists 
had no right to consider their access to knowledge privileged. Winch 
used the Azande monograph as an example of the naive belief in 
the superiority of science. Evans-Pritchard presented a ‘scientific’ 
explanation of the ‘obviously mistaken’ belief in witches. What 
if the tables were turned? How can we know that a witchcraft-
based explanation of the ‘obviously mistaken’ belief in science 
would be less true? Winch’s book was the starting point of a long 
and influential debate about rationality and cultural translation, 
to which both philosophers and anthropologists contributed (B. 
Wilson 1970; Hollis and Lukes 1982; Overing 1985).
It is worth noting that Evans-Pritchard seems to have arrived 
at a similar position as Winch independently. The third volume of 
the Nuer trilogy, Nuer Religion (1956), is more interpretive than 
explanatory; the author declares at the outset that his ambition is to 
make sense of the Nuer worldview, not to explain it sociologically. 
In this, he is in accord with his Oxford colleague and close associate 
in this period, Godfrey Lienhardt, whose later work on the Nuer’s 
neighbours, the Dinka, was similarly interpretive (Lienhardt 1961). 
Understanding and translation had become more pressing issues for 
Evans-Pritchard than explanation and the search for general ‘laws’. 
But it is also true, as his student Mary Douglas (1980) says, that his 
entire oeuvre – from the Azande book onwards – was marked by 
continuity. Even The Nuer, which is often described as a paragon 
of orthodoxy, is at heart an evocative, even a poetic, book.
While the renewed focus on change in British anthropology is 
often described as a turn ‘from structure to process’, the change in 
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Evans-Pritchard’s position was a turn ‘from function to meaning’. 
Two of his intellectual descendants would, in the decades following 
the Marett lecture, with particular success combine a sociology 
of integration with an interpretive method concerned with 
symbolic meaning.
The first of these was Gluckman’s student Victor Turner 
(1920–1983). During the 1950s and 1960s, Turner developed a 
perspective on symbols and social cohesion which has remained 
persistently influential up until our day. Unlike Leach, he was mainly 
concerned with ritual, not myth; and where Leach saw myths as 
focal points for conflict, Turner regarded rituals as ultimately 
cohesive (though not unchanging). As Durkheim had seen, rituals 
offered splendid material for the ethnographer since they expressed 
the central values and tensions of society in intensely concentrated 
form. Though Turner’s approach to ritual would increasingly 
focus on symbolism, he always sought to combine it with an 
underlying Durkheimian notion of social integration. In one of 
the most influential British monographs of the 1950s, Schism and 
Continuity in an African Society (1957), based on fieldwork among 
the Ndembu of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), the main problem 
is a classic one: how do matrilineal societies (like the Ndembu) 
solve the problem of integration? While succession, inheritance and 
group membership are united in a single principle in patrilineally 
organised societies, such rights were distributed in accordance 
with several different criteria in matrilineal systems, seemingly 
predisposing them for ambivalence and instability. In his discussion 
of Ndembu, whose social structure he describes as unstable, Turner 
(inspired by Gluckman’s notion of crisis) introduces the concept 
of the social drama – often a rite of passage – in which underlying 
norms are given symbolic expression, and thus contribute to bring 
a fragmented world together.
While Turner’s monograph remained within the structural-func-
tionalist paradigm, his discussion of social drama suggested that a 
break was under way. In a series of articles written in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s (published as The Ritual Process in 1967), Turner 
developed his influential theory of ritual communication. In ‘Betwixt 
and between: The liminal period in rites-de-passage’, he introduced 
the concept of liminality, later a staple of anthropological studies 
of ritual. Taking his cue from van Gennep’s early work on rites of 
passage (Chapter 3), Turner regards the ritual, and in particular the 
initiation ritual, as a process of transformation whereby a person 
moves from one defined state to another, with an intervening period 
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of uncertainty and crisis. It is this state of crisis – the liminal period 
– that is the focus of the ritual, which the ritual first creates and 
later seeks to control, by imposing the values of society upon the 
wavering individual who, for a short but critical time, finds herself 
‘betwixt and between’. In the borderland between social statuses, 
neither old nor new rules apply, and the individual is compelled to 
reflect on her personal situation, her place in society and indeed 
the legitimacy of society as such. Thus, liminality is a critical and 
creative state of being, and change a potential of any ritual. And 
yet, the initiate is nearly always reintegrated into society.
The continuity with both Durkheim and Gluckman is strong in 
Turner’s work, which nevertheless stands out through its emphasis 
on the individual, on the multivocality of symbols, and on the 
creative potential of the crisis. Turner’s emphasis on multivocality 
implies that symbols themselves might be tension-filled sources 
of change, and that the same symbol might mean different things 
to different people, thus creating a sense of community among 
people who are otherwise very different. This perspective would 
later be mined by others, not least scholars of nationalism (Chapter 
8). By placing the liminal crisis at the core of every ritual, Turner 
introduced a basic uncertainty to the very heart of ‘the sacred’, 
which in Durkheim was the ultimate guarantor of social cohesion.
Another Africanist of structural-functionalist descent who would 
propel social anthropology towards the study of symbols, was 
Evans-Pritchard’s student, Mary Douglas (1921–2007). Douglas 
studied the Lele of Kasai, Belgian Congo, in the late 1950s. This 
brought her into contact with French and Belgian anthropologists, 
and she would in time become a bridge-builder between the French 
and British traditions. Her most influential early work was not 
the monograph from her fieldwork, but a comparative study of 
symbolic boundaries and classification, Purity and Danger (1966). 
The book combines an almost orthodox structural-functionalism 
with a symbolic analysis drawing on structuralist and psychoanalyti-
cal models. An anthropological bestseller on a par with Patterns of 
Culture, Purity and Danger can be seen as a British counterpart to 
Benedict’s book. In both books, the concern is with group identity 
and values; but whereas Benedict restricts herself to the symbolic 
aspects of culture, Douglas links symbols to social institutions 
as a classical Durkheimian. She sees symbols as means of social 
classification, which distinguish categories of objects, persons or 
actions, and keep them separate. The order of the classificatory 
system reflects and symbolises the social order, and ‘intermediate’, 
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‘unclassifiable’ phenomena come to represent a threat to social 
stability. Snakes (animals without legs) and substances that pass in 
and out of the body, are problematic. Foodstuffs are often ordered 
in hierarchies of ‘pure’ and ‘polluted’, which have nothing to do 
with their nutritional value. Bodily waste is universally polluting 
and potentially dangerous, since it symbolically challenges our 
humanness. Where Barth, for example, might see an unorthodox, 
unclassifiable person as a potential entrepreneur who may bring 
about change, Douglas might see the same person as a classificatory 
anomaly. The contrast hints at the differences between symbolic and 
actor-centred perspectives, as they appeared in British anthropology 
in the 1960s.
Both Douglas and Turner would refine and expand their perspectives 
through the next decades. Douglas would do pioneering work on 
the cultural dimension of consumption (Douglas and Isherwood 
1979), risk perception and modern technology, and institutional 
anthropology. Turner, who moved to the United States in 1961, 
would develop his ideas of liminality into a general theory of ritual 
performance (Turner 1969, 1974, 1987). Though Turner died in 
1983, his influence continued to grow during the 1980s and 1990s, 
when his concern with performative play and reflexivity would be 
welcomed by the postmodernist movement in anthropology, and 
by anthropologists concerned with bodily experience, emotions and 
the symbolic dimensions of power (Chapter 8). Turner’s intellectual 
itinerary passes from fairly orthodox structural-functionalism to a 
radical focus on aesthetics and performance, but he remains at heart 
a Durkheimian – though his version of Durkheim differs radically 
from Radcliffe-Brown’s.
ETHNOSCiENCE AND SymBOliC ANTHROPOlOGy
While anthropologists like Evans-Pritchard were busy distancing 
themselves from the natural sciences and reflecting the ideals of the 
German cultural historians, others made the opposite move. This 
was not only true of the American cultural ecologists and British 
methodological individualists, but also of many linguistic anthro-
pologists in the USA.
Several of Edward Sapir’s successors explored semantics and 
language structures with exact methods. Some devised quantitative 
research strategies that allowed them to measure frequency patterns of 
linguistic terms and correlate them across languages, in cooperation 
with psychologists, mathematicians and other workers in the 
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emerging interdisciplinary field of cognitive science (Chapter 9), itself 
heavily inspired by cybernetics (Chapter 5). Among the foremost of 
these were Harold Conklin, Charles Frake and Ward Goodenough, 
who all contributed to the development of ethnoscience in the 1950s. 
Ethnoscience was concerned with describing ‘cultural grammars’, by 
identifying the building blocks of semantic universes or systems of 
knowledge. They drew on both the culture and personality school’s 
interest in socialisation, on formal linguistics and on the comparative 
study of classification, to which Sapir and Whorf (and, before them, 
Durkheim and Mauss) had contributed. In its most technical form, 
ethnoscience appeared as componential analysis, which broke down 
meaningful expressions into more elementary ‘features’, to allow 
precise definitions of meaning. 
In its original form, ethnoscience died out during the 1960s, but 
the issues it raised have later been pursued in cognitive anthropology 
(D’Andrade 1995; Shore 1996). In both schools, the relationship 
between the universal and the culturally specific was of concern. 
Colour classification was an early, and relatively simple, field to be 
explored in this way. There were parallels between ethnoscience 
and the rationality debate in Britain, on the one hand, and Lévi-
Straussian structuralism, on the other. Unlike Winch or Lévi-Strauss, 
however, the ethnoscientists worked inductively, amassing huge 
amounts of data which were processed by the massive, sluggish 
computers of the day.
In the 1950s, American anthropology was still dominated by 
Boas’ students, who produced predictable work in the culture-
and-personality tradition, often merged with the Durkheimian 
and Weberian ideas that were gradually gaining acceptance in 
the USA, largely through the work of Talcott Parsons. One of 
the most interesting monographs of this period was Kluckhohn’s 
Navaho Witchcraft (1944), which resembles Evans-Pritchard’s 
Azande monograph, in that it combines sociological analysis with 
psychological perspectives.
After Boas’ death, the pater familias of American anthropology 
was Kroeber. In 1952, he published, with Clyde Kluckhohn 
(1905–1960), Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and 
Definitions, which discusses 162 definitions of culture, and ends by 
recommending the abandonment of Tylor’s and Boas’ all-embracing 
concept in favour of a definition limited to cognitive (symbolic, 
meaningful) culture.
Thus, the turn towards meaning that took place in Britain had 
its parallel in the USA, not least thanks to Parsons’ influence. From 
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his powerful position at Harvard, Parsons dominated American 
sociology in the 1950s. He had monumental visions for the social 
sciences, and was well connected with funding agencies. He 
suggested a ‘temporary division of labour’ between sociology and 
anthropology, in which sociologists would study power, labour 
and social organisation, while anthropologists (in accordance with 
Kroeber and Kluckhohn’s recommendations from 1952) would 
focus on the symbolic and meaningful aspects of social life. In an 
article jointly authored by Parsons and Kroeber in 1958, this ‘truce’ 
(as the authors called it) was programmatically endorsed (Kuper 
1999: 69). Although the majority of twentieth-century American 
anthropologists had already gravitated towards the symbolic, the 
‘truce’ attempted to narrow the discipline’s scope still further. From 
Kroeber’s point of view, this was a last-ditch attempt to escape the 
influence of social science and maintain anthropology’s humanistic, 
German roots. As the growth of Steward’s programme shows 
(Chapter 5), he had at best partial success at this. 
GEERTZ AND SCHNEiDER
Two postgraduates who received funds through a joint Parso-
nian-Kroeberian programme at Harvard were Clifford Geertz 
(1926–2006) and David M. Schneider (1918–1995). Both took part 
in interdisciplinary projects during their PhD studies – Schneider 
doing fieldwork on Yap, in Micronesia, Geertz on Java. Both at 
the time endorsed the cognitive definition of culture, with Geertz, 
in his early work, carefully distinguishing between two ‘logics 
of integration’: society, or social structure (‘causal-functional’ 
integration), and culture, or the symbolic realm (‘logico-meaning-
ful’ integration). Each subsystem, he argued, could in principle be 
studied independently of the other.
In the 1960s, Geertz and Schneider emerged as the most important 
American symbolic anthropologists (along with Turner, who was 
by now in the USA), with research programmes that were sharply 
opposed to the materialist agendas of Steward’s students, such as 
Wolf or Sahlins (for a while a colleague of Geertz at Chicago). They 
agreed that Kroeber and Parson’s ‘truce’ had become a straitjacket, 
but instead of defining anthropology as a branch of sociology, they 
expanded – as Boas no doubt would have done – the field of culture 
as a symbolic system. Culture was a system of Weberian interpre-
tations (Chapter 2) – of one’s own acts as well as others’. They 
claimed that action was impossible without interpretation – that 
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is, without meaning – and thus made substantial inroads into the 
‘exclusive domain’ of sociology. In Britain, this view was often 
misunderstood as a claim that meaning could be studied without 
reference to social organisation, which to social anthropologists 
seemed patently absurd.
Schneider’s best known work is American Kinship (1968), a 
study of American kinship terms based on interview data collected 
by his students. The ‘American Kinship Project’ was the result of 
cooperation between Firth and Schneider. The two anthropolo-
gists had spent a year together at Stanford University in the late 
1950s, and agreed that it would be interesting to extend anthro-
pological kinship studies to modern society. They inaugurated a 
comparative project of middle-class kinship in London (Firth) and 
Chicago (Schneider). Although the comparative aspect of the project 
was never realised and the two studies were published separately, 
Schneider’s book became a milestone in kinship research; in part 
because it demonstrated that kinship studies in complex societies 
were both possible and interesting, and in part because it forced a 
fundamental reassessment of anthropological notions of kinship.
After Evans-Pritchard’s defection and the appearance new 
perspectives on politics and ritual at Manchester and Cambridge, 
kinship remained the last stronghold of structural-functionalism. 
Then, in 1962, John Barnes published the article ‘African models 
in the New Guinea Highlands’ (reprinted in Barnes 1990), which 
concluded that the theory of segmentary lineages, which had been 
applied so successfully in Africa, could not be transferred to the 
New Guinean context without seriously distorting the data. The 
problem lay not the kinship terms themselves. It was possible to 
interpret the New Guinean material as if it were African, but such 
an interpretation flew in the face of native understandings of kinship 
as well as their practices.
Schneider’s book made a similar statement, but its conclusions 
were more radical. While Firth, in his London study, had catalogued 
a fairly standard range of kinship terms, Schneider’s informants 
were asked to give information about anyone with whom they had 
any kind of kin relationship. A broader view of kinship was thus 
made possible. It emerged that kinship was a symbolic universe, 
through which informants moved tactically and strategically. This 
implied that the idea of kinship as a biologically based metaphor of 
human relations was seriously at fault, hardly a new observation, 
but in Schneider’s view, a culture could in principle construct 
kinship entirely from scratch, without any reference to blood ties 
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whatsoever. Furthermore, within each ‘culture of kinship’ each 
kinship term derived its meaning from the semantic network of 
which it was a part, which was unique for the culture in question. 
Even elementary kinship terms, like ‘father’, had different meanings 
in different kinship cultures. Kinship was in effect situational. This 
undermined the entire project of comparative kinship studies that 
had survived since Morgan.
Schneider’s redefinition of kinship from social structure to culture 
has parallels in the work of Geertz. Geertz’ association with Parsons 
at Harvard has been mentioned. However, Geertz was influenced 
from many directions: from European sociology, from Boas, even 
from Steward’s cultural ecology. Geertz’ early work dealt with 
a wide variety of themes, from ecology (1963a) and economy 
(1963b) to religion (1960). His oft-cited and eloquent article on 
‘thick description’ (1964, reprinted in Geertz 1973) expresses his 
methodological credo, and challenges anthropologists to describe 
the world in the same dense detail and with as many overlapping 
contextualisations as the natives experience. Among the European 
sociologists, Geertz was inspired by both Durkheim and Weber, as 
well as by Alfred Schütz (1899–1959), an Austrian social scientist 
who pioneered interpretive studies of modern everyday life. A 
decisive intellectual impulse in Geertz’ mature work came from 
the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur (1913–2005), who saw society, 
culture and action as ‘texts’ that anthropologists – and the actors 
themselves – must ‘read’ and interpret (Ricoeur 1971). As mentioned 
above (Chapter 2), the interpretive method of hermeneutics had 
a long history before Schleiermacher’s postulate (Chapter 2) that 
a text is simultaneously an assemblage of individual parts and a 
seamless whole, and that interpreting the text involves a movement 
to and fro between these two poles.
In the 1960s, Geertz introduced this idea, with latter-day 
refinements, to Anglo-American anthropology. As opposed to British 
anthropologists who focused on the individual as a (normatively 
or strategically motivated) actor, Geertz introduced the individual 
as a reader of the world. Against their idea of society as rationally 
constituted and of the individual participating in it through 
rational activity, Geertz posited that the world contains an infinity 
of meanings and that the subject must actively interpret this vast 
multivalence to find meaning in the world. In the lecture ‘Religion 
as a cultural system’ (1966, reprinted in Geertz 1973), he argued 
that religion is not primarily a functionally integrated subsystem 
of a social whole, but a means for individuals to make sense of the 
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world. In 1973, Geertz’ most important early articles were collected 
in The Interpretation of Cultures, and his reputation has been on 
the rise ever since. During the 1980s, he was viewed as a kind of 
postmodernist avant la lettre, although it seems obvious to the 
present authors that this is at least a partial distortion.
lÉVi-STRAUSS AND STRUCTURAliSm
The son of a prosperous Jewish couple of the cultured middle classes, 
Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908–2009) studied philosophy and law in 
Paris in the early 1930s and associated with the intellectual circle 
around the existentialist philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre. In 1935–39, 
he taught at the University of São Paolo in Brazil, and organised 
short field trips to several peoples of the Amazon region. As a Jew, 
he fled from France during the Second World War, and upon the 
intercession of Métraux and Lowie was offered a position at the New 
School of Social Research in New York City, where he stayed until 
1946. While in New York, he was intimately affected by Boasian 
anthropology (Boas died of a heart attack in his arms, during a 
formal dinner), commenced a lifelong friendship with Margaret 
Mead, and met the important Russian-American linguist, Roman 
Jakobson (1896–1982), whose structural linguistics would become 
a mainstay of Lévi-Strauss’ later work. He received his doctorate in 
Paris in 1947, and published his dissertation in 1949 as Les Structures 
élémentaires de la parenté (The Elementary Structures of Kinship, 
1969). It was a book that would revolutionise kinship studies. Six 
years later, Lévi-Strauss published the ultimate anthropological 
travelogue, Tristes Tropiques (1955), a wide-ranging, beautifully 
written and intricately composed narrative, so full of suggestive 
and haunting passages that a summary would be useless. Three 
years later came a collection of theoretical articles, Anthropologie 
structurale (1958; Structural Anthropology, 1963a). Together, these 
three books established Lévi-Strauss’ reputation as a formidable 
thinker with enormous ethnographic and theoretical knowledge.
By now, he had also established structuralism. Structuralism is a 
theory that seeks to grasp the general qualities of meaningful systems 
– most famously, in Lévi-Strauss’ own work, kinship systems and 
myths – and ultimately reveal fundamental properties of the human 
mind. Such systems consist of elements, but the elements are not 
delineated categories or objects. They are relationships. A kinship 
system, for example, is a meaningful system and thus consists of 
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relationships, rather than positions (‘statuses’). A father is not a 
father in himself, but only in relation to his children.
The idea that meaning was relational was not in itself new. It was 
an important component of Jakobson’s structural linguistics, as 
well of the semiotic linguistics established by Ferdinand de Saussure 
before the First World War. In both, meaning derives from the 
relationship – the contrast or difference – between linguistic elements 
(phonemes, words, signs). Relational meaning was also central 
to cybernetics – as Bateson liked to say, meaning is a ‘difference 
that makes a difference’ (Bateson 1972: 453). Finally, and most 
importantly, relational meaning is implicit in Mauss’ discussion 
of the gift. Here, objects are charged with magical power by the 
relationships through which they move. It is the exchange that gives 
the gift its meaning (Lévi-Strauss 1950).
The advantage of reducing meaningful systems to structures of 
contrasts is that the flow of time within the system is frozen. Living 
language becomes a static grammar. The confusing enactment of 
kinship in practice is reduced to a lucid, formal structure. Roughly, 
structuralist analysis consists, first, in unearthing this structure; 
second, in deducing its underlying principles – its ‘logic’; and finally, 
in arriving at a universal ‘logic of logics’ of human communication. 
The technicalities of this process need not concern us here, but 
we shall briefly outline how it was expressed in The Elementary 
Structures of Kinship. 
Structural-functionalism’s reputation rested to a great extent 
on its analyses of segmentary lineage systems, which seemed to 
prove beyond reasonable doubt the role of kinship as the prime 
organisational principle in tribal societies. Lineage theory, in 
turn, presupposed a primary emphasis on linear kin relationships 
(grandfather–father–son), while lateral relationships (husband–
wife, sibling–sibling) were often downplayed. All of this was upset 
by Elementary Structures. In Lévi-Strauss’s view, kinship was not 
primarily a mode of social organisation, but a meaningful system, 
a system of relationships, and the primary relationship was not the 
‘natural’ bond of blood (parent–child), but the socially constructed 
bond between husband and wife. The first cultural act takes place 
when a man gives his sister in marriage to another man and ties are 
forged between persons who are not biologically related. Marriage is 
the point of indeterminacy in biological kinship – one cannot choose 
your parents, but one must choose one’s spouse. For Lévi-Strauss, 
this choice is the fissure through which meaning enters kinship, 
transforming tribal society from biology to culture.
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Clearly, the integrity of this choice must be safeguarded. It must 
not appear to be determined by nature. You must not marry your 
siblings; they are ‘too close’, ‘too natural’, it would be too much like 
marrying yourself. It would do nothing to ‘open up’ your world, to 
give it meaning by relating it to something else.
In marriage, as practised in tribal societies, women are exchanged 
between groups of men, and a meaningful relationship is formed 
between these groups – a lateral kin relationship which Lévi-Strauss 
refers to as an alliance. From this, the logic of kinship is deduced – 
that is from lateral, rather than linear, kin relations. The result is a 
theory diametrically opposed to lineage theory, that places alliance 
above descent, contrast above continuity, arbitration above norms, 
meaning above organisation. In a rather brisk letter written near the 
end of his life, Radcliffe-Brown told the Frenchman that they would 
probably always talk past each other. Still, Lévi-Strauss expresses 
more respect for Radcliffe-Brown than for Malinowski, ‘for whom 
culture is merely a gigantic metaphor for digestion’ (Lévi-Strauss 
1985). Radcliffe-Brown and Lévi-Strauss had a common interest in 
uncovering the hidden structures that governed thought and social 
life, and a common ancestor in Durkheim – though they belonged 
to very feuding segments of his lineage.
Lévi-Strauss’ further writings are hard to summarise. His books 
are long, erudite, packed with facts, and held together by some 
at times very technical thinking. Thus, Le Totémisme aujourd’hui 
(1961; Totemism, 1963b) seems to be a discussion of the concept of 
totemism (which is debunked), but it is also (among other things) an 
ambiguous critique of the Western opposition of nature and culture. 
La Pensée sauvage (1962; The Savage Mind, 1966) discusses a fairly 
standard ‘primitive’ versus ‘modern’ dichotomy, reminiscent of 
Durkheim or Weber, Maine or Tönnies, but starts with a seemingly 
endless inventory of the detailed knowledge that ‘primitives’ have 
of their natural surroundings, and ends with a critique of Sartre’s 
theory of history. In the first chapter of this book, ‘The science of the 
concrete’, Lévi-Strauss establishes the basis of ‘savage’ or ‘mythical’ 
(in contrast to ‘modern’ or ‘scientific’) thought. Both are equally 
complex and equally rational, but their governing rationalities differ. 
The bricoleur starts with the world that is directly accessible to his 
senses. He relates the objects found in this world to each other, 
and builds structures of meaning out of them, that are narrated, 
for example, in myths. Thus he creates structure out of events. The 
engineer, in contrast, creates events out of structure. He starts with 
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a blueprint, an abstraction that the senses cannot perceive, and by 
manipulating it he changes the real world.
The Savage Mind marks the transition from Lévi-Strauss’ ‘kinship 
period’ to his ‘mythology period’. The most remarkable work of this 
latter period is the Mythologiques, a vast, four-volume compilation 
and analysis of Native American myth, published between 1967 and 
1974, which traces the transformation and convolutions of mythical 
themes throughout the continent. The sheer complexity of this work 
has limited its influence, just as the brevity, if not simplicity, of The 
Savage Mind has made it exceedingly popular.
EARly imPACT
Lévi-Strauss’ impact on Anglo-Saxon anthropology was limited 
before the 1960s, and his early work was belatedly translated 
into English. The Elementary Structures of Kinship appeared 
in translation only in 1969, and for a long time the book was 
largely known indirectly, through an introduction written by 
a Dutch anthropologist – the founder of an older structuralist 
school – J.P.B. Josselin de Jong (1952). Despite the dearth of 
translated texts, Lévi-Strauss was from the first a controversial and 
influential author. In France, structuralism became an alternative 
to Marxism and phenomenology in the 1950s, and the impact of 
structuralism on general intellectual life was at least as pronounced 
as in anthropology. Important non-anthropologists such as Roland 
Barthes, Michel Foucault, Louis Althusser and Pierre Bourdieu were 
introduced to structuralism at a tender age and eventually rebelled 
against it – and their rebellion was in turn noted and debated by 
anthropologists, who imported these authors into the discipline’s 
canon (Chapters 8 and 9).
In Britain, Leach was the first of the leading anthropologists to 
be attracted to Lévi-Strauss. Lévi-Strauss had commented quite 
extensively on kinship among the Kachin, and Leach immediately 
recognised the relevance of his conclusions for his own data. In 
structuralism, Leach discovered a sophisticated alternative to 
structural functionalism, and in 1970, he wrote an introduction 
to Lévi-Strauss, which substantially increased knowledge of his 
work in the English-speaking world. The Oxford anthropologist 
Rodney Needham, who had studied with Josselin de Jong in Leiden, 
was another early spokesman for Lévi-Strauss in Britain, although 
he had certain reservations from the beginning (Needham 1962). 
These were further strengthened by an unfortunate exchange with 
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Lévi-Strauss himself, who repudiated Needham’s interpretation 
of his kinship theory in no uncertain terms in the preface to 
the English edition of his kinship book. Needham continued to 
develop structuralist thought about classification and kinship in 
innovative directions, but without referring again to Lévi-Strauss. 
Most Anglo-American anthropologists were nevertheless deeply 
suspicious of structuralism. They were provoked by Lévi-Strauss’ 
abstract models and deductive thinking. Many regarded his work 
as useless because it could not be tested empirically.
Lévi-Strauss’ kinship theory (often referred to as alliance theory, 
as opposed to structural-functionalist descent theory) was already 
debated in Britain during the 1950s (although misunderstandings 
were inevitable because of the lack of translations). Within struc-
tural-functionalism, there had been growing dissatisfaction with 
descent theory, which seemed unable to account for kinship systems 
that were non-unilinear. The structuralist focus on exchange and 
alliance seemed to have the potential to resolve these problems, since 
it accorded greater weight to lateral than lineal kin relationships; 
thus it was widely embraced by anthropologists working in societies 
without clear-cut unilineal descent groups. In a famous debate in 
the journal Man, in 1959, Leach defended Lévi-Strauss’ views, 
while Fortes defended the descent model. But Leach too may have 
misunderstood Lévi-Strauss’ intentions, which were less sociological 
and more cognitive than his British colleagues tended to believe. Like 
the formalist–substantivist controversy in economic anthropology, 
the debate on alliance versus descent in kinship studies slowly 
petered out towards the end of the 1970s. By then, there was a 
tendency to see the two systems as complementary (as Morgan did), 
and Lévi-Strauss himself proposed a theory of kinship that seemed 
to incorporate both perspectives (Lévi-Strauss 1987b).
In France, Louis Dumont (1911–1998) developed his own brand 
of structuralism, by combining impulses from Lévi-Strauss with 
classical European sociology (Durkheim, Tönnies) into an influential 
theory of social integration and symbolic meaning. Dumont, who 
is particularly known for his erudite study of the Indian caste 
system, Homo Hierarchicus (1968), posited that caste was a cultural 
system of classification, rather than a functional means of social 
organisation (a view not dissimilar to Needham’s). He emphasised 
the irreducibility of Indian (Hindu) categories, in explicit opposition 
to political anthropologists like Barth, who had described caste in 
purely sociological terms, and argued that strategic actors were 
driven by the same kinds of motivations as Europeans.
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THE STATE Of THE ART iN 1968
By 1968, anthropology had become a very diverse discipline. The 
‘Man the Hunter’ symposium had just been held, demonstrating the 
power of ecological anthropology. The interpretive anthropology 
of Geertz had begun to make its influence felt. Peasant studies in 
Latin America and the Caribbean had become a mainstay at some 
American departments. Barth’s radical ‘transactionalism’ rubbed 
shoulders with the creative revitalisation of structural-functionalism 
carried out by Douglas and by Gluckman’s students. The rationality 
debate was on, formalism confronted substantivism, alliance theory 
battled with descent theory, while structuralism loomed on the 
horizon, and young radical Marxists and feminists waited in the 
wings for their share of the academic pie. New journals, conferences 
and workshops, monograph series and institutions devoted to 
anthropological research made important contributions to the 
growth and diversification of anthropology.
The demographic expansion had been formidable. In 1950, a 
mere 22 PhDs were awarded in the USA. By 1974, the number had 
increased to 409, a level that remained stable until the mid-1990s 
(Givens and Jablonski 1995). However, the discipline had grown 
not only in complexity and size, but in geographic dispersal. 
Scandinavian, Italian, Spanish and Dutch anthropology became 
part of the European mainstream – in the first case, the British 
influence was strongest; in the second and third, the main impulses 
came from France; in the fourth there was a little bit of both. In 
several Latin American countries, notably Mexico, Columbia, 
Brazil and Argentina, indigenous anthropologists influenced by 
the Boas school, by Steward and his students, and by French 
anthropology, conducted research on Native Americans, peasants 
and city-dwellers. But in spite of strong non-metropolitan milieus 
such as Leiden and Bergen, the discipline remained centralised. 
In Britain, Oxford, Cambridge and London still held the reins, 
though Manchester and University College London were becoming 
powers to be reckoned with, and anthropology was taught in several 
other places as well, from Sussex to Edinburgh. In the USA the 
dispersal was greater, since the numbers were greater, but prominent 
universities such as Columbia, Yale, Harvard, Berkeley, Stanford, 
Michigan and Chicago still had the lead. In France, all roads led 
towards the prestigious institutions in Paris.
The 1950s and 1960s also saw considerable diversification of 
the core regions for ethnographic research. During the 1920s and 
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1930s, British anthropologists had shifted from the Pacific to Africa, 
American anthropology saw a less pronounced move from Native 
North America to South and Central America. In France, both Africa 
and the Pacific had been important since the 1920s and, after the 
war, Georges Balandier further strengthened the African orientation 
(Balandier 1967), while Dumont and his students flocked to the 
Indian subcontinent and Oceania. By the 1960s, the mountainous 
New Guinean highlands had become an extremely fertile area for 
ethnographic research, and with this change came new perspectives 
on gender relations, warfare, exchange and kinship. For although 
anthropological research may be carried out anywhere, each region 
confronts ethnographers with new questions.
In spite of occasional dialogue, there was still little contact between 
the three dominant national traditions. As we have repeatedly 
pointed out in the last two chapters, research interests were 
frequently similar, but the theoretical approaches were sufficiently 
different to make direct discussion difficult. Firth and Schneider had 
to abandon their comparison of kinship in London and Chicago. 
Lévi-Strauss debunked Needham’s interpretation of his work. As 
mentioned, Kroeber and Kluckhohn presented 162 competing 
definitions of culture, a term that few British anthropologists had 
discussed since Tylor. There was much individual movement going 
on, though mostly in a westward direction: Bateson, Turner and 
Polanyi had settled in the USA, and Lévi-Strauss spent the war there. 
Many others were to make the move later, particularly from Britain. 
The national traditions were nevertheless still relatively bounded.
Language differences played their part in this. The belated 
translations of Lévi-Strauss delayed the acceptance of structuralism 
by at least a decade in most of the English-speaking world, and 
research published in less prestigious European vernaculars than 
French generally fared even worse. Throughout much of the 
Third World (a term introduced into English by anthropologist 
Peter Worsley in 1964; in French le tiers monde had been used, 
with a slightly different meaning, since the 1950s), these problems 
were exacerbated by the lack of adequate economic resources 
in academia. Finally, political conflicts delayed the internation-
alisation of the discipline. In the former colonies, hostility was 
sometimes directed at anthropology as such, thus inhibiting 
and sometimes even halting its spread. With decolonisation, the 
relationship between metropolitan institutions and their colonial 
counterparts was often severed. In Europe two decades earlier, the 
Iron Curtain had effectively prevented academic contacts between 
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East and West. Anthropology was becoming a global discipline, 
as scholars increasingly started publishing in English, but even in 
the West, scholars in, say, Stockholm, could draw inspiration from 
metropolitan anthropologists, but feel certain that their own work 
would never be read outside of Scandinavia unless they chose to 
publish in a foreign language, that is, in English (Gerholm and 
Hannerz 1982).
With the next chapter, we rapidly approach the present, and we 
begin to recognise research interests that still have high priority in 
the new millennium. The radical Marxism of the 1970s lies at the 
root of various present-day research agendas. The radical feminism 
of that decade has been transformed into sophisticated gender 
studies. Research on ethnicity in complex societies has continued, 
and later spawned a burgeoning interest in nationalism. The new 
discussions of fieldwork methods that saw the light of day after 
1970 were soon to be drawn up into wider debates on reflexivity and 
field ethics, which still elicit professional interest. On the other hand, 
the political awareness that was so powerful in anthropology during 
these years eventually receded, along with the optimistic hope that 
anthropological insight could change the world. Nevertheless, while 
anthropologists in 1968 were still grappling with problems that 
would soon seem outdated, several of the concerns of 1978 remain 
important today as well.
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The Cuban missile crisis, the Berlin Wall, the civil rights movement, 
the Prague spring; hippies in Haight-Ashbury, student riots in Paris; 
the Beatles, the Moon landing, Kennedy’s assassination, the Vietnam 
War – all this is emblematic of the ‘Sixties’, as the time is known 
in the West. But the radical political climate to which these events 
contributed did not come to bloom before the end of the decade, 
and belongs, strictly speaking, to the ten years following 1968. 
Certainly this was true in academia, where students shout their 
slogans but tenured professors remain as the years go by. Anthro-
pologists, always a radical bunch, may have searched their souls 
more deeply than many other academics, but were no less subject 
to the academic routine. Enter the 1970s, the forgotten decade, 
sandwiched between Flower Power and the Iron Lady, between 
Richard Nixon’s election victory and John Lennon’s death, the 
decade when world population hit 4 billion, when we saw the Yom 
Kippur War breed the Middle East oil crisis, the CIA-assisted coup 
in Chile, the founding of Microsoft, the deaths of Mao and Elvis 
(overdue and premature, respectively), the first Polish pope and the 
Iranian Islamic Revolution. It was a decade of revolutionary dreams 
that would soon enough be crushed under the wheels of history – in 
anthropology as elsewhere.
As we get closer to our own time, we need to alert the reader, 
again, to the inevitable bias of in any book such this. As time goes 
by, the sheer size of the discipline must necessarily force us to be 
either extremely selective, or too superficial to be informative at 
all. By 2012, the American Anthropological Association alone had 
more than 10,000 paying members, and around the globe there are 
countless regional centres of academic and applied anthropology, 
each with their specific research traditions. No historian in the world 
could do justice to this growing multiplicity – which, by the end of 
the 1970s, was already well advanced.
In this chapter, we deal mainly with two of the most powerful 
intellectual currents to arise from the radicalisation of academia: 
Marxism and feminism. Both were insistently present everywhere in 
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anthropology in the 1970s, until disillusion set in and new agendas 
were set. However, gender and power had arrived in anthropology, 
separately and in tandem, and they were destined to stay.
But an account of the 1970s which concentrated exclusively on 
radicalisation would leave out some very important features of the 
anthropology of that period: it was also the decade when ethnicity 
studies came into their own, when sociobiology became a household 
word (to abhor or to emulate), when economic anthropology had 
its golden age. French anthropology had re-entered the international 
scene with Lévi-Strauss, and now a whole troupe of Frenchmen 
appeared beside him, with messages that were not only politically 
radical, but intellectually complex. It was a decade of controversies, 
and it is the first decade in which anthropology had grown so vast 
and interconnected that it was no longer possible for a single 
anthropologist to follow the entire discipline. For the authors of 
this book, this is the decade in which it was no longer possible to 
trace more than the most important trends and connections in the 
discipline. This chapter should nevertheless give an impression of 
some of the milestones of that decade.
THE RETURN Of mARX
Of the previous generation of anthropologists, Steward, White 
and Gluckman were the most decisively influenced by Marx – 
Steward in his materialism, White in his technological determinism, 
Gluckman through his interest in crisis and conflict. However, 
references to Marx in their work were all but absent. There are 
scattered references to Marx and Marxist theory in the work of 
a few Anglophone anthropologists in the 1950s and early 1960s, 
including Eric Wolf and Stanley Diamond in the USA, and Peter 
Worsley in Britain. But the ideological climate of the time was 
neither congenial nor receptive to Marxists; this was especially so 
in the USA, and not much easier in Britain. A card-carrying English 
Communist like Worsley had serious difficulties obtaining research 
permits and finding employment, before finally securing a job in 
sociology at Manchester, supported by Gluckman, who had had 
similar experiences himself (Chapter 5).
In Britain, the USA and France, all this changed quickly in the 
1960s, certainly among students. Marxist theories of alienation, of 
ideology as false consciousness, of the infrastructure–superstructure 
distinction and the concept of contradiction, entered the academic 
vocabulary in the late 1960s, and many young anthropologists 
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began to engage intellectually with the old, hoary theory of social 
classes and historical change. But grafting Marxist theory onto 
contemporary anthropology was no easy task. As explained in 
Chapter 2, Marxism was chiefly a theory of capitalist society. Its 
attempts to describe and compare other modes of production and 
engage in long-term cultural history (the latter mainly undertaken 
by Engels after Marx’s death) were influenced by Victorian 
evolutionism and Hegel’s philosophy of history. Anthropology 
had been moving for almost a century since then. If anything 
at all held the sprawling discipline together in the mid-1960s, it 
was a commitment to empirical variation, a distrust of simplistic, 
universalist models, and an ingrown cultural relativism. The global 
pretensions of Marxism and its antiquated empirical base did 
nothing to attract anthropologists.
But Marx had a compelling vision of the modern world, which, 
in a context of ever more visible global disparities, seemed no less 
relevant to the 1970s than the 1870s. The Vietnam War, seen by 
many as a war of imperialist expansion, was the main item of foreign 
news for years. On fieldwork, too, anthropologists were increasingly 
exposed to such injustices, and many were eager to contribute to 
their demolition, as Wilson and Gluckman had done a generation 
before them. Now as then, Marx was the sociologist who spoke 
most eloquently of these problems, and so it was to Marx that the 
young revolutionaries flocked. No matter that Marxism was more 
than a social theory; that it had become the official state ideology 
of a substantial portion of the world and was thus a resource of 
political power. To a Marxist in particular, this should have been a 
fact of deep significance, though it rarely was. Instead, the power 
structures of the Communist states reproduced themselves in the 
organisations outside those states that fought for freedom from other 
power structures. Meanwhile, in Western academia, devastating 
battles took place between Maoists, Trotskyites, Stalinists, Anar-
cho-Syndicalists, and so on, ad infinitum, who nonetheless all 
united to face the common enemy, frequently personified in the 
local anthropology professor. Out of all this commotion grew the 
academic Marxian anthropologies.
There were several distinctive strands of Marxian anthropology. 
One, which we could label cultural Marxism or superstructure 
studies, arrived so late on the scene that it was post-Marxist before 
it was established in anthropology in the 1980s. This brand of 
Marxian theory was inspired by Antonio Gramsci’s critical studies 
of ideology and hegemony and the Frankfurt school’s (Adorno, 
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Horkheimer), critique of the commodification of culture, and 
entered anthropology via Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978), a 
book that criticised ‘exotifying’ European representations of the 
Middle East (Chapter 8). Take Said’s critique, mix with Michel 
Foucault’s post-structuralism and add a dash of deconstructionism 
à la Derrida, and the result is the heady cocktail that would hit 
anthropology in the 1980s.
The two main flavours of Marxian anthropology were structural 
Marxism and political economy. It is a testimony both to the breadth 
of Marx’s work and the scope of anthropology that there was little 
contact between these schools, and that the questions they raised 
were strikingly different.
Finally, there was also a fourth brand of Marxism, that followed 
up Marx’s emphasis on the person as a productive, creative 
material body in a material world. We shall return to this ‘sensual 
Marxism’, with its roots in German Romanticism, towards the end 
of this chapter.
STRUCTURAl mARXiSm
A harbinger of the new era was a paper published in 1960 by 
the French anthropologist Claude Meillassoux (1925–2005), 
who presented an unmistakably Marxian analysis of subsistence 
production in agricultural societies. Originally an economist 
and a businessman, Meillassoux had studied anthropology 
with Georges Balandier (1920–), a lone voice of sociologically 
oriented anthropology in structuralist-dominated France, who did 
fieldwork among the Guro of the Ivory Coast in the late 1950s. 
His research from the start had a Marxian orientation: not only 
did it concentrate on economic life, it tried to map the dynamics 
between the social relations of production and the technological and 
environmental means of production in Guro society. Meillassoux’s 
article represented the first evidence of an emerging French 
Marxist anthropology. He would later develop a typology of ‘pre-
capitalist modes of production’ in Africa, but, unlike his younger 
contemporaries, he was mainly a committed empirical researcher, 
and would be increasingly critical of the abstract theories that would 
soon dominate French Marxist anthropology. Indeed, among the 
French Marxists, Meillassoux was the one most sympathetic to the 
British school. In a preface to the English translation of his 1975 
book Femmes, greniers et capitaux (Maidens, Meal and Money, 
1981), he writes that Balandier had introduced him to ‘the best of 
Eriksen HOA3 01 text   141 16/04/2013   16:04
142 A HiSTORy Of ANTHROPOlOGy
current anthropology – that is British anthropology’ and goes on 
to praise the work of Schapera, Gluckman, Monica Wilson and 
others. However, he notes, functionalism ‘was based more on a sort 
of legalistic empiricism than on a thorough analysis of the content 
of economic and social relationships’ (1981: viii), and he adds that 
it concealed economic exploitation by allowing kinship to permeate 
the field of enquiry. A main task for Meillassoux, then, was to 
extricate economics from kinship. This was not easy when writing 
about societies organised on the basis of kinship (Chapter 2), and 
he eventually proposed a mode of production new to the Marxist 
canon, which he called ‘the domestic mode of production’, based 
on the family and household. Interestingly, Sahlins, in his Stone Age 
Economics (1972), developed a nearly identical concept, but with 
a different aim: rather than reconciling African economies with 
Marxist orthodoxy, he sought to rescue economic anthropology 
from the perils of formalism, where the individual maximiser was 
the universal actor. In Sahlins’ view, the household taken as a unit 
was not a maximising actor, and drawing on both Chayanov’s early 
peasant studies and Mauss’ theory of reciprocity, he argued that 
household-based production is not a means of maximisation, but a 
way of procuring necessities. To this Meillassoux answered that the 
household was not a productive, but at reproductive unit, it created 
the labour that was exploited by whatever system dominated it.
An enduring obstacle in Marxist theory for the new French 
anthropologists was the notion that power ultimately rests with 
control over the means of production, that is ownership of tools, 
fields, machinery, and so on. Since, in traditional African societies, 
such ownership is most often not individual but accorded to kin 
groups, there was a problem in locating power in the system. 
Meillassoux concedes, seemingly contradicting Marx, that ‘power 
in this mode of production rests on control over the means of human 
reproduction – subsistence goods and wives – and not over the 
means of production’ (Meillassoux 1981: 49).
Structuralism had little influence on Meillassoux. Others were 
more ingenious in forging links between Marx, anthropology and 
current intellectual sensibilities, including not only Lévi-Strauss’ 
work, but also the original interpretations of Marx proposed by the 
philosopher Louis Althusser. When Althusser’s Pour Marx and Lire 
Le Capital (the latter co-written with Étienne Balibar) were published 
in 1965, they had a major impact not only on French intellectual 
life, but on the new generation of anthropologists. Althusser’s 
Marxism seemed to suit anthropology, since it introduced a measure 
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of flexibility in the infrastructure–superstructure relationship. A 
conventional reading of Marx would state that the infrastructure 
(material and social features of the process of production) determines 
the superstructure (everything else in society). In non-capitalist 
(or ‘pre-capitalist’) societies, it was often very difficult to see how 
this came about. Non-Marxist anthropologists simply would not 
believe it; it contradicted everything they had ever learned. In British 
anthropology, kinship was assumed to be fundamental; in American 
anthropology, culture – whatever that meant, but certainly not 
economics. And Lévi-Strauss (who explicitly but confusingly had 
called himself a Marxist) was concerned with the superstructure 
exclusively, as was Dumont, whose view that the values of society 
ultimately determine its power structure was directly opposed to 
that of the Marxists (Parkin 2005).
Althusser, who wrote extensively on ideology, made it legitimate 
to study rituals and myths as devices of domination. He further held 
that in a given society, any social institution can be dominant in the 
sense that it de facto dominates, but whether it does so or not will 
always ultimately be determined by the infrastructure. In medieval 
Europe, for example, the Church was the dominant institution, but 
the Church’s dominance was ‘in the last instance’ determined by 
the feudal mode of production – and ultimately served the ends of 
that mode of production.
In the hands of the most famous of the French Marxist anthro-
pologists, Maurice Godelier (1934–), the influences from Marx, 
Althusser and comparative ethnography merged with an equally 
strong admiration for the work of Lévi-Strauss. Originally educated 
as a philosopher, he was converted to anthropology by Lévi-Strauss 
and has done extensive fieldwork among the Baruya of New Guinea. 
The Baruya, with their non-monetary economy based on subsistence 
and barter, indicated important differences between capitalist and 
non-capitalist societies. Unlike Meillassoux and several other 
French Marxist anthropologists, who regarded structuralism 
as neo-Kantian, idealist mystification, Godelier – who worked 
with Lévi-Strauss in the early 1960s – saw structuralism as a real 
scientific advance. In his view, the Marxian concept of contradiction 
could make structuralism more historical, while the conceptual 
apparatus of structuralism was indispensable in locating the hidden 
mechanisms of society and culture. At one stage, Godelier even went 
so far as to suggest that Marx was a structuralist avant la lettre 
(1966, republished in Godelier 1977).
Eriksen HOA3 01 text   143 16/04/2013   16:04
144 A HiSTORy Of ANTHROPOlOGy
Godelier was also – like Meillassoux – concerned with kinship. 
Since kinship seemed to be ‘everywhere’ in traditional societies, he 
reasoned that it had to be seen as part of both the superstructure 
and the infrastructure (Godelier 1975). Rather than looking for 
particular institutions that took care of economy, ideology and so 
on, he proposed a ‘formalised Marxism’ that instead looked for 
functions. Such formulations further indicate the need felt by many 
of these researchers for a more flexible Marxian theory.
Much of the structural Marxian scholarship dealt with modes 
of production. Marx and Engels’ old idea of an ‘Asiatic mode of 
production’ was unearthed and eagerly discussed, and notions of 
one or several ‘African modes of production’ were widely debated, 
following the research of Meillassoux and others on that continent. 
These debates died out towards the end of the 1970s, along with 
most anthropological attempts at grand typologies.
British Marxist anthropology was largely an offshoot of the 
French ‘structural’ variety. Since Lévi-Strauss, on the eve of the 
late 1960s radicalisation, was acknowledged as the worthiest 
partner in argument outside Britain for British theorists, the 
attraction of structural Marxism for young British radicals was 
easy to understand. (Of the alternatives, the older Marxism of the 
Manchester school seemed outdated by this time, and American 
Marxist anthropology was perceived as close kin to human ecology, 
a poorly understood and practically non-existent field in Britain, 
except at Forde’s department at University College Loondon.) Symp-
tomatically, the most important British Marxist anthropologist, 
Maurice Bloch, was of French origin.
The fundamental problem with Marxism in anthropology was, 
and is, that it is essentially a theory of capitalism, and that its 
account of ‘pre-capitalist societies’ was based on speculation and 
inadequate data. To reconcile orthodox Marxism with ethnographic 
research required a strong will, and as Jonathan Spencer (1996: 353) 
points out, when competent ethnographic analysis was carried out 
by Marxian anthropologists, ‘it did become more obviously cultural, 
but looked less and less convincingly Marxist’. Nevertheless, many 
French Marxist anthropologists, notably Godelier, continued to 
publish anthropological work with a distinctly Marxian flavour 
through the 1980s and 1990s. Others, like Bloch and Marc Augé 
(Chapter 9), eventually changed their research priorities. Though 
Joel Kahn and Josip Llobera, in a review article from 1980, 
wrote that it was too early to ‘produce a definitive critique’ of the 
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movement (Kahn and Llobera 1980: 89), it seemed that movement 
had somehow expired while the article was in press.
THE NOT-QUiTE-mARXiSTS
While French Marxist anthropologists were often politically active, 
within or outside the Communist Party, this was rarely the case for 
the new generation of American Marxist or Marx-inspired anthro-
pologists – though in retrospect it is easy to see that their efforts 
had more direct bearing on political issues of global injustice than 
the more academic contributions of their French contemporaries.
Marxist anthropology in the USA developed among Steward’s, 
White’s and Fried’s students in the early postwar years. It began 
to make its mark by the end of the 1960s, flourished in the 1970s 
and peaked only in the early 1980s. The concerns of these scholars, 
inspired by the practical bent of Steward’s research, continue to 
play an important role in anthropological studies of power and 
underdevelopment today. Though this generation of materialist 
Americans included some of the most important figures of the 
1970s, some (like Marvin Harris) never really became Marxists, 
while others (like Marshall Sahlins) followed complex intellectual 
itineraries of their own, passing through a Marxist phase but 
eventually abandoning it. Sahlins (1930–), originally an evolutionist 
trained first by White, then by Steward, engaged creatively with 
the European Marxist debates about modes of production and 
forms of subsistence, arguing, in a famous, almost Rousseauesque 
contribution to the ‘Man the Hunter’ symposium, that hunter-
gatherers were ‘the original affluent society’ (1968, reprinted in 
Sahlins 1972), and that economies of scarcity were the result of 
the inequalities imposed by the agricultural revolution. In ‘On the 
sociology of primitive exchange’, the centrepiece of his subsequent 
collection of essays (Stone Age Economics, 1972), Sahlins argued 
that the logic of generalised reciprocity, or sharing, was the norm 
in tribal societies, where the calculating, ‘economising’ actor of 
the formalist economic anthropologists was conspicuously absent. 
But as early as in this book, marked by Marxian concerns as it is, 
Sahlins was more convincing in his culturalist arguments than in his 
attempts to show causal connections between modes of production 
and symbolic culture. Then, in 1976, in his important theoretical 
treatise, Culture and Practical Reason, Sahlins angrily criticised 
Marxism for its reductionism and for not treating symbolic culture 
as an autonomous realm.
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The itinerary followed by Sahlins – from cultural ecology 
via Marxism to symbolism and history – was no mere personal 
idiosyncrasy. Several other American anthropologists followed 
similar (but rarely identical) paths. Columbia-trained Andrew 
Vayda, whose research priorities moved, between the 1960s and 
1980s, from a strong version of cultural ecology to a cognitivist and 
almost postmodern attitude to theory, is one example (Vayda 1994). 
A collaborator of Vayda in the 1960s and a long-time associate 
of Bateson, Roy Rappaport, also moved from a materialist to a 
cybernetic vision. In the long series of postscripts to the 1984 edition 
to Pigs for the Ancestors, Rappaport reveals decreasing commitment 
to ecological determinism and increasing sophistication in his 
Batesonian analyses of webs of communicative feedback.
With Marvin Harris (1927–2001) the situation was different. 
Though a student at Columbia under Steward, he remained 
committed to the Boasian mainstream in his student years, 
discovering White’s and Steward’s work only in the mid-1950s. 
Following fieldwork in Mozambique, when he was confronted 
with the miseries of Portuguese colonialism, Harris’ politics were 
radicalised and his analytical interests sharpened. Over the next 
decades, Harris would develop his own research programme, or 
‘paradigm’ as he might have called it, based on the notion that 
the material facts of economy and ecology determine culture – not 
merely ‘in the last instance’ but directly. In a famous article from 
1963, he discusses the sacred cow of Hinduism, and concludes 
that the cow’s special status may seem an exotic feature of Hindu 
religion, but is in fact a perfect example of economic and ecological 
rationality. Accusations of functionalism, to which Harris paid 
no heed, were inevitable. Later in the 1960s and 1970s, Harris’ 
materialism became more pronouncedly non-Marxist, and in his main 
theoretical work, Cultural Materialism (1979), he spends half the 
book repudiating what he regards as inferior research programmes 
– from sociobiology and Marxism to ‘eclecticism’. Harris was the 
strongest positivist materialist in American anthropology, and he 
saw the Marxian insistence on a ‘dialectical relationship’ between 
infrastructure and superstructure as a mystifying and non-scientific 
device. His opponents, and they were many, would class him 
variously as a crude evolutionist or a vulgar Marxist with no 
understanding of the subtler aspects of society. Harris published 
a popular textbook and, in 1968, a history of anthropology (The 
Rise of Anthropological Theory), which describes the history of the 
discipline more or less as a unilinear evolutionist narrative (with 
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minor branches and dead-ends), culminating unsurprisingly with 
cultural materialism. He also wrote several popular books, among 
which Why Nothing Works (1981), an amusing and provocative 
exposé of the irrationality of modern life, is a perennial favourite.
Even in Britain, the debate between Marxism and cultural 
ecology was activated. Studies of ‘habitat’ (ecology), pioneered by 
Daryll Forde and continued at his department at University College 
London, had otherwise hovered on the outskirts of respectable 
university life for decades. Now, cultural ecology finally found a 
few tenured adherents, and it soon became clear that although 
cultural ecology and Marxism pose many of the same questions, 
they answer them in profoundly different ways (Burnham and 
Ellen 1979). In a pyrotechnical demolition of Rappaport’s work 
on the Tsembaga Maring, Jonathan Friedman (1979) – who had 
re-analysed Leach’s Kachin work in a structural Marxist framework 
in his PhD dissertation – argued that Rappaport’s ecological analysis 
of Tsembaga ritual fell into the classic traps of functionalism, by 
positing a ‘great ecologist in the sky’ as an omniscient subject 
regulating pig populations as needed. Rappaport’s response was 
a sophisticated Batesonian plea for the unity of ‘mind’, which 
argued that in the conceptual universe of the Tsembaga there was 
no difference between the material and the symbolic – hence no 
‘great ecologist’ or ‘functionalism’ was needed; the local symbolic 
vernacular was in effect a specialised discourse on ecology.
POliTiCAl ECONOmy AND THE CAPiTAliST WORlD SySTEm
The leading proponent of Marxist or Marx-influenced anthropology 
in the USA was arguably Eric Wolf (1923–1999). The ‘peak’ 
of American Marxist anthropology alluded to above was the 
publication of his major work, Europe and the People Without 
History in 1982, a magisterial enquiry into the complex economic, 
cultural and political effects of colonialism on the peoples studied 
by anthropologists, and their responses. Here Wolf concentrates, 
as in much of his work, on features of the lives and histories of 
non-Europeans that had been neglected by generations of anthro-
pologists. Wolf, originally an Austrian, was another of Steward’s 
and Benedict’s Columbia students, and he retrospectively pointed 
out that both his teachers had, ‘each in their own way, intensified 
my own interest in how subgroups and regions came to be welded 
into overarching nations’ (Wolf 1994: 228). A participant in 
Steward’s Puerto Rico project in the late 1940s, Wolf later worked 
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on peasant issues in Mexico and published an important synthetic 
work, Peasants, in 1964. Opposed to the single-society approach 
favoured by most contemporary anthropologists, Wolf throughout 
his life explored how the destinies of localities are intertwined with 
larger-scale national and global processes. More often than not, 
the engine of these processes is economic profit, and the result 
is capital accumulation at the centre and exploitation in the 
peripheries. Peasants were, more than other groups, the victims of 
this exploitation. Deprived of land and producing for the global 
market at often ridiculous wages, they tended to live in poor 
countries, whose national autonomy was undermined because of 
unequal access to the world economy. Wolf was one of the first 
anthropologists who questioned the very concept of ‘society’, 
and preferred to think in terms of interconnected networks and 
social fields.
Wolf was not alone in pursuing interests in world-system theory, 
imperialism and underdevelopment during the 1970s. Along with 
Marx, anthropology had discovered Lenin, whose theory of 
imperialism was a logical add-on to Marx, and an alternative to the 
prevalent, but fading views of the civilising effects of colonialism. 
In a period when rural sociology was rapidly expanding, not least 
in Latin America, Marxist political economy seemed a natural part 
of any Third World-oriented scholar’s field kit, particularly since 
social scientists were now engaged in development issues on an 
unprecedented scale (Grillo and Rew 1985). The most ambitious 
attempt at synthesis along these lines during the 1970s was Immanuel 
Wallerstein’s neo-Trotskyist The Modern World System (Wallerstein 
1974–79), a massive study of the evolution of a tripartite world 
of centres, semi-peripheries and peripheries, with accumulated 
resources flowing from the outer reaches to the centres. On a less 
grand scale, it was also the decade of Johan Galtung’s structural 
theory of imperialism (Galtung 1971), which showed how global 
inequality was maintained through alliances between elites in the 
centres and the peripheries.
The 1970s also saw the rise of dependency theory, a close 
cousin of world-system theory. While theorists of development 
had formerly held that all societies would eventually ‘catch up’ 
with the West, a crypto-evolutionist position that was anthropo-
logically unpalatable and hardly empirically correct, sociologists 
and economists like Andre Gunder Frank and Samir Amin, writing 
about Latin America and Africa, respectively, sought to demonstrate 
that exchange between rich and poor parts of the world – whether 
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de facto colonies or not – amounted to capital accumulation in 
the North and deprivation in the South. However, the dependency 
theorists tended to be non-anthropologists, and the main exception, 
Peter Worsley, seemed merely to prove this rule. Though Worsley 
had been Gluckman’s student, he worked in a sociology department, 
and most of his work was in a sociological vein. It was not that 
anthropologists were cynical accomplices of world imperialism, 
that their cultural relativism had led them to moral nihilism, or that 
they were oblivious to the suffering of the world. On the contrary, 
many anthropologists had gone to great lengths to assist ‘their’ 
people, who were most often indigenous populations with ‘authentic 
cultures’. But by the 1970s, the study of the millions of urban 
poor and semi-modern peasants had become a growth industry 
for anthropological research, and many anthropologists became 
engaged in development work and aid projects, with all the ethical, 
methodological and political dilemmas that this entailed.
The problem of anthropology’s relation to issues of 
neocolonialism and Third World exploitation was at least fourfold. 
First, as suggested, the poor masses of the tropics were – outside 
the milieux inspired by Steward and Gluckman – generally not 
considered relevant to anthropological attention. They were ‘too 
acculturated’, and though ethnographic studies of modern people 
had existed throughout the twentieth century, it was only in the 
1970s that they started to become common. As yet, the theoretical 
and methodological framework to deal with such groups was poorly 
developed. Second, the single-people approach favoured for both 
theoretical and methodological reasons by both the Boasians and 
the British, could not easily be reconciled with a concern with global 
political economy, though Steward’s Puerto Rico project seemed 
to indicate a middle way. Third, most anthropologists related with 
reserve, if not hostility, to colonialism, which they often – for want 
of better alternatives – expressed by ignoring it (the only anthro-
pologists to discuss such issues before the 1960s belonged to the 
Manchester school). This passivity was now heavily criticised. 
One of the most hotly debated books in British anthropology in 
the early 1970s was the Saudi-born anthropologist Talal Asad’s 
edited volume Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter (1973), 
which argued that anthropology and colonialism had developed 
in collusion for several countries. Though many of Asad’s claims 
have later been controverted, there was enough substance in his 
argument to stimulate significant self-searching in the discipline. 
Fourth, and not least important, the notion of ‘development’ was 
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– and is – difficult to swallow for anthropologists, who had been 
taught for generations to be sceptical of notions of social evolution. 
Lévi-Strauss said that he regarded himself as a ‘fourth-worlder’ as 
opposed to a ‘third-worlder’, meaning that he defends the small, 
vulnerable and unique peoples against not just the onslaught of 
Westernisation, but also against the development schemes of Third 
World governments (Eribon and Lévi-Strauss 1988). In this, he 
probably speaks for much of the anthropological community of 
the 1970s.
These issues, thorny as they were, could be overcome, as Wolf’s 
work shows. Years earlier, Redfield had argued that peasants ‘had 
their own culture’, and though the quest for ‘authentic culture’ 
implicitly remained strong in anthropology, there were no strong 
academic arguments for not studying the hybridised, mixed cultures 
of, say, Latin America and the Caribbean, or for that matter, Belgrade 
and Hong Kong. A combination of in-depth fieldwork with a wider 
systemic and historical analysis was also perfectly viable, though it 
did not legitimise over-reliance on non-ethnographic material. The 
relationship to colonial authorities was irrelevant by the 1970s. 
What remained, then, was the problem of ‘development’, which 
seemed as difficult to overcome as the French Marxists’ problems 
with infrastructural determination in tribal societies. Many of the 
most creative anthropologists who worked with issues of political 
economy in the 1970s had encountered this problem. In most cases 
they argued, true to the principles of anthropology, that development 
had to be defined from within, as an ‘emic’ (native) category. At the 
same time, they regarded the fact of global capitalist expansion as 
an objective, homogenising and unifying force in the world; indeed, 
Wolf, Mintz, Wallerstein and Worsley were active supporters of the 
globalisation studies that made their debut in anthropology in the 
1990s (Chapter 9).
There was a distinct regional focus on ‘the backyard of the USA’ 
in the 1970s anthropological research informed by Marxist political 
economy and world-system theory. This regional focus tended, like 
Steward’s earlier efforts, to stimulate academic anthropology and 
rural sociology in the countries under study. Unlike most places in 
the Third World, countries like Argentina, Mexico and Brazil offered 
established academic facilities, with a steady output of potential 
‘native’ collaborators for Western anthropologists, with whom they 
could work on an equal intellectual footing. This was good news 
for the many young, politically committed Western anthropologists, 
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who carried out fieldwork among Latin American peasants within 
a Marxist theoretical framework (Melhuus 1993).
While French structural Marxism today appears as a dead end, 
it left a lasting imprint on the profession. It forcefully directed 
attention to the complex interweavings of local and global strands 
of inequality and power, resistance and survival; it grappled 
resolutely with historical change and the difficult relationship 
between ‘development’ and culture. Most important of all, perhaps, 
it directed the attention of a blandly Durkheimian or Boasian 
mainstream to the imperative material conditions for life. In the 
work of Godelier and Meillassoux, we may see the beginnings of a 
theory that addresses these issues in a wider perspective, and tries 
to wrest new meaning out of the distinction between the material 
and the ideational.
We have stated above that the boundary between structural 
Marxism and political economy was practically watertight. This was 
not always true in practice, and there are examples of ‘crossover’ 
scholars. The Argentinian anthropologist Eduardo Archetti 
(1943–2005) was one such case. Archetti did undergraduate studies 
in sociology in Argentina before going on to study with Godelier 
in Paris in the late 1960s, while Sidney Mintz, a Caribbeanist and 
another of Steward’s students, was also teaching there. His main 
research interest was in the underlying logic of peasant societies 
and their relationship to the outside world. Under Godelier’s 
supervision, he carried out fieldwork on peasants in Argentina, 
and wrote a doctoral thesis on which theories of underdevelopment 
and dependency made a deeper imprint than structural Marxism. 
When, in the mid-1970s, he began to teach at the University of 
Oslo, the professor who hired him reminisces that ‘we took him 
on because we needed someone to teach the latest fads in French 
structural Marxism’ (A.M. Klausen, personal communication). 
This, to remind us that intellectual trajectories are rarely simple, 
and boundaries are rarely clear-cut.
fEmiNiSm AND THE BiRTH Of REflEXiVE fiElDWORK
In 1954, under the pseudonym of Elenor Smith Bowen, the 
American anthropologist Laura Bohannan published Return to 
Laughter, a candid and personal account of a (fictional) American 
woman anthropologist on fieldwork among the Tiv of Nigeria. 
The pseudonym was deemed necessary, because it was not 
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considered proper to speak publicly about the personal aspects 
of fieldwork, the doubts and mistakes, fortuitous circumstances 
and general disjointedness that lurked behind Malinowski’s 
‘participant observation’. In 1966, Malinowski’s old student 
Hortense Powdermaker published Stranger and Friend: The Way 
of the Anthropologist, which describes a life of fieldwork in the 
most varied localities. Again, the impression is that fieldwork is 
perhaps not quite the orderly data collection that Radcliffe-Brown 
envisioned. Then, in 1967, Malinowski’s personal diaries from his 
Trobriand fieldwork were edited and published – and created an 
immediate scandal. The master himself, it seemed, had been no 
more than mortal. He had been homesick, had cursed the natives, 
masturbated and felt sorry for himself. How could anyone claim, 
after this, that he produced ‘objective knowledge’? Later, many 
have defended Malinowski, notably Barth (2005), himself a prolific 
fieldworker, by pointing out that Malinowski had the good sense to 
separate his private rants and frustrations – which were perfectly 
understandable – from his scientific work.
Only a few years later, the participants in the ‘rationality debate’ 
would grapple with these questions philosophically, but in the 
meanwhile a group of young American female anthropologists 
responded more practically to the issue at hand. In 1970, the year 
Bryan Wilson’s edited Rationality came out, the edited volume 
Women in the Field: Anthropological Experiences (Golde 1970) 
appeared. Each of the many essays in this hefty volume recounts 
the concrete circumstances under which the author’s field research 
had taken place, and reflects on the effect of her experiences on the 
quality of her data. The essays are different, reflecting a wide variety 
of practices and experiences in the field, but they all agree on one 
thing: the fact that they were women had a profound effect on the 
conclusions they brought home with them. In this way, the idea of 
‘positioned’ fieldwork emerged, the idea that the anthropologist can 
learn significant lessons about her own data by reflecting on her 
personal role in the field. Thus, Women in the Field put two debates 
on the agenda: How should self-reflexive fieldwork be conducted? 
And what role does gender play in social systems?
The first question was responded to with a series of detailed, 
practical accounts of how concrete fieldwork situations had in fact 
been tackled. A wonderful example of the genre is Rosalie Wax’s 
Doing Fieldwork: Warnings and Advice, published in 1971, where 
the budding anthropologist is told, in no uncertain terms, What 
You Are Getting Into. 
Eriksen HOA3 01 text   152 16/04/2013   16:04
QUESTiONiNG AUTHORiTy 153
The second question – how can gender be studied anthropo-
logically? – introduces the first male participant into this hitherto 
completely female account. He was the British anthropologist Edwin 
Ardener (1927–1987), who published ‘Belief and the problem 
of women’ in 1972. An Oxford anthropologist who carried out 
extensive fieldwork in Cameroon and Nigeria, Ardener’s most 
important theoretical papers (collected in Ardener 1989) deal 
with social anthropology and linguistics, and with problems of 
translation, generalisation and intelligibility. He was also concerned 
with power, not least who had power to define the category systems 
of a society. Add Ardener’s sustained interest in language – rare in 
British anthropology – and his contribution to the gender debate 
should come as no surprise. (His wife, Shirley Ardener, was a leading 
figure in British feminist anthropology at the same time, and edited 
two important collections in the 1970s (S. Ardener 1975, 1978).)
Ardener posited that ‘[t]he problem of women has not been solved 
by social anthropologists’. He emphasised that his ‘problem’ was 
not why women everywhere had lower rank than men, though that 
was also an important issue. His concern was with the conspicuous 
absence of women in most of the (presumably holistic) classics 
of anthropology, even in books written by female anthropologists 
(he mentions Richards’ Chisungu (1956) as an exception). An 
important cause for this absence was general male bias in Western 
society, but this did not explain everything. Ardener argued that 
fieldworkers, whether male or female, more easily found rapport 
with male informants than with women, since men dominated the 
public sphere and were used to addressing outsiders. The cultural 
models ethnographers brought home were often formulated by men. 
Ardener described women as a muted group, not because they were 
silent, but because their statements were not easily translated into 
meaningful fieldnotes. The argument recalls sociolinguistic studies 
of class, race and language in the USA, that had shown that black 
and working-class children did badly in school because they were 
used to expressing themselves in ‘context-dependent’ language 
(Giglioli 1976). Ardener’s paper and the debate it provoked raised 
similar questions in Britain as Golde’s book had in the USA.
Two years later, the response came, again from a group of 
American women anthropologists, in the form of another edited 
volume, this time in a more theoretical vein: Woman, Culture and 
Society (1974), edited by Michelle Z. Rosaldo and Louise Lamphere. 
Two of Ardener’s questions were dealt with there.
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First, Ardener had presupposed – as a premise for the mutedness 
of women – that societies generally distinguish between a private 
and a public sphere, where men control the latter and women 
occupy the former. Rosaldo discusses this distinction comparatively, 
and confirms Ardener’s view by showing that women’s efforts are 
in most societies confined to the immediate vicinity of the home, 
due to the physical constraints imposed by frequent childbirths 
and long periods of lactation. Men have a wider radius of action 
and have time to spare to constitute a public sphere around such 
activities as ritual, politics and trade.
Second, towards the end of his paper Ardener noted that women 
are often associated with ‘wild’ nature, while men are considered 
essentially ‘cultural’. Sherry Ortner, who would later write about the 
Sherpas of Nepal and publish several influential theoretical articles, 
responded with the classic ‘Is female to male as nature is to culture?’ 
(Ortner 1974). She writes that ‘each culture, in its own way and on 
its own terms’, regards women as ‘in some degree inferior to men’ 
(1974: 69), and describes the train of symbolic associations that 
connects the socially oppressed to the non-social world.
The enduring impact of Woman, Culture and Society – which was 
widely read throughout the next two decades – was at least partly 
due to its distinctly un-revolutionary tone. It was a collection of 
articles on gender, not a political manifesto. Along with several later 
anthologies discussing women and (increasingly) gender relations, 
it contributed to permanent changes in the research priorities of 
anthropology in the 1980s and 1990s.
It is not easy to give an overall assessment of the impact of 
feminism on anthropology. It is often difficult to discern the 
theoretical impulses from feminism against the rising tide of 
postcolonial and postmodernist work. More concretely, the emphasis 
on ‘women’s worlds’ led to classical monographs on gender relations 
in various societies. We might mention Jean Briggs’ self-reflexive 
account of emotional life among Canadian Inuit (1970), Annette 
Weiner’s ambitious re-study of the Trobriand islanders (1976), 
Michelle Rosaldo’s discussion of language and emotion among 
the headhunting Ilongot of the Philippines (1980) and Robert and 
Yolanda Murphy’s gender-sensitive monograph on the Mundurúcu 
of Brazil (1985). These and other books challenged the orthodox 
view of traditional societies. In 1967, it was still acceptable to classify 
non-agricultural societies under the heading ‘Man the Hunter’. In 
1981, the collection Woman the Gatherer was published (Dahlberg 
1981), which showed that women’s work – gathering – provided 
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well over half of the food the ‘hunters’ ate. Though the importance 
of gathering had been pointed out before, it was by now no longer 
meaningful to speak of ‘hunting societies’. They are either ‘hunters 
and gatherers’ or ‘foragers’.
The influence of feminism is deeper and broader than these 
examples can show. As we will see, feminist anthropology laid the 
agenda for the next decades’ studies of the anthropology of the 
body, of kinship and gender, of resistance among the oppressed, 
and of exchange. It is hard to imagine the numerous reworkings of 
the concept of power we have seen since 1980, without the feminist 
influence. The 1970s were also the decade when female students in 
large numbers entered the discipline. Women in anthropology had 
been muted (though not completely, as the careers of Benedict and 
Mead, Douglas and Richards show). Now they were about to speak.
ETHNiCiTy
A third trend in 1970s anthropology was ethnicity studies. This had 
several independent sources. The first was the work of the Chicago 
anthropologist George DeVos (1923–2010) and his associates at 
Berkeley (DeVos and Romanucci-Ross 1975). Inspired by the 
pioneering work of the Chicago school (Chapter 4), DeVos did 
extensive work on ethnic minorities and immigrant assimilation 
in the USA, Japan and elsewhere. A committed interdisciplinarian 
with a background in psychology, he remained loyal to the basic 
tenets of the culture and personality school, and was a major force 
behind the establishment of psychological anthropology as a sub-
discipline. ‘Ethnic identity’ (a term DeVos introduced) was for him 
a matter of cultural psychology and self-identification.
Another, more sociological tradition studied ‘plural societies’. As 
defined by the British-trained Jamaican anthropologist Michael G. 
Smith (1965), the term referred to societies in which clearly separated 
ethnic groups coexisted. Smith, originally a West Africanist who 
wrote increasingly from the West Indies, saw the constituent groups 
of plural societies as tight-knit, culturally distinctive corporations, 
competing fiercely for power. A controversial theme was whether 
such ethnic groups are in fact as discrete as Smith claimed, since 
they have often been subjected to intensive integration processes, not 
least in the Caribbean. This recalls the Chicago school’s discussion 
of the American melting-pot as well as the Manchester school’s 
problems with de- and re-tribalisation in Africa (Chapter 5). Then 
as now, the debate led to no definite conclusion.
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Two other schools of ethnicity studies would be more influential, 
particularly in Europe. Both had their roots in British postwar 
studies of social change, and conceived of ethnicity as a factor in the 
strategic choices of individuals and groups. Both also emphasised 
the instrumental, political dimension of ethnic relations rather than 
their cultural content.
Around 1970, several monographs by British Africanists on 
urbanisation and social change appeared. Abner Cohen, yet 
another of Gluckman’s students, published Custom and Politics 
in Urban Africa (1969), a study of trade and ethnicity in West 
Africa, which showed how Hausa merchants from northern Nigeria 
monopolised cattle trade through the use of networks based on 
kinship, ethnicity and, notably, religion. Writing from East Africa, 
David Parkin showed, in Neighbours and Nationals in an African 
City Ward (1969), how Luo tribal loyalties were transformed into 
modern ethnicity after migration to Nairobi. In these and other 
studies from the same period, the continuity with the Manchester 
school was strong. Indeed, Mitchell himself wrote an important 
contribution to Cohen’s edited collection Urban Ethnicity (1974b). 
In Cohen’s introduction, and in his theoretical volume Two-Dimen-
sional Man (1974a), this continuity is abundantly clear. Among the 
influences that may be discerned are Victor Turner’s insistence on the 
multivocality of symbols, Mitchell’s discussion of the transformation 
of tribal loyalty into modern ethnicity, and Gluckman’s original 
fusion of structural-functionalism and social conflict. Cohen 
nevertheless went further than his mentors, with his explicit focus 
on the dual – emotional and political – character of ethnic symbols, 
and his observation that political entrepreneurs manipulate such 
symbols to gain and guide the loyalty of their followers. As opposed 
to DeVos and Smith, Cohen went far in divorcing ethnicity from 
culture, stating, for example, that ‘City men’ (London bankers) 
might well be seen as an ethnic group. It was the social function 
of ethnicity, rather than its cultural content, that interested him.
The most widely influential of the ethnicity studies from this 
period was Barth’s edited collection Ethnic Groups and Boundaries 
(1969). Based on a conference in 1967, and including contributions 
from leading Scandinavian anthropologists – including several of his 
former students – Barth’s book, and particularly his introduction, 
was one of the most widely quoted works in academic anthropology 
during the last decades of the twentieth century. Like Cohen, Barth 
argued that ethnicity was chiefly a social and political, rather than 
a cultural, phenomenon. Barth, however, went on to say that it is 
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‘the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff 
that it encloses’ (1969: 15). The relationship between groups, not 
the culture of groups, is the basis of ethnicity. The similarity with 
Lévi-Strauss’ and Bateson’s ideas of meaning (based on difference or 
contrast) is easily seen, and indicates the common interest of all these 
authors in formalist, rather than substantivist, concept formation, 
and in cybernetics. In Barth’s book this formalism implied that 
ethnicity should no longer seen as an expression of shared culture, 
language, history or territory, but a result of social processes 
generated by individual choices. Ethnicity arises when groups meet 
and their interaction generates a boundary between them. The 
empirical studies that make up the body of Barth’s volume explore 
this idea, and analyse the economic, political and demographic 
communication that takes place across ethnic boundaries. The 
studies demonstrated that significant cultural differences could exist 
within a single ethnic group, while different ethnic groups could 
have near-identical cultures. All that mattered, it seemed, was that 
the groups perceived themselves as different, and interacted on that 
assumption. Barth’s formalist stance on ethnicity (all ethnic groups 
are defined by a universal kind of ‘ethnic behaviour’), mirrors his 
preoccupation with formalist economics (Barth 1967). However, 
the success of formalism in ethnicity studies has been far greater.
Barth himself would later come to view his contribution to 
ethnicity studies as a preamble to the deconstructivist movement 
in anthropology (Barth 1994), where the very notion of cultural 
wholes with substantial content was questioned on epistemologi-
cal, theoretical and methodological grounds (Chapter 8). If the 
leaders of ethnic groups virtually fabricated cultural differences 
for strategic reasons, what then remained of Boas’ conception of 
cultures as unique and authentic? It may be objected that Barth’s 
basically positivistic agenda is irreconcilable with the aesthetic and 
eclectic vision of postmodernism. Still, the practical effect of the 
two theories was in this context similar.
Soon it also became clear that Barth’s understanding of 
ethnicity was compatible with the new interest in nationalism and 
globalisation that appeared in anthropology in the 1980s and 1990s. 
In some of that work, several of the trends discussed in this chapter 
came together: power and inequality from Marxism and feminism, 
the global context from Marxism, ‘muted’ discourses and reflexivity 
from feminism, cultural deconstruction and identity from ethnicity 
studies. And though the leading European schools reduced ethnicity 
mainly to a tool of politics, more complex analyses soon appeared 
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which emphasised the importance of subjective identification and 
ontological security for ethnicity. Two early books that developed 
these aspects were Manchester anthropologist A.L. Epstein’s Ethos 
and Identity (1978) and A.P. Cohen’s The Symbolic Construction 
of Community (1985). 
PRACTiCE THEORy
In 1984, Sherry Ortner, who had contributed to Rosaldo and 
Lamphere’s volume ten years earlier, published the article ‘Theory 
in anthropology since the Sixties’. Here she described a new, 
overarching theoretical paradigm that had been emerging in 
anthropology during the previous two decades, which she called 
‘practice theory’. Practice theory was, according to Ortner, an 
outgrowth of several long-term tendencies in the discipline. The 
old controversy between actor-oriented and structure-oriented 
approaches during the 1950s had lost much of its appeal, and the 
search was on for a new synthesis. The Marxian and feminist work 
of the 1970s was fresh in mind; neither were the debates of the 1950s 
and 1960s forgotten: on change and symbolism, formal models and 
rationality. Practice theory was not a formal school, but a loosely 
defined tendency encompassing many different research agendas, 
with a common meta-theoretical interest in unifying methodological 
individualism and collectivism, and in understanding human beings, 
not as abstract ‘social positions’ or ‘roles, but as physical bodies in 
a material world, under pressure from historical and macrosocial 
processes, but resisting them. Though Ortner’s references were 
mainly to American anthropologists, her conclusions were 
descriptive of important trends in European social science as well.
The idea of a social theory that could unify actor- and structure-
orientation, as well as sociological and cultural perspectives, was 
not new, and had been approached – variously – by both Bateson, 
Geertz and Barth. The term ‘practice’ (or more philosophically: 
praxis) is derived from Marx, whose description of the human body 
as exploited by and resisting power underlies his value theory, and 
is one of the most powerful statements in the social sciences. The 
feminists, too, with their emphasis on power and gender, forced 
the body to the forefront of analytical attention, as did the new 
sub-discipline, medical anthropology, which became one of the fast-
est-growing specialisations in the discipline in the 1980s and 1990s.
Some of these concerns would lead to a hesitant rapprochement 
of anthropology and biology in the 1990s (Chapter 9). In the 1970s, 
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however, they attracted the attention of several leading lights of 
European social theory, two of whom will briefly be treated here, 
while the third will also be discussed in the next chapter.
In 1979, the sociologist Anthony Giddens (1938–), who has been 
described as ‘Britain’s best-known social scientist since Keynes’, 
published Central Problems in Social Theory, a collection of 
essays that leaned heavily on Marx and Althusser, while also citing 
interaction theorists, such as Goffman and Barth. Giddens’ explicit 
aim was to unify two dimensions of social life, which he referred 
to as structure and agency. In his chef-d’œuvre, The Constitution 
of Society (1984), Giddens develops this theory further.
The concept of agency, which in Giddens’ work evoked a 
conscious, strategic actor, acting within the structural constraints 
imposed by power on his body, is nearly identical to Ortner’s 
concept of ‘practice’. Practice is also the preferred term in the 
work of the French sociologist and anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu 
(1930–2002). Born to a lower-middle-class family in a provincial 
town in France, Bourdieu studied in Paris (with Michel Foucault 
and Jacques Derrida; see Chapter 8), and did fieldwork among the 
Kabyles, a Berber group in Algeria, during the War of Algerian 
Independence in the 1950s. He was deeply influenced by Marx 
and Lévi-Strauss, Mauss, Durkheim and Weber, and his project has 
been to unify these influences into a simple but sensitive instrument 
for the study of human societies. Bourdieu wrote on a wide range 
of subjects, including class, sports, art, taste, architecture, power, 
gender and exchange, and his influence on anthropology has been 
wide-ranging and profound. His most influential work in the 1970s, 
Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique (1972; Outline of a Theory of 
Practice, 1977; see also Bourdieu 1990), uses Kabyle ethnography 
extensively, but is basically a sustained theoretical meditation on the 
relationship between collective norms, social power and individual 
agency, as these are expressed through and by the human body. 
Two aspects of Bourdieu’s theory will concern us here. First, the 
idea of habitus, which he borrows from Mauss and the German 
sociologist Norbert Elias. Habitus is the permanent internalisa-
tion of the social order in the human body. The body inhabits a 
material world, a world of power, and a social world of people. 
The structural constraints inherent in these worlds are impressed 
on the body, forming permanent dispositions:
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… schemes of perception and thought, extremely general in their 
application, such as those which divide up the world in accordance 
with the oppositions between the male and the female, east and 
west, future and past, top and bottom, right and left, and so on, 
and also, at a deeper level, in the form of bodily postures and 
stances, ways of standing, sitting, looking, speaking, or walking. 
(Bourdieu 1977: 15)
Habitus is a pervasive aesthetics of action, which determines 
the actor in the manner of a dance – you cannot break out of it 
without loss of grace. At the same time, style, like dance, may be 
practised more or less skilfully, it may be utilised creatively, and 
opens infinite possibilities for variation and improvisation. Harking 
back to Bateson, and beyond him to Benedict, the concept of habitus 
seems to give tangible reality to the vague and general idea of ethos, 
by coupling it to power and the material world.
In the second part of his book, Bourdieu develops a model of 
symbolic culture, in which he distinguishes doxa and opinion as 
two basic forms of knowledge. Doxa refers to that which is taken 
for granted, which is beyond discussion and in many cases cannot 
even be articulated by members of society. Opinion, in contrast, 
refers to those aspects of culture that are open to scrutiny, discussion 
and dissent.
A third theorist with a profound impact on anthropological 
research on embodied practices, to whom we shall return in the 
next chapter, was the French philosopher and historian Michel 
Foucault (1926–1984). In 1975, Foucault published an acclaimed 
study of the rise of the modern prison system in Europe, which 
rested heavily on the concept of discipline. Discipline, like habitus, is 
structure and power that have been impressed on the body, forming 
permanent dispositions. Foucault, however, stresses the violence of 
this ‘impression’ more strongly than Bourdieu, and gives a more 
vivid sense of the cost of modernisation for whoever is subjected 
to it. This aspect of Foucault’s work had a fundamental influence 
on the anthropological studies of power and violence that came to 
the fore during the 1980s and 1990s (Chapters 8 and 9).
In sum, the practice theorists opened up a whole new field of 
enquiry for anthropology by focusing on the human body as the 
central fact of social existence. This interest connected them – 
directly or indirectly – to another group of researchers, who had 
been exploring the interface between biology and sociology. This 
group included Victor Turner, whose late work on performance and 
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ritual had a strong body-orientation. It included Bateson, who (with 
Mead) had worked on body language on Bali, and had inspired such 
anthropologists as Ray Birdwhistell, who did technical work on the 
minute details of non-verbal communication. It also touched on 
the work of psychologists, linguists and cognitive anthropologists 
who had been exploring inborn or deeply imprinted linguistic and 
perceptual aptitudes (Chapter 9). Finally, it connected to the work 
of a group of biologists and physical anthropologists who created 
a major stir in the discipline in the late 1970s through an attempt 
to redefine anthropology as a branch of the study of evolution (E. 
Wilson 1975). The resistance among mainstream anthropologists to 
this work is illustrated by the fact that when Turner’s posthumous 
‘Body, brain and culture’ was published in 1987, his editor deemed 
it necessary to preface it with a long introduction, explaining that 
Turner had not, in his dotage, become a sociobiologist.
THE SOCiOBiOlOGy DEBATE AND SAmOA
In spite of its evolutionist overtones, Marxist anthropology was 
grudgingly acknowledged as a legitimate project by most of the senior 
figures in anthropology. Feminist anthropology was by and large 
welcomed as an elaboration of some of the perennial disciplinary 
concerns, and practice theory, particularly in Bourdieu’s version was, 
if anything, embraced too uncritically. Not so with sociobiology. 
It was met with extreme hostility, and traditional antagonists 
– cultural materialists and hermeneuticians, British political anthro-
pologists and French structural Marxists – temporarily joined forces 
to exorcise the evil spirit. The centrepiece of the controversy was 
the biologist Edward O. Wilson’s book Sociobiology (1975). Most 
of it deals with non-human forms of ‘social organisation’, but in 
the final chapter, Wilson (who is considered the world’s leading 
authority on ants) proposes to include the social sciences in the 
grand endeavour of evolutionary biology. He sees culture essentially 
as an adaptation in the biological sense; its main function consists 
in ensuring the production of offspring, and in order to understand 
what people are up to and how societies work, one has to see their 
activities in the light of the ‘hardware’ of their genetic apparatus. In 
Wilson’s view, cultural phenomena such as religion, cooperation and 
morality should be seen as biological adaptations. In the intellectual 
circles of the time, where feminism and Marxism loomed large and 
Durkheim’s spirit still moved upon the face of the waters, such 
bio-determinism inevitably caused uproar. At a public meeting in 
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1978, a member of the audience poured a pitcher of ice-cold water 
over Wilson’s head as he entered the podium to speak, and others 
chanted: ‘Wilson, you’re all wet now!’ The event serves to illustrate 
the emotions that seemed to be at stake. 
As the reader will be aware, the idea of biological determinism 
was not new to anthropology. It had been fought off by Bastian’s 
postulate of the ‘psychic unity of mankind’, then again by Boas in 
the face of racism and eugenics. Since the war, the demon had lain 
low, but after the early 1960s, a few anthropologists, and quite a 
few human behavioural biologists, started to think seriously about 
developing a Darwinian science of culture. Popular books with 
tantalising titles such as The Naked Ape, The Imperial Animal and 
The Territorial Imperative appeared in the late 1960s, claiming 
for biology areas that had been monopolised by cultural relativists 
and other social scientists for most of the twentieth century. These 
books were academically lightweight, and caused less anxiety than 
irritation among professionals. With the publication of Wilson’s 
book, and three years later, his On Human Nature, social and 
cultural anthropologists had a target worthy of sustained attack. 
And attack it they did. Even many evolutionary biologists, 
including Richard Lewontin and Stephen Jay Gould, went out of 
their way to discredit the view of humanity proposed by Wilson. 
In anthropology, Marvin Harris – who might perhaps have seemed 
a suitable ally for the sociobiologists – wrote a chapter on the 
movement in Cultural Materialism, where he concluded that the 
cultural variation in the world could be accounted for by reference 
to ecological, demographic and technological factors, and the socio-
biological proposals were either trivial or wrong. Sahlins, who had 
just completed his anti-reductionist Culture and Practical Reason, 
responded with a small book, The Use and Abuse of Biology (1977), 
published well before the debate in the journals had come to an 
end. In the book, or pamphlet, Sahlins pursues several arguments. 
One is that sociobiology is a kind of social Darwinism, an ideology 
of individualism and competition masquerading as ‘real science’. 
Another, more technical argument concerns Wilson’s and his 
followers’ concept of ‘kin selection’. This principle states that 
a person’s loyalty and willingness to make personal sacrifices is 
contingent on genetic kinship, so that one would be more inclined to 
make sacrifices for close genetic relatives than for others. Obviously, 
a cultural anthropologist would have misgivings about this kind 
of view, and Sahlins spends nearly half the book showing that the 
ways of reckoning kin vary immensely worldwide, and that there is 
Eriksen HOA3 01 text   162 16/04/2013   16:04
QUESTiONiNG AUTHORiTy 163
no necessary connection between genetic proximity and the social 
solidarity entailed by kinship. In a rejoinder to Sahlins, Richard 
Dawkins (in the second edition of The Selfish Gene, 1983) argues 
that cultural representations may vary, but this does not mean that 
practices vary accordingly.
The debate did not end there. Lévi-Strauss politely demolished 
sociobiology in his Le Regard éloigné (1983; The View from 
Afar, 1985), pointing out that the idea of ‘inclusive fitness’ was 
an empty explanatory category since it was so flexible in practice 
that it could apply to anything at all. In Evolution and Social Life, 
published a decade after Sociobiology, Tim Ingold (1986) devotes 
much attention to the book and the ensuing controversy. With 
an air of exasperation, he remarks that Wilson (in On Human 
Nature) unwittingly reinvents the nineteenth-century evolutionists’ 
comparative method in his attempt to create a biologically based 
social science from scratch (Ingold 1986: 71).
Just as the sociobiology debate was cooling down, at least in the 
anthropological mainstream, the publication of a monograph on 
Samoan social life led to its resurgence. In 1928, Margaret Mead 
had published Coming of Age in Samoa, an intimate description 
of young girls growing up, which did much to force the idea of 
cultural relativism into the public eye in the West. In the interwar 
years, it had been instrumental in discrediting the then-powerful 
eugenics movement, which favoured ‘selective breeding’ of humans 
in order to improve their culture. The book was also an important 
inspiration for American feminism, and was often referred to by 
the new anthropological feminists of the 1970s.
In 1983, the Australian anthropologist Derek Freeman published a 
book-length assault on Mead’s research, Margaret Mead and Samoa: 
The Unmaking of an Anthropological Myth (1983). Freeman had 
been doing research on Samoa on and off for decades, and at first, 
as he explains it, he had taken Mead’s views on Samoan society for 
granted. Only gradually did he start wondering at the discrepancy 
between what he saw around him and the descriptions given 
by Mead. Nothing seemed to fit: gender roles, socialisation and 
sexuality were not at all as Mead had described them. In his book, he 
attributes these discrepancies, in part, to wishful thinking; in part to 
Mead’s having been cunningly misled by her informants. Freeman’s 
own analysis appeared to show that Samoa was a dreadful place to 
grow up. Rape, suicide and mental disorder were common, and – in 
stark contrast to Mead’s romantic portrait of free sexuality among 
adolescent Samoans – there was an extreme cult of virginity.
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Mead’s academic work had been criticised before. It was generally 
agreed that her fieldwork in Samoa – as a young woman of 24, 
less than a decade after Malinowski’s return from the Trobriand 
Islands – had been methodologically questionable, and that the 
monograph was probably not a major scientific work. The virulence 
of Freeman’s attack, and the fact that he chose to publish it after 
Mead’s death in 1978 (rather than face the matriarch’s wrath; 
he had been working on the book for decades), contributed to 
the almost unanimous pro-Mead reactions the book provoked 
among American anthropologists. But the 1970s had been full of 
re-analyses, from Talal Asad’s demolition of Barth’s work from 
Swat (1972), to Jonathan Friedman’s accusations of functionalism 
in Rappaport’s study (1979), to Annette Weiner’s respectful but 
thought-provoking follow-up critique of Malinowski (1976). None 
of these caused such a stir as Freeman’s critique of Mead. Not only, 
it seems, was he criticising Mead; he was being obnoxious to the 
memory of an icon of liberal humanism, and, worst of all, he was 
doing it as a biologically inclined anthropologist. Freeman was 
not treated politely by his fellow anthropologists, and he quickly 
became persona non grata; but he continued his crusade until his 
death in 2001.
Interestingly, other Samoan specialists did not, on the whole, take 
Freeman’s side. One might have thought they would. Was he not the 
real scientist of the two, working doggedly for decades, collecting 
voluminous materials, learning the language – while Mead was never 
more than a visitor with time for no more than fleeting engagements 
with her informants? Maybe so, but the specialists were cautiously 
equivocal in assessing the relative merits of Mead’s and Freeman’s 
research. One non-specialist pointed out, slightly tongue-in-cheek, 
that Mead’s point that nurture was stronger than nature had been 
proven in the intervening years, since American society had moved 
from a very puritan view of sexuality to a more liberal view, not least 
because of the influence of her ideas. Some regional experts praised 
Freeman for having provided a more complete picture of Samoan 
society, while Lowell Holmes (1987), who had himself replicated 
Mead’s work in the early 1950s, concluded by stating, in reference 
to his own work, that he would have loved to thrash Mead, but he 
was unable to do so: the resemblance between the real Samoa and 
the picture she had drawn was too strong.
Although the subject matter of this controversy is in itself bound 
to be engaging to any anthropologist, what interests us most in the 
context of the history of the discipline, is the degree of passion, not 
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to say aggression, it aroused. Even during the recent fierce debates 
about descent versus alliance in kinship, the assumed universality 
of male supremacy, the true Marxist meaning of infrastructural 
determination or the autonomy of culture, the antagonists rarely 
moved beyond irony in castigating their opponents. With the 
sociobiology debate and related issues concerning nature versus 
nurture, the politeness of anthropological debate was discarded, 
and the pitcher of cold water was never far away.
Before we return to these (and other) issues, we must take the 
plunge into the turbulent and turgid waters of postmodernism. 
Regarded by some as a source of salvation, by others as a dead 
(and excessively wordy) end, by still others as a tunnel with a light 
in the distance, the diverse intellectual currents summarised as 
‘postmodernism’ had few concerns in common, but were responses 
to a particular historical situation.
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The End of modernism?
If every age has its ambience, that of the 1980s is unmistakable. 
The decade seems to roll in on us in a heavy cloud of AIDS, black 
leather, urban decay and crack. The sound of The Cure from a 
Walkman, drifting down the street, past the pale guy on the corner 
with his spikes and golden mohawk. Or watch the girls in tight 
pastels swooning to Michael Jackson and dancing till dawn – while 
the first clunky personal computers hit the home market, and the 
pale moon shines down on you from a sky that now contains ozone 
holes and greenhouse gases – weird phenomena, that an astute 
anthropologist will soon call hybrids. Another hybrid is buried in 
an unmentionable sarcophagus close to the small town of Chernobyl 
in the Ukraine. Reagan and Thatcher; Nicaragua and Afghanistan. 
Indira Gandhi assassinated, Saddam Hussein elected. Olof Palme 
assassinated, Mikhail Gorbachev elected. Right at the middle of 
the decade, deep-sea divers locate the sunken Titanic on the North 
Atlantic ocean floor, and plans are discussed for rescuing parts of 
the vast, luxurious wreck. But then the Soviet Union proclaims 
glasnost and perestroika, unilateral arms cuts, freedom of speech; 
and the world watches as the great Communist superpower falters 
and crumbles under its own weight. In 1989, the Berlin Wall goes 
down, and is sold piecemeal to individuals and corporations all 
over the world. Democracy and capitalism are triumphant. Nelson 
Mandela is freed.
The 1980s brought domestic political developments that few 
academics were happy with. The public sector was undermined, 
and universities restructured with a view to becoming more efficient. 
The future funding of ‘useless’ disciplines like anthropology became 
more uncertain than for decades. Competition and individualism 
were proclaimed from the rostrums and enforced in the lecture halls. 
After the outgoing, aggressive academic life of the 1970s, the 1980s 
seemed enclosed: claustrophobic or soul-searching. Disillusion was 
widespread among a generation of anthropologists who had recently 
thought they could change the world. By the end of the decade, 
some were saying that ‘anthropology as we know it’ was (or should 
166
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be) dead and buried, while others continued their with their job, 
sending students off on fieldwork and keeping the institutions going 
– organising conferences, editing journals, reviewing monographs, 
working on projects, applying for grants, and so on.
By 1980, anthropology had become a diverse and lively discipline 
with a number of clearly delineated research traditions. Despite the 
recent upheavals brought about by Marxists and other subversives, 
and despite the nearly constant self-criticism that anthropologists had 
practised for a decade or more, the leading theorists still commanded 
deference and respect. They were the generation who had cut their 
teeth in departments headed by people like Kroeber, Redfield and 
Herskovits, Steward, Firth, Evans-Pritchard and Gluckman, during 
the first postwar years. The rising star of American anthropology 
was Clifford Geertz, who had moved from Chicago to Princeton 
in 1970, two years after Turner came to Chicago and received 
his professorship there. Geertz was by now firmly established as 
the leading American symbolic anthropologist, admired for his 
eloquent and subtle interpretations. His contemporary, Sahlins, 
arrived in Chicago in 1973. He had abandoned neo-evolutionism 
in favour of Boasian Marxism (if such a thing can be!), but would 
soon move on to develop his own brand of structuralism, with 
particular focus on collective memory. All three phases of his work 
had their admirers. Schneider, also at Chicago, would soon (in 1984) 
proclaim that the concept of kinship was as good as meaningless; 
while Wolf, who published his magnum opus on the local impact 
of colonialism in 1982, had a sizeable following at City University 
of New York. Harris would move from Columbia to the University 
of Florida in 1982, after publishing his theoretical manifesto on 
cultural materialism in 1979 – the year that Bateson, pursuing his 
interdisciplinary interests in California, published his first and only 
major synthetic work, Mind and Nature, only months before his 
death in 1980.
Among British anthropologists, several left for the United States 
– among them Mary Douglas and F.G. Bailey. Douglas continued to 
produce important work in the borderlands between structuralism 
and structural-functionalism – some consider the little-known 
Cultural Bias (1978) her best book ever. In the next decade, she 
would publish How Institutions Think (1987), a remarkable defence 
of structural-functionalism at a time when, in most people’s eyes, 
it was safely relegated to the mists of history. In Britain itself, 
Needham and Ardener had their followings at Oxford; Needham 
with his more Dutch than French brand of structuralism and an 
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ethnographic focus on South-East Asia; Ardener, the Africanist, 
with his ‘post-structuralist’ concern with language and cognition. At 
Cambridge, Leach retired in 1978, though he continued to attract 
attention for his theoretical views, influenced in about equal measure 
by Malinowski and Lévi-Strauss, until his death in 1989. Goody 
retired in 1984 and was succeeded by Ernest Gellner (1925–1995), 
a Paris-born Czech philosopher – who had joined the anthropology 
department at Cambridge in the early 1980s. Gellner was attracted 
to Malinowskian functionalism while still a student at the LSE, 
had converted to anthropology and published his first and only 
field study on – Moroccan saints (1969). Barth, probably the most 
versatile Malinowskian fieldworker in the history of the discipline, 
had recently completed studies in New Guinea and Oman, and 
was looking forward to new fieldwork in Bali and, later, Bhutan 
(previous fieldwork had been done in Iraq, Sudan, Norway, Pakistan 
(Swat) and Iran). In the mid-1970s, he had relocated from Bergen to 
Oslo – and from his old interests in economy, ecology and politics 
to studies of knowledge. In 1987, he published Cosmologies in the 
Making, a regional study of knowledge traditions in Highland New 
Guinea, seen from a processual and generative perspective.
In France, all roads still seemed to lead to Paris, where Lévi-Strauss 
officiated. He had witnessed the phenomenal rise of structuralism 
during the 1950s, and then the relentless attack on it by the younger 
generation, headed by Foucault and Derrida. He wrote new books, 
though he had few new students by now. Bourdieu had moved to 
Paris from Lille in the early 1960s, and became an international 
figure with the translation of Outline of a Theory of Practice into 
English, in 1977. Dumont, whose reputation as an anthropologist 
had been on the rise since Homo Hierarchicus was published 
in English in 1970 (until then, he had been considered, outside 
France, as a ‘mere’ South Asianist), had gone on to write challenging 
works on hierarchy and values, individualism and collectivism, ‘the 
West’ versus ‘the East’, and would acquire quite a following during 
the 1980s.
By 1980, it could no longer be said that anthropological 
research was limited to certain ‘core regions’, or to studies of 
exotic, non-Western cultures. In the wake of the methodological 
revolution of the 1970s, fieldwork in Western countries had 
become commonplace, and the 1980s would see a considerable 
output of publications in this genre, including Marianne Gullestad’s 
Kitchen-Table Society (1984) – a study of working-class urban 
Norwegian women; and Katherine Newman’s Falling from Grace 
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(1988) – a study of downward mobility among the American 
middle class under Reagan. Urban anthropology, pioneered by the 
Chicago and Manchester schools, had been established as an entirely 
respectable enterprise.
The older generation of anthropologists entered the 1980s with 
mixed emotions. For some, the retreat from political commitment 
seemed a betrayal of all that was sacred to anthropology. Others 
saw a chance to get back to work after a decade of stormy political 
debates. For yet others, it was the long-awaited opportunity to get 
rid of the old idea of anthropology as a natural science and institute 
a new humanism. An example of the latter was Victor Turner, who, 
in his posthumously published The Anthropology of Performance, 
writes of the ‘systematic dehumanizing of the human subjects of 
study’ in anthropological accounts, ‘regarding them as the bearers of 
an impersonal “culture,” or [as] wax to be imprinted with “cultural 
patterns,” or as determined by social, cultural or social psychological 
“forces,” “variables,” or “pressures” of various kinds’ (Turner 
1987: 72). Turner had come a long way since his student years 
with Gluckman. In this book he calls for an experimental, playful 
anthropology that addresses the entire human being, as a living, 
sensual body. Turner welcomed postmodernism (though he disliked 
the label) because it, at least in some of its forms, offered a freedom 
from abstract systems and formal models, whether actor-oriented 
or structural, sociological or cultural. Formal models obscured the 
exuberance, creativity and humour of human life, and placed the 
scientific mind above real people.
There is a paradox hidden here, which we shall briefly point out. 
On the one hand, a theoretical hardliner like Bourdieu seems to 
be saying much the same thing as Turner. His concept of habitus 
has the express purpose of bringing out the richness of human 
interaction – by focusing on the body – which is just what Turner 
recommends. On the other hand, Bourdieu’s whole project, with 
its totalising ambitions and its involuted, formal argument, seems 
to contradict Turner’s intentions completely.
Among the younger generation too, the views and interests 
were diverse. It is enough to leaf through some of the monographs 
they wrote to be convinced of this. Take Gananath Obeyesekere’s 
Medusa’s Hair (1981), a psychoanalytically and medically inspired 
discussion of spirit possession in Sri Lanka; or Steven Feld’s Sound 
and Sentiment (1982), a jazzed-up structuralist essay on music, 
natural sound and emotion in Papua New Guinea; or Katherine 
Verdery’s Transylvanian Villagers (1983), tracing three centuries 
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of political, economic and ethnic change in a Romanian peasant 
community; or Henrietta Moore’s Space, Text and Gender (1986), 
a study – inspired by Ricoeur and Marx – of gender, symbolism 
and power among the Kenyan Marakwet. Maurice Bloch’s From 
Blessing to Violence (1986), the greatest and last structural Marxist 
thesis, treats history and power as expressed through an initiation 
ritual in Madagascar; while Bruce Kapferer’s Legends of People, 
Myths of State (1988), delves into the cognitive underpinnings of Sri 
Lankan and Australian nationalisms, drawing on Dumont’s notions 
of hierarchy and Turner’s theory of ritual performance.
We could continue in this vein indefinitely, but we have seen 
enough to appreciate the wide range of issues and places discussed 
in these ethnographies. But we should also note their pervasive 
theoretical eclecticism. The influence of Marxism and feminism 
is often seen; and there is a tendency to focus on the body, on 
power, on ritual – but the authors seem more willing than before 
to throw in a dash of Lévi-Strauss without swallowing his whole 
perspective, or to apply action-based network analysis in essentially 
Durkheimian studies of social integration. Steven Feld’s monograph, 
moving at will through the theoretical landscape, is perhaps the best 
example in the bunch. Postmodernism proclaimed the ‘death of 
the grand narrative’, it ‘deconstructed’ the great synthetic projects, 
leaving the fragments spread out on the ground. So it is happy 
days for individualists, in anthropology as elsewhere, and every 
anthropologist with respect for him- or herself, seems to create 
a private analytical toolbox, never to be recycled by anyone else, 
except in fragments.
A glance at some of the more explicitly theoretical works of the 
decade seems to confirm this impression. Take Anthony Cohen’s 
The Symbolic Construction of Community (1985), a slim book on 
local identity based on data from Shetland, and on Barth’s model 
of ethnicity – as opposed to Marilyn Strathern’s The Gender of 
the Gift (1988), a vast and intricate work on exchange and gender 
among the Hagen of New Guinea, engaging with a wide range of 
theorists, including Mauss and Lévi-Strauss; or take Roy Wagner’s 
Symbols that Stand for Themselves (1986), a neo-Lévi-Strauss-
ian excursus on symbolic creativity in European philosophy and 
Papuan ethnography – as opposed to Arjun Appadurai’s edited 
work, The Social Life of Things (1986), a comparative discussion of 
consumption and value transformations in global economic systems, 
drawing on the value theories of Marx and Simmel.
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All these varied and incompatible projects took place against the 
background of a more general academic movement. Ideas often 
called ‘post-structuralist’ were spreading. Foucault was becoming 
a household name among anthropologists. Heavy controversies 
turned around issues of representation, reflexivity and the very 
possibility of an anthropological science. If the 1970s were a decade 
of commitment, the 1980s were an age of doubt. And – partly as a 
result of the very individualism and eclecticism we have noted – this 
doubt also affected the integrity of the various national traditions in 
the discipline. Their century-old boundaries were beginning to blur.
THE END Of mODERNiSm?
By the mid-1980s, many younger, particularly American, anthro-
pologists spoke about a crisis in anthropology, a crisis in how 
anthropologists described – or ‘represented’ – the people they 
studied (Fabian 1983; Clifford and Marcus 1986). To various 
degrees, they accused the discipline of ‘exoticising’ the ‘Other’, of 
maintaining an untenable ‘subject–object distinction’ between the 
observer and the observed, which, it was argued, continued the 
‘othering’ enterprise of colonialism by maintaining an indefensible, 
asymmetrical ‘distinction’ between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’.
Their writings might be heavy with jargon, but the critics had 
much to offer in the setting of the 1980s. Anthropologists and 
others had argued that Western culture, and particularly the Western 
scientific and intellectual tradition, is heavily biased toward control, 
as embodied most visibly in the ‘controlled circumstances’ of physics 
laboratories (Latour 1991). As a science, anthropology shares this 
‘disposition’ (as Bourdieu might call it) to control its objects of 
study. The mere planning of a research project assumes this. It is 
obvious that care must be taken at all stages of the project to keep 
the amount of – well – ‘othering’ at a minimum.
 An early expression of this new sensitivity was Paul Rabinow’s 
Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco (1977), which, in line with 
the self-reflexive model of fieldwork that arose earlier in that decade 
(Chapter 7), describes the difficulties caused by power asymmetries 
(he had money, they did not), sketchy mastery of the language (he 
spoke good French, but bad Arabic) and his attempts to justify his 
project to himself.
But the postmodernist movement was less straightforward 
than this. Indeed, one might well ask if it should be considered 
one movement at all, since its main proponents often held widely 
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diverging views. There were in fact many different strains of 
‘postmodernism’ (which was fully in keeping with the spirit of 
‘postmodernism’ itself). Let us now trace the history of a few of 
these tendencies.
In the previous decade, Marxism and feminism had paved the 
way for the postmodern critique of anthropology. They had shown 
that knowledge and power were interconnected and worldviews 
were never neutral. However, the Marxists and feminists themselves 
presumably inhabited some kind of meta-level from which they 
could safely and critically observe and analyse the world. Strip 
away that, and what you get is postmodernism. It is as if one were 
to take away the authority of scientific observation and description 
from the Boasians and Malinowskians. All that remained would be 
an indefinite number of versions of the world.
The term ‘postmodern’, whose roots go back to Spanish literary 
criticism in the 1930s, was first defined in philosophy by the 
French philosopher Jean-François Lyotard (1924–1998), in his La 
Condition postmoderne (1979; The Postmodern Condition, 1984). 
Lyotard saw the postmodern condition as a state where there were 
no longer any overarching ‘grand narratives’ that could be invoked 
to make sense of the world. Different voices competed for attention, 
but never merged. The book, an unlikely bestseller, was intended as 
a critique of the standardising and ‘flattening’ effect of computerised 
information retrieval systems on intellectual discourse. It described a 
particular historical situation in the West, in which new technologies, 
new power relations and ideologies reigned. But postmodernism was 
itself an ideology (an -ism), an analytical perspective and an aesthetic 
that described the world (whether the world of the postmodern 
period itself, or any other world) as discontinuous and fragmented – 
a world of local, individual voices, rather than of hegemonic schools 
and ideologies. In architecture, film, literature and art, this attitude 
was eagerly embraced, resulting in a number of eclectic, collage-like 
productions, often playing ironically on nostalgic evocations of the 
styles and fashions of bygone days. In anthropology, the attitude 
was quickly associated with uncompromising cultural relativism, 
going well beyond the standards of all but most marginal anthro-
pologists. All worlds and worldviews were equal – as long as they 
did not attempt to dominate each other. Each world was constituted 
by an independent ‘language game’ (a term Lyotard derived from 
the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein), and we are condemned 
to live in different worlds, without any overarching language to 
bring us together. Visions of democracy or universal human rights 
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were, as certain anthropologists had previously held, part and 
parcel of a culture-specific, Western ideology, and could never be 
value-neutral. We are reminded of Herder’s critique of Voltaire 
(Chapter 1); the role of Voltaire being played notably by the German 
social philosopher Jürgen Habermas, who developed a theory of 
Herrschafftfrei (‘authority-free’) communicative action in the 1970s.
The direct impact of Lyotard on anthropology was limited. Of 
greater importance to the new generation of anthropologists was 
Michel Foucault. A philosopher and critical social theorist, Foucault’s 
main works deal in part with the conditions of knowledge (1966), in 
part with the history of mentality (1972), in part, as we have seen 
(Chapter 7), with power and the body in the modern world (1975). 
His influence has been profound, on a par with Bourdieu’s. When 
the Times Higher Education Supplement ranked the most-cited 
authors of books in the humanities and social sciences in 2007, 
these two shared the first place, with their old co-student Derrida 
as a somewhat distant third. Surprisingly, perhaps, Goffman comes 
out number six, in front of Weber, Freud and Kant, and way before 
Durkheim and Marx and the only full-blooded anthropologist in 
the brood, Clifford Geertz. Foucault showed, through historical 
studies of the treatment of deviance (insanity, criminality and 
sexuality) in Europe, how the taken-for-granted frameworks for 
understanding and acting upon the world have changed historically. 
He used the term discourse to delineate such frameworks. This 
term had been used by linguists for years, but in Foucault’s usage 
it meant specifically a public exchange of ideas, in which certain 
questions, agendas and definitions – so-called ‘discursive objects’ – 
evolved as the result of power struggles between participants, and 
imposed themselves on the sensual human body. In his ruthless, 
intensely beautiful prose, often drawing on military analogies in 
its descriptions of discursive power and bodily discipline, Foucault 
spoke of the discourse as establishing a regime of knowledge.
At first sight, this theory might not seem to pose a challenge 
for mainstream, relativist anthropology, but rather to confirm its 
importance, in contrast to quantitative social science. However, 
anthropologists reading Foucault, notably Paul Rabinow (1989), 
stressed that anthropology was itself a regime of knowledge. 
Foucault’s attack on power therefore not only struck at the 
cultures that anthropologists studied, but at anthropology itself. 
Courses in the history of anthropology could no longer depict it 
as a value-neutral accumulation of knowledge and experience, but 
would have to see it as a genealogy of discursive objects (‘cultures’ 
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or ‘actors’) that were constituted, debated and challenged through 
the impersonal discursive flow, and imbued with authority by the 
power contained in discourse.
The anthropological work inspired by Foucault in the 1980s 
belongs to two distinct categories: on the one hand, ethnographic 
studies of discursive power, such as Lila Abu-Lughod’s work on 
gender and politics in the Middle East (1986); and on the other 
hand, critiques of anthropological enquiry itself (Clifford 1988). 
Either way, the Foucauldian perspective was compatible with views 
that had previously been espoused by Marxists, postcolonialists 
and feminists. All knowledge was situated, and more often than 
not it served to justify existing power structures. Moreover, as we 
indicated above and shall argue below, the perspective had a limited, 
but nevertheless striking affinity with a number of existing anthro-
pological agendas, most notably with the cultural relativism of Boas 
and Benedict, but also with certain strands of British interactionist 
anthropology. Both Geertz and Barth would claim that their (deeply 
opposed) approaches were precursors of postmodernism. American 
interpretive anthropologists and European students of ethnicity 
were (along with feminists and some erstwhile Marxists) among 
the first to display an interest in postmodern thinking.
When Foucault studied at the École Normale Supérieure in Paris 
during the 1950s, he was part of a group influenced by the structural 
Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser and the semiotician and literary 
critic Roland Barthes. In the 1960s, this group of ‘post-structur-
alists’ vehemently attacked Lévi-Strauss, in part for his disregard 
for power, in part for the elegant sterility of his formal models. 
Jacques Derrida (1930–2004), a student of Foucault, soon to be the 
leading figure of this movement, expanded this critique to Western 
philosophy as a whole. He developed a method of analysing texts 
that exposed the hierarchical assumptions inherent in them, which 
he referred to as deconstruction. To deconstruct a text is to locate 
the centre of power in it, and then look for unnoticed, marginal 
expressions, which escape power and allow the reader to interpret 
the text in new ways. The paradoxical nature of this project – given 
that deconstruction itself had to be done in the form of written texts 
– was evident to Derrida, and his deconstructions therefore sought 
to deconstruct themselves. This made for an involuted, extremely 
self-reflexive style of writing, full of allusions, contradictions and 
irony, which in Derrida’s own work is also meticulously exact – but 
in many of his admirers seems obscure at best, and at worst imbues 
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the text with a ‘centralism’ that is directly opposed to Derrida’s 
aims. Derrida himself, who grew up in the periphery, as a ‘pied-noir’ 
Jew in French Algeria, had an intrinsic interest in the ‘margins’, 
and later in life would dedicate much energy to such causes as the 
abolition of apartheid.
Transferred to anthropology, Derrida’s method effectively entails 
the end of ethnographic authority. There is no privileged, fixed 
‘I-view’ from which one can make neutral statements of any kind. 
Every concept is slippery, every description can be contested. Again, 
these problems were hardly alien to anthropology. Ever since the 
‘rationality debate’ (Chapter 6) and the new reflexivity’s entry into 
fieldwork (Chapter 7) similar problems had been at the forefront of 
anthropological discussion, and before that as well they had been 
raised periodically. What was new about Derrida’s proposal, was 
the suggestion that any text could be deconstructed. In other words, 
Winch’s criticism of Evans-Pritchard’s representation of Zande 
witchcraft was no more stable and valid than the text it criticised. 
In Derrida’s philosophy, there is no fixed point of reference, no 
‘Archimedean point’, to use a favourite postmodernist term. The 
potential for self-criticism, already significant in anthropology, was 
raised to unheard-of heights.
Though some anthropologists attempted (and usually failed) to 
follow Derrida straight through to the bitter end, there were also 
more moderate reactions. Thus, in ‘The decline of modernism in 
social anthropology’, Evans-Pritchard’s old protégé Edwin Ardener 
(1985, republished in Ardener 1989) developed the idea that social 
anthropology was inextricably linked to modernism, loosely 
defined as an artistic and intellectual movement which sharply 
distinguishes modernity, on the one hand, from all other forms 
of human existence, on the other. Anthropological modernism, as 
epitomised, for instance, in Evans-Pritchard’s work, built on several 
premises, including a clear subject–object distinction (the active 
fieldworker versus the passive informant), a ‘primitivist’ notion 
(traditional societies are stable, integrated wholes), and an idea 
of timelessness (the society under study is presented as ‘the Nuer’, 
not ‘the Nuer in 1936’). Ardener argued that these premises were 
no longer tenable, and as a result, modernist social anthropology 
(functionalism, structural-functionalism, structuralism) had lost its 
momentum and legitimacy around 1980. Ardener’s fear was that 
anthropological fieldwork would as a result be discredited, and 
texts would be produced that were nothing but commentaries on 
other texts.
Eriksen HOA3 01 text   175 16/04/2013   16:04
176 A HiSTORy Of ANTHROPOlOGy
THE POSTCOlONiAl WORlD
But other, related concerns were also on the rise, and contributed to 
the postmodernist movement in anthropology. One of these was the 
postcolonial movement in the arts and humanities, which challenged 
the right of metropolitan intellectuals to define who ‘the natives’ 
were and what they were like, and, more generally, questioned the 
aesthetic and intellectual authority of metropolitan judgements. 
Derrida had been close to such concerns, but two earlier writers 
would also influence anthropology profoundly. These were Frantz 
Fanon (1925–1961) and, on a less philosophical but more anthro-
pological note, Vine Deloria (1933–2005). Fanon, a Martiniquan 
medical doctor and writer, published two books with a lasting 
impact on thought about power and identity in unequal group 
relationships. In Peau noire, masques blancs (1956; Black Skin, 
White Masks, 1986), Fanon performs an Hegelian analysis of the 
relationship between black and white man in the colonies. The 
book is a downright painful psychological portrait of the sense of 
inferiority and humiliation imposed on black people, who were 
convinced by their white masters that their only hope was to become 
white – but whose skin could never become white. The only escape 
was to hide behind the mask of ‘the native’, cloyingly obeying the 
master’s wishes, while all the time, behind the mask, living an 
altogether different life. This book anticipated similar concerns in 
anthropology by nearly three decades. It was subtle and terrible, 
and later led Fanon to declare, in Les damnés de la terre (1960; 
The Wretched of the Earth, 1967), the need for a black revolution.
Vine Deloria was a Lakota Sioux Professor in Native American 
Studies, a theologian, lawyer and activist, whose much discussed 
book, Custer Died for Your Sins (1970), was an impassioned attack 
on all kinds of liberal (and not so liberal) authorities, who spoke 
about and on behalf of Native North Americans, thereby effectively 
preventing them from speaking for themselves. Deloria was furious 
with the Boasian anthropologists, whose relativism condemned 
Native Americans to eternal exoticism, and prevented them from 
attaining equality with whites.
In spite of these and other books written by non-anthropolo-
gists (the Kenyan author Ngũgı̃ wa Thiong’o is another example), 
the 1980s postcolonial movement was effectively launched by an 
American professor of Literature of Palestinian origin, Edward Said. 
His Orientalism (1978) became a benchmark study, not only because 
of its originality, but because of its huge readership and influence. In 
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the book, Said argued that representations of ‘Orientals’ in Western 
academia were permeated by ambivalent fascination and disgust at 
the ‘irrational’, ‘sensuous’ and ‘mysterious’ East – an ambivalence 
that went back to nineteenth-century colonialism, but could trace its 
roots much further back (Chapter 1). Said argued that to Europeans 
‘The Orient’ was a flexible location, consisting of very many and 
very different real societies, strung out across two continents from 
Morocco to Japan. Citing an infamous remark by Marx on Asians 
to the effect that ‘they cannot represent themselves, so they need to 
be represented’, Said held that Western studies of Asians, including 
anthropological monographs, had created an ‘essentialised’ – or 
‘reified’ – image of their way of life, based on a simplistic and 
misleading dichotomy between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, where the West 
represented science and rationalism, the East its negation.
Said’s critique, which focused largely on work dealing with his 
home area (West Asia and North Africa), was dismissed by many 
regional specialists who felt that he discredited serious scholarly 
work and glossed over the diversity in Oriental studies. Nevertheless, 
the argument stung the increasingly self-critical anthropologi-
cal community, and its concerns overlapped with those of the 
postmodernists. Said questioned the simple, unequivocal represen-
tations of ‘whole cultures’ that were common in anthropological 
research (though he seemed to approve of Geertz), and stressed 
the notion that knowledge was always ‘positioned’ (dependent on 
the social positions of known and knower). As in postmodernism, 
there appeared to be no privileged position from which neutral 
assessments of other peoples could be made.
‘Postcolonial studies’, which emerged as an academic discipline 
during the late 1980s, addressed the issues brought up by Said, 
Fanon and others, among them two influential theorists of Indian 
origin: the literary critic Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and the cultural 
theorist Homi K. Bhabha. Both were more explicitly postmodernist 
in their approach than Said, but they shared his concern with 
suppressed voices – the illiterate, women, low castes, blacks – 
and with affording them a place in the sun by deconstructing the 
hegemony of white, Western, male knowledge.
The postcolonial perspective had an ambivalent reception in 
anthropology. On the one hand, anthropologists might with 
some justification feel that their discipline served as an antidote 
to Orientalism, since it was the only non-regional academic 
discipline to have its chief focus outside Europe. Had not a major 
objective of anthropology since Malinowski and Boas been to 
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offer sympathetic interpretations of non-European worldviews, 
and had not many important anthropologists – from Morgan and 
Boas onwards – defended powerless peoples against the forces of 
destruction, sometimes at great personal cost and to the detriment 
of their careers? The answer was yes, and yet many – within and 
outside the profession – could agree that anthropology often had 
a patronising tendency to represent others ‘who were unable to 
represent themselves’, and that the holism of many classical analyses 
projected an image of ‘the other’ as uniformly passive and changeless 
– an essentialised object of scientific inquiry. Thus, though Said 
goes unmentioned by Ardener, the latter’s article on the decline of 
modernist anthropology has parallels with Orientalism.
In coming years, the debate continued. In 1983, the Dutch 
anthropologist Johannes Fabian published Time and the Other, 
which argued that anthropology tends to ‘freeze’ the peoples it 
describes in time. In 1990, the historian Ronald Inden, in his 
influential book Imagining India, demonstrated the relevance of the 
Orientalist critique for South Asian studies. Finally, in Occidentalism 
(Carrier 1995), several anthropologists and sociologists showed 
that not only do Westerners have stereotyped images of ‘the East’, 
but stereotypical images of ‘the West’ are widespread in the rest of 
the world.
In parts of the Third and Fourth World, partly as a result of the 
critique of Orientalism, anthropologists have become increasingly 
unpopular with national authorities as well as local intellectuals. 
They are seen as hunters for exotica and intellectual adventurers – 
part of the problem rather than the solution for people who struggle 
from day to day to be allowed to represent themselves on their own 
terms, as respected members of the global community.
Anthropologists responded in a variety of ways to these critiques. 
A lasting effect on the discipline has probably been that traditional 
cultural relativism, as highlighted by the Boasians, has become a 
difficult position to maintain. It is no longer politically correct 
for anthropologists to state publicly that they are, for example, 
opposed to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights for relativist 
reasons (as the American Anthropological Association did in 1947). 
Furthermore, as a result of the sustained self-criticism and the at 
times bitter confrontations with vocal representatives of studied 
peoples that took place in the 1980s, the attention of anthropolo-
gists was increasingly drawn towards the large-scale processes of 
global history. The systemic and historical approaches favoured 
by anthropologists like Wolf and Mintz seemed more and more 
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relevant for many young scholars, while synchronic, single-society 
studies increasingly seemed outdated and ethically problematic 
(Chapter 9). Finally, the Orientalism debate stimulated attempts 
to conceptualise the specificity of anthropological writing about 
specific regions. Thus, in 1990, British anthropologist Richard 
Fardon edited a volume with many prominent contributors which 
discussed the growth and transformation of ‘regional traditions in 
ethnographic writing’. In his introduction, Fardon (1990) points 
out that such traditions, which typically associate an ethnographic 
region with specific analytical interests (exchange in Melanesia, 
lineage studies in Africa, and so on), are expressions of scholarly 
priorities which often have less to do with empirical conditions in 
the regions being described, than with established hierarchies in 
anthropology itself. However, he also stresses that such traditions 
have typically grown out of long-term exposure to the regions 
themselves through fieldwork, and they are therefore not arbitrary, 
but contain important insights into actual conditions.
Although its main objectives were arguably political rather than 
epistemological, the postcolonial critique of anthropology ‘from 
the outside’ to a great extent overlapped with the ‘reflexive turn’ 
that came from within the discipline itself in the 1980s, particularly 
in the USA. A handful of books published in the latter half of the 
decade may be seen as representative of this movement, and we 
now move on to a brief consideration of their message and impact.
A NEW DEPARTURE OR A RETURN TO BOAS?
What we might retrospectively call the postmodernist movement 
in American anthropology was associated with the work of a fairly 
small group of scholars. The core included non-anthropologist 
James Clifford, a historian of anthropology with leanings towards 
literary studies; and anthropologists Stephen Tyler (a convert to 
postmodernism from ethnoscience), George Marcus, Michael 
Fischer, Renato Rosaldo and Paul Rabinow. Others associated 
with the movement included Fabian, Richard Handler (a student 
of Schneider’s studying discourses of nationalism), Lila Abu-Lughod 
(an Arabist), and Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson, who co-wrote 
and edited an important work on the discursive construction of 
space and narrative in the 1990s. In spite of differences (regarding, 
for example, the possibilities and limitations of ethnography), 
these and other scholars shared a number of concerns. They 
were uncomfortable with the reified ‘othering’ typical of classical 
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modernist anthropology, and sought to redress this, often by 
advocating ‘experimental ethnographies’, where the informants 
participated as equal partners in the production of knowledge 
(Clifford and Marcus 1986; Marcus and Fischer 1986). They 
were critical of the Boasian (and, more recently, Geertzian) idea of 
cultures as integrated wholes with deep historical roots. Inspired by 
Foucault and cultural Marxists like Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937), 
they were also concerned with modes of representation and the 
power implied by particular styles of writing.
The year 1986, in many ways an annus mirabilis for this 
movement, saw the publication of two important books and the 
launching of a new journal edited by Marcus, and entitled – with 
youthful arrogance – Cultural Anthropology. The first book was 
Marcus and Fischer’s Anthropology as Cultural Critique, subtitled 
An Experimental Moment in the Human Sciences. Arguing that 
the discipline suffered from ‘a crisis of representation’, they went 
on to present several of the problems outlined above, and to 
affirm the importance of reflexivity (positioning the anthropolo-
gist’s knowledge) and wider systemic concerns (incorporating an 
understanding of world history and economics in ethnographic 
analyses). They argued that a main objective of the discipline should 
be to engage in cultural criticism ‘at home’, and that an appropriate 
way of achieving this was by defamiliarisation – creating a sense 
of ‘strangeness’ by pointing out the similarity of the readers’ own 
world to distant and ‘exotic’ cultures. In their view, the 1980s were 
a period of unique potential for the fulfilment of anthropology’s 
promise as an instrument of cultural critique. The discipline was in 
disarray; the broad postwar consensus had broken down on both 
sides of the Atlantic; the postcolonial movement had generated 
uncertainty; grand theories had lost their appeal. In this situation, 
‘experimental ethnographies’ could contribute substantially to 
critical self-reflection on Western society.
Anthropology as Cultural Critique, which emphasised continuity 
with the concerns of anthropologists like Mead, Sahlins and Douglas, 
was less radical than the edited volume Writing Culture (Clifford 
and Marcus 1986). Although the latter book contained about a 
dozen chapters written by different scholars, who represented 
various positions in the postmodernist debate, it was received as 
a single-minded assault on the dominant concept of culture. The 
contributors unanimously distanced themselves from the idea of 
culture as an ‘integrated whole’, questioned the rhetorical devices 
of ‘scientific’ anthropology, and argued the merits of both ‘dialogic’ 
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methods (the main inspiration here being the Russian literary critic 
Mikhail Bakhtin), and historical contextualisation in the increasingly 
problematic art of anthropological representation.
The hugely influential Writing Culture was followed two years 
later by Clifford’s The Predicament of Culture, which could 
be summarised as a long, historically based argument against 
essentialism. In the same year, Geertz published a small, elegant 
book called Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as Author. 
This was a collection of essays about famous anthropologists that 
focused on the rhetorical and literary aspects of their writings, and 
was based on a lecture series which antedated Writing Culture. 
Ardener’s predictions now seemed to be confirmed from the other 
side of the Atlantic: the anthropological quest had been brought to a 
close, since it no longer dealt with living people, but with texts; not 
with cultures, but with their representations. Of course, this view 
had limitations. Never had so much fieldwork been done, in so many 
different places, as in the 1980s. Yet it remains a fact that some of 
the most hotly debated writings of that decade were reflexive texts, 
which deconstructed ethnographic authority, questioned the ethical 
legitimacy of turning ‘natives’ into data, and ultimately challenged 
the validity of ethnographic representation as such.
The connection between American postmodernist anthropology 
and literary studies was strong. Both looked to recent French 
philosophy for inspiration, and the young anthropologists, steeped 
in Geertzian hermeneutics, were predisposed to see cultures as texts. 
Their break with Geertz consisted largely in problematising the 
subject–object relationship between anthropologist and informant, 
and in not seeing cultures (‘cultural texts’) as integrated wholes. 
However, these problems were not foreign to Geertz himself. He once 
compared an integrated culture to an octopus, a loosely coordinated 
animal with a weak brain that does not always know what each of 
its arms is doing; and in Works and Lives, he effectively deconstructs 
classical anthropological texts, as imaginative, historically situated 
works. Indeed, from a distance, American postmodern anthropology 
might resemble an extreme form of Boasianism, nothing entirely 
new. Geertz is the key figure here. Though the younger anthro-
pologists, who congregated around Cultural Anthropology, had 
an ambivalent relationship to Geertz’ hermeneutics, he was their 
favourite discussion partner. There was continuity between his view 
of anthropology and the radical deconstruction advocated in Writing 
Culture, but eertz himself felt that the younger generation had 
gone too far, and coined the term ‘epistemological hypochondria’ 
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to describe the excessive self-criticism that prevented people from 
doing good ethnographic work.
Many anthropologists would agree with Geertz or even go further 
in their criticism than he. Some of the more explicit critics were 
Steven Sangren (1988), who saw the ‘reflexive turn’ as a retreat 
from anthropology’s proper mission, and Jonathan Spencer (1989), 
who argued that anthropology might be better viewed as a style of 
working than as a form of writing. Marvin Harris, in one of his many 
position papers, thoroughly thrashed (some would say parodied) 
the likes of George Marcus, who seemed to favour an increase in 
‘the number of experimental, personalistic, and idiosyncratic field 
studies carried out by untrained would-be novelists and ego-tripping 
narcissists afflicted with congenital logo-diarrhea’ (Harris 1994: 64). 
Ernest Gellner, in a little book devoted to the defence of rational 
science in the face of the two-pronged threat of closed-world 
fundamentalism and boundless postmodern relativity, berated the 
American postmodernists, singling out Clifford and Rabinow as his 
main targets, for their sloppy thinking and poorly defined concepts, 
and ultimately for being more interested in their own interpre-
tations than in understanding the world (Gellner 1992). While 
Gellner saw Geertz as an important precursor of the postmodernist 
movement, he noted that Geertz, at least, was still trying to ‘say 
something about something’, as Geertz himself once put it. Against 
the critique of Great Divide (or ‘Big Ditch’) theories (that contrast 
‘Us’ with ‘Them’, ‘modern’ with ‘primitive’, and so on), Gellner 
confirmed his position as a modernist in Ardener’s terms. Elsewhere, 
Gellner (1993) also voiced misgivings about postcolonialism, for 
undermining scientific truth claims, confusing ideology and analysis, 
and not understanding that the ‘problem of power and culture … is 
too important to be left to lit[erary] crit[icism]’ (Gellner 1993: 4). 
Finally, Gellner hinted that there was an element of careerism in 
the postmodern movement, remarking that ‘Sturm und Drang 
and Tenure might well be their slogan’ (1992: 27). While there 
is undoubtedly something to this, the same might of course be 
said of all innovative movements in anthropological history, from 
the Malinowskian–Radcliffe-Brownian ‘functionalist revolution’, 
via Steward’s evolutionist and Barth’s interactionist ‘revolutions’, 
to the ‘revolution’ in nationalism studies that Gellner himself 
had sponsored.
It was also often noted that many of the ideas inspiring American 
postmodern anthropology had originated in France, and that the 
Americans tailored the French masters to fit their anthropology, 
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often trivialising their views in the process. Foucault, in the American 
reading, became a theorist of discourse; Derrida a philosopher of 
relativism. Again, this may be true, but it is important to situate 
American anthropology itself as well. Boas, a German, had in his 
day understood very well the potential for ethnic and racial conflict 
in the sprawling, multinational United States, and events since his 
death have not proven him wrong. Clifford and Marcus may seem 
as crude as McDonald’s to highbrow intellectuals from Paris, but 
relativism, even extreme relativism, was an understandable stance in 
a country split apart by a history of Afro-American slavery, Native 
American genocide and immigration from every part of the world.
Some critics doubted that postmodernism was as radical a 
departure from anthropological tradition as it claimed to be. 
However, this argument was double-edged, and was also used 
by some of the postmodernists to legitimise their project. Thus, 
Kirsten Hastrup, a Danish student of Ardener, whose work has 
been relentlessly anti-positivist, and has in some ways represented 
a European counterpart to American postmodernism, argued that 
anthropology had always been a postmodern science, ever since 
it started to confront the West with images of other lifeworlds 
(Hastrup 1995). Though Hastrup may have overstated her case, 
there are definite affinities between the deconstructive efforts of 
the postmodernists and several previous trends in anthropologi-
cal history. Thus, there are precedents to postmodernism in the 
‘rationality debate’ of the 1960s (Chapter 6) and in the 1970s 
revolution in fieldwork (Chapter 7), and debunking the objectivity 
of ethnographic method had been an anthropological parlour game 
on both sides of the Atlantic at least since the Second World War. 
But above all, of course, there is continuity with the historical 
particularism of Boas and the German Romantic tradition. In general, 
American anthropologists, who were steeped in this tradition, were 
more favourably disposed to postmodernism than their European 
colleagues, who were the heirs of confirmed positivists such as 
Radcliffe-Brown (Kuper 1996: 189). Schneider’s deconstruction 
of kinship studies had nothing to do with postmodernism, but 
was the work of a devoted Boasian and a lifelong supporter of 
Parsons’ sociology. Later, his work would be cited with approval 
in Britain too, by the Czech-British anthropologist Ladislav Holy in 
his textbook on kinship (Holy 1996), but Holy’s point of reference 
is not Boas, but the methodological individualism of the British 
anti-structural-functionalist movement of the 1950s and 1960s 
(Chapter 5). This movement also often regards itself as a precursor 
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of postmodernism. When Barth, in the mid-1960s, demolished the 
concept of social structure and posited that stable social forms were 
unintentional aggregate outcomes of individual decisions, this was 
(in a sense) a deconstructive argument which closely paralleled the 
postmodernists’ deconstruction of Boasian and Geertzian concepts 
of integrated cultural wholes.
Nevertheless, the postmodern critique of anthropology, with 
occasional support from feminist and postcolonial scholars, 
did represent something new, though its originality was often 
exaggerated at the time. The newness, as far as anthropology 
was concerned, lay mainly in the reflexive emphasis on styles of 
writing, in the rejection of a neutral and non-positioned authorial 
voice, and (most fundamentally) in the application of reflexivity to 
anthropology itself. After postmodernism, anthropology could no 
longer see itself as a privileged discourse with access to objective 
truth about the peoples it studied.
OTHER POSiTiONS
Postmodernism and ‘the reflexive turn’ were not the only show 
in town in the 1980s. For most anthropologists, it was largely 
business as usual, as the discipline continued to grow and diversify 
into increasingly specialised sub-fields. Postmodernism – a new 
and untested departure – often had a noncommittal reception. 
Thus, in two turn-of-the-century introductory texts to anthropo-
logical theory, by Robert Layton (1997) and Alan Barnard (2000), 
postmodernism is afforded a prominent place, with about as many 
pages of text as structural-functionalism or structuralism. However, 
both authors are careful not to pass definite judgement on its merits 
and lasting effects on the discipline. In the massive Companion 
Encyclopedia of Anthropology (Ingold 1994), there is scarcely a 
mention of the movement at all.
However, during the 1980s and early 1990s, on both sides of the 
Atlantic, a very large number of anthropologists might be said to 
belong to the fringes of postmodernism, sympathising with some 
of its views, but incorporating them in established anthropological 
theory. These were largely scholars who, unlike Gellner and Harris, 
felt that their discipline was an interpretive activity whose claims 
to enduring truth were debatable. The most obvious example is 
Victor Turner, whose theory of performance would inspire many 
anthropologists studying ritual and related phenomena (Turner 
and Bruner 1986). Another example was the Melanesianist Roger 
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Keesing, who, in his last academic papers before his early death in 
1993 (Keesing 1989, 1994), contended that the classical conception 
of culture had been mistaken. He now argued that ‘his’ people, the 
Kwaio, had no homogeneous, more or less stable culture, and that 
their ideas of their own culture were both politicised and influenced 
by ethnographic writings about themselves. Judith Okely and Helen 
Calloway’s edited volume, Anthropology and Autobiography (1992), 
also paralleled some of the concerns of the Writing Culture group, 
but focused less on texts and more in the tradition of the reflexive 
fieldworkers of the 1970s. These latter scholars were the heirs of 
the anti-positivist, hermeneutic trend in British anthropology which 
began with Evans-Pritchard’s late work. They turned the tools of 
hermeneutics inward, towards anthropology itself, to look critically 
at the juncture of knowledge production and personal experience. 
As in Keesing’s case, the concerns of these authors were developed 
independently of the American postmodernists; Okely, for one, 
had produced a trenchant criticism of ‘scientism’ in anthropology 
back in the mid-1970s (Okely 1975). Another, unjustly neglected 
work of this general type, was the American anthropologist Robert 
Ulin’s magisterial but little-read volume on cultural translation and 
rationality, Understanding Cultures (Ulin 1984). The book parallels 
the concerns of the Cultural Anthropology group, but instead of 
embracing postmodernism, applied an historicising hermeneutic 
method (as opposed to Geertz’ more ahistorical hermeneutics) 
inspired by the German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer.
One of the most important anthropologists to be inspired by 
the deconstructive method was Marilyn Strathern, a Melanesianist 
at Manchester, who succeeded Gellner as professor at Cambridge 
in the 1990s. Strathern published several influential books in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. In her magnum opus, The Gender 
of the Gift (1988), she explored concepts of personhood and 
exchange in Melanesia, and argued that Melanesian culture had 
been misread by Europeans who imposed their own concepts and 
prejudices on it. On a more general level, Strathern contended 
that classical theories of exchange and identity were defective in 
that they did not take gender into account. Is it meaningful, she 
asked, to say that objects are exchanged between two ‘persons’, or 
that a ‘person’ has a certain identity, if these ‘persons’ are always 
gendered? This critique brought feminist perspectives close to the 
heart of several foundational theoretical debates in anthropology, 
and thus increased their legitimacy in the discipline greatly. Later, in 
After Nature (1992), Strathern performed a comparison of concepts 
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defining personhood, society and kinship in Melanesia and England, 
making an argument that at once deals with a substantial issue 
(new reproductive technologies) and with the (reflexive) relationship 
between anthropological and native concepts.
Strathern represents a ‘postmodern’ approach that is perhaps 
more significant in the long run than the programmatic work 
of the American postmodernists. The same might be said of the 
somewhat similar project of the American Melanesianist Roy 
Wagner, who published The Invention of Culture in 1975, an 
influential theoretical essay that anticipated some of the central 
issues of postmodernism. Wagner here argued that cultures were 
symbolic constructions with an inherent capacity for change, 
innovation and reflexivity. In 1986, he further elaborated these 
themes in Symbols that Stand for Themselves, a complex account 
of symbolic transformation and continuity, which combines the 
stringent analysis of Lévi-Strauss with a reflexive and processual 
perspective reminiscent of postmodernism.
Wagner was one of a number of authors during the 1980s who 
started to explore the repercussions of applying phenomenology 
(a school of thought founded by the German philosopher Edmund 
Husserl) to anthropological analysis. An early proponent of such 
an approach was the British anthropologist Tim Ingold, who had 
previously done work on ecological adaptation. In 1986, Ingold 
published a major theoretical and historical work, Evolution 
and Social Life (Ingold 1986), where he developed a framework 
for the study of humanity in its social, cultural, biological and 
environmental dimensions, without reducing one to another. In at 
least two ways, this book is similar to the project of the American 
postmodernists. First, Ingold announces the need to ‘clear out 
some of the accumulated conceptual debris of a century of social 
and evolutionary theorizing’; and, second, he emphasises that we 
‘cannot afford to maintain the illusion that we stand, like gods, 
aloof from the world’ (1986: 376). The latter attitude clearly 
recalls ideas proposed by major phenomenologists such as Martin 
Heidegger (1889–1976) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961). 
Like these philosophers (who rejected the subject–object dichotomy 
on different grounds than the postmodernists), Ingold argues that 
people are intimately connected to the non-human world they 
inhabit. His solution to the subject–object paradox is therefore 
almost the opposite of the Americans’. Discarding postmodernism 
as intellectual aloofness, he instead proposes to bring anthropology 
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closer to other ‘life sciences’ (such as biology) – quite the opposite 
of comparing cultures to literary texts.
Ingold’s movement towards biology parallels that of quite a 
number of anthropologists who, from very different perspectives, 
have sought to establish links between anthropology and the natural 
sciences during the 1990s. We shall return to this trend in Chapter 
9; here, however, it is necessary to point out two related movements, 
that were already entering their boom years during the 1980s.
During the 1970s, Western countries increased their budgets 
for developmental aid to the Third World dramatically. The aid 
lobby became a power to be reckoned with in global politics, 
and anthropologists were increasingly drawn into the planning, 
implementation and evaluation of aid projects. Through UNESCO, 
the World Health Organisation, the World Bank, the European 
Union and other international organisations, through the broad 
range of NGOs that started engaging in aid-related work, and 
through the various national ministries of developmental aid that 
were formed at this time, the practical expertise of anthropolo-
gists was becoming increasingly in demand. From the start, the 
problem was to find niches where anthropological knowledge could 
be meaningfully deployed. The organisations were often dominated 
by representatives of ‘hard’ professions such as economy, law and 
engineering, who regarded concepts such as ‘culture’ and ‘identity’ 
with scepticism. Nevertheless, anthropologists quickly made their 
mark in a number of areas. The increasing interest in peasant 
studies and economic anthropology during the 1970s clearly bears 
witness to this, and as the years passed, and the practical problems 
of developmental aid became more apparent, anthropological 
viewpoints were increasingly taken into account. The successes 
should not be exaggerated (technocratic, economic and political 
interests still dominate aid work), but it should be noted that several 
key anthropological standpoints have gained wide acceptance. 
Anthropologists were among the first to argue the need to orient aid 
work towards smaller-scale projects, towards women (as the stable 
nucleus of households in many poverty-stricken areas) and towards 
ecological awareness – viewpoints which today are widely accepted, 
in theory, if not always in practice. The fate of other viewpoints has 
been more doubtful, and the fault lies not only with the development 
agencies: In 1973, Keith Hart coined the term the informal sector to 
designate economic activities that elude planners and statisticians: 
market exchange without ledgers and receipts, barter and mutual 
exchange of services, bootleg production, illegal migrant labour, 
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drug dealing and prostitution … the range is huge, and the values 
astronomical. Such activities are often of life-and-death importance 
in poverty-stricken urban areas, particularly in the South. To Hart, 
it seemed that anthropologists were the only category of ‘experts’ 
who would be able to discover and describe the informal sector 
convincingly. He may be right about this, but expertise in the 
informal economy has rather diminished than increased during the 
four decades that have passed since he wrote his article, due to a 
generally declining interest in economic anthropology.
One of the areas where anthropologists have most successfully 
forged alliances with dominant aid professions is in the field of 
health and nutrition. In the 1980s, when many anthropologists were 
disillusioned with aid work and the term ‘post-development’ was 
emerging (Ferguson 1990), medical anthropology grew to become 
the fastest expanding sub-field in the discipline. The roots of medical 
anthropology go back to the pioneering work of Audrey Richards in 
the 1930s, and to the efforts of a number of dedicated professionals 
who followed up and expanded her interests in the next few decades. 
An example is Ronald Frankenberg (1929–), who studied under 
Gluckman. Frankenberg did fieldwork in Central Africa and England 
(where he wrote about football, among other things), and has later 
written widely on questions of health and healing (Frankenberg 
1980). He acted as a consultant on a number of aid projects, and 
did pioneering theoretical work on such issues as the conception 
of time in medical practice and the psychiatric understanding of 
children. During the 1980s he was drawn towards phenomenology 
and parts of the postmodernist movement, particularly the work of 
his old colleague and friend, Victor Turner, on performance, which 
inspired Frankenberg’s interest in the uses of ritual in (traditional 
and modern) healing. Frankenberg is an example of how ‘decon-
structionism’ can be put to ‘constructive’ use. His criticism of the 
essentialisation of concepts of disease and mental health in the 
medical sciences has inspired many to consider the social processes 
that generate such concepts.
In general, it might be said that medical anthropologists 
contribute an understanding of social context to standard medical 
work. The effect of a programme of regular health checks for 
pregnant women may, for example, be significantly enhanced by 
knowledge of the women’s conceptions of propriety, their work 
schedules, the authority structures within their households, their 
kinship obligations, their conceptions of how disease expresses itself 
and what it means. Many prominent medical anthropologists are 
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themselves medical doctors or psychiatrists, which gives them a 
high level of professionalism and increases their legitimacy among 
medical professionals as well.
In the United States, where medical anthropology grew significantly 
during the 1980s and 1990s, one of the most influential figures 
has been Nancy Scheper-Hughes, at Berkeley. Scheper-Hughes, a 
student of Hortense Powdermaker’s (Chapter 7) and a former civil 
rights activist, has done work on psychological anthropology and 
gender-related health issues in Ireland and Brazil (Scheper-Hughes 
1979, 1992), and is at present working on a study of violence and 
democracy in South Africa. In 1987, she and Margaret Lock wrote 
the programmatic article ‘The mindful body: a prolegomenon to 
future work in medical anthropology’, which charted out an agenda 
for future applied and theoretical research in the field. In an interview, 
she described her fieldwork in Brazil in the following terms:
… I started out with the question of the high incidence of infant 
mortality. What did that mean for women who had to face four 
or five, six, in some cases eleven deaths in a row? What did it 
mean for their understanding of motherhood? What did it mean 
in terms of their sense of optimism and hope? And what did it 
mean for the children who lived? How were they raised, given 
the spaces that they were made to fill [after] all the children who 
had died before? … I decided I would track these deaths … I did 
interviews with … close to a hundred women, getting them to tell 
me the context around each of the deaths of their children and 
what they thought were the causes of death. But also interviewing 
children, because children in northeast Brazil are the ones who 
bury the dead and they’re the ones who form the procession. 
What do they think about death? (Scheper-Hughes 2000)
A third example from this sub-field is Arthur Kleinman, professor 
of medical anthropology at the prestigious Department of Global 
Health and Social Medicine at Harvard, who has done extensive 
work on cross-cultural psychiatry, particularly in China (Kleinman 
1980; Kleinman and Good 1985). Kleinman, who has engaged in a 
wide variety of consultancy work, has in recent years been Director 
of the World Mental Health Project, a very large-scale consultancy 
project, sponsored by the Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundations, 
and organised under the auspices of the United Nations. Kleinman 
has also been one of the pioneers in the study of ‘social suffering’, 
which addresses the ‘consequences of war, famine, depression, 
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disease, torture – the whole assemblage of human problems that 
result from what political, economic, and institutional power does 
to people’ (Kleinman et al. 1997).
As several of the above studies indicate, medical anthropologists 
are by no means limited to applied research, indeed, with the recent 
rapprochement between anthropology and the natural sciences, the 
establishment of body-oriented theories of practice, and the growing 
interest in phenomenology, medical anthropologists have made very 
significant contributions to fundamental research in a wide variety 
of fields, during the 1990s. As we remarked in our discussion of 
Marilyn Strathern above, such engagement with anthropology’s 
basic theoretical discourse tends to indicate that a sub-field (feminist 
or medical anthropology) has reached a mature stage, and is no 
longer a marginal ‘special interest’ in the discipline.
Finally, we shall briefly discuss a third important research field 
that came to the fore in the 1980s, namely the study of nationalism. 
Like medical anthropology, though for very different reasons, 
nationalism studies were less vulnerable to the postmodern epis-
temological critique than many other parts of anthropology. The 
research did not posit the existence of ‘discrete, homogeneous 
cultures’ existing in a timeless ‘ethnographic present’. Rather, it 
explored a particular feature of modernity, in whose name the 
existence of such cultures was claimed, at least partly for strategic 
reasons, by political and cultural elites. As we have seen, the 
concept of culture had the same historical roots (in Herderian 
Romanticism) as political nationalism, and anthropologists who 
sought to deconstruct nationalist ideologies, thus had many interests 
in common with postmodernist deconstructors of culture. Though 
both empiricist and comparative in orientation, and thus potentially 
open to postmodernist attack, nationalism studies generally went 
unchallenged: they were neither essentialist (they deconstructed 
indigenous essentialisms), ahistorical (they located their object of 
study firmly in history) nor neocolonial (many major studies of 
nationalism focused on Western societies). Furthermore, as nation-
alistically motivated political conflicts spread worldwide during the 
1990s, anthropological studies of nationalism seemed increasingly 
relevant. And the excessive violence of many nationalist movements, 
led some nationalism scholars to contribute to studies of the effects 
of violence (as in medical anthropology; see Malkki 1995), and to 
studies of power (as in political anthropology; see Kapferer 1988).
The interdisciplinary flourishing of nationalism studies that 
took place during the 1980s was inspired by three books that were 
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published in the same year. The first was Gellner’s Nations and 
Nationalism (1983), where a main argument was that nationalism 
was a functional, cohesive ideology in an otherwise fragmented 
and alienating modern world. The second was historian Benedict 
Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1983), which concentrated on 
the symbolic features of nationalism, comparing it to phenomena 
like kinship and religion. The third was historians Eric Hobsbawm 
and Terence Ranger’s co-edited The Invention of Tradition (1983), 
which demonstrated that many presumedly ‘ancient traditions’ were 
in fact invented by colonial authorities or other elites to create 
cohesion where it would otherwise be absent. Often inspired by 
these books, anthropological research on nationalism seemed 
to confirm Ardener’s view that modernism occupied ‘an almost 
precisely datable span from 1920 to 1975’ in social anthropology 
(Ardener 1989 [1985]: 197). Research on nationalism and, more 
generally, identity politics was seen as a form of postmodern 
anthropology. Powerful monographs on nationalism, like Bruce 
Kapferer’s Legends of People, Myths of State (1988), combined 
classical concerns of anthropology – the meaning of myth, the 
problem of social cohesion, the power of symbols – with an attempt 
to come to terms with contemporary identity politics, its violent 
imagery and frequently violent practice, its creation of enemy images 
and its relationship to the State. Here again we see the movement 
of a sub-field from a relatively marginal position in the discipline, 
into its mainstream.
Although the debates on postmodernism stole many of the 
headlines during the 1980s, it is perhaps (as Derrida might say) 
in the margins of the postmodern movement, rather than among 
its most prominent spokesmen, that its most lasting contributions 
must be sought. Studies of exchange and identity, studies inspired 
by phenomenology, studies of health and nationalism, were all 
brought to the fore during this decade, and would deeply influence 
the anthropology of the 1990s and into the new millennium.
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Lack of historical distance precludes a proper review of the last 
decades, whether of the general cultural ambience or of the specific 
enterprise of anthropology. In both regards, it is nevertheless obvious 
that some of the trends of the 1980s were consolidated towards 
and beyond the millennium. Uncertainty, or ambivalence, became 
a standard feature (some would say an affectation) of intellectual 
life, certainly in the humanities and social sciences; although trends 
representing a more positivist view, seeking less equivocal answers 
to the perennial questions of anthropology, were also on the rise. 
In particular, we have sociobiology and its successor, evolutionary 
psychology, in mind, but grand theory has also made a reappearance 
in the form of cognitive science. Nevertheless, Henrietta Moore, 
one of the most influential British anthropologists at the turn 
of the millennium (who in 2008 succeeded to the William Wyse 
professorship at Cambridge – occupied by Marilyn Strathern before 
her, and before her, by Gellner, by Goody, by Meyer Fortes, and 
before him, by the great pre-Malinowskian ethnographer John Henry 
Hutton, and before him by the linguist and diffusionist Thomas 
Hodson) introduced her Anthropological Theory Today with the 
sentence: ‘It is very tempting to begin a book of this kind with the 
statement that there is no such thing as anthropological theory’ 
(Moore 1999: 1). She goes on to note that the critical projects of the 
1970s and 1980s had led, in the 1990s, to a widespread retreat from 
theory to ethnography and, in some cases, ‘even from the project 
of anthropology itself’ (1999: 1). She goes on to state that there is 
no longer (if there ever was) anything like a single anthropology 
and that the status of theory as such is increasingly questionable. 
‘Theory is now a diverse set of critical strategies which incorporates 
within itself a critique of its own locations, positions and interests: 
that is, it is highly reflexive’ (1999: 9).
The impression one may get from this and other attempts to 
provide broad overviews of contemporary anthropology, is that the 
discipline is hopelessly fragmented and in profound disarray. For 
several reasons, this view is seriously misleading.
192
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First, practising anthropologists rarely feel that their discipline 
has been deconstructed. This is because they usually work within 
a field of specialisation which is clearly delineated and continues 
to raise research questions that can be addressed with the methods 
at hand. This, on the other hand, means that anthropology as a 
generalist’s discipline is probably on the wane. As early as the late 
1960s, the subject had become too diverse for a single person to be 
familiar with it in its entirety. 
Second, at a purely quantitative level, anthropology has been 
phenomenally successful during the last decades. The increase in 
the number of publications and conferences has been formidable, 
anthropological engagement in applied research has never been 
more widespread, and in many countries, anthropology had become 
a very popular undergraduate subject by the turn of the millennium. 
It makes sense to study anthropology in today’s interconnected 
world, where travel, electronic communication and migration have 
brought people of different cultural backgrounds together more 
closely than ever.
Third, academic and applied anthropology, in more or less 
‘modern’ versions, has spread from its original heartland in Britain, 
France and the USA to most, if not all, countries in the world. 
The spread has not always been easy, and in many cases modern, 
‘sociological’ anthropologists are still a beleaguered minority, 
facing a more traditionalist consensus, often with nationalistic, and 
sometimes overtly racist, overtones. There exists a global anthropo-
logical identity, which, though embattled and disputed, commands 
the loyalty of anthropologists today.
Fourth, and partly as a result of this, anthropology has, half a 
century after Margaret Mead’s heyday, attained near-global public 
attention, and key anthropological concepts and perspectives 
have made inroads into the global public sphere. This is nowhere 
more apparent than with the concept of culture. There is a broad 
and steadily-growing global awareness, among policy-makers, 
businesspeople, journalists, politicians, other academics and in the 
general public, that culture and cultural difference are important, and 
that anthropologists may be able to tell us why they are important 
and what their practical consequences are. Anthropologists today 
are the stewards of generations of anthropological thinking, and 
have a responsibility for it, vis-à-vis the public. As ‘culture’ becomes 
a global term, anthropologists are committed to assess and criticise 
the use and abuse it is put to. In the decade following the terrorist 
destruction of the Twin Towers in Manhattan, with its obsessive 
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focus on ‘cultural’ factors, such as religion, ethnicity and migration, 
this is particularly true. Sometimes, the services of anthropologists 
are called upon by the state, and not only in relatively uncontroversial 
contexts to do with, for example, development or migration. 
During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, anthropologists were 
‘embedded’ among US forces to facilitate communication and basic 
cultural understanding, and this led to heated controversy in the 
anthropological community in the early 2000s.
There are obvious reasons for the continued relevance of 
anthropology today. Just as Marxian sociology offered a key to 
understanding the hidden agendas of class- and gender-related 
oppression in the 1970s, anthropology supplies an understanding 
of cultural variation in an age when multiculturalism, identity 
politics, intercultural terrorism, failed states, international 
migration, ethnic discrimination and nationalist wars stand high 
on the agenda of politicians, grassroots movements, NGOs and the 
media almost everywhere.
TOWARDS AN iNTERNATiONAl ANTHROPOlOGy?
Speaking from the vantage point of 2013, the demographics of the 
discipline have become increasingly complex, though anthropology 
remained larger and more diverse in the USA than anywhere 
else. In the early twenty-first century, the American Anthropo-
logical Association had about 10,000 members, while the British 
Association of Social Anthropologists had less than a tenth that 
number, and the European Association of Social Anthropologists 
had around 2,000. The Brazilian, Japanese national anthropological 
associations, two of the largest in the world, each gathered about 
2,000, while associations in Russia, India and Mexico together may 
have had another 3,000 members. Hundreds of other organisations 
existed around the world, some specialising in sub-fields that are 
marginal to the concerns in this book. All told, there may be as many 
as 25,000 anthropologists worldwide. This may seem an impressive 
number when we consider the minute size of the anthropological 
community a mere century ago, and indeed it is. However, the 
picture is not quite as rosy as it looks. The increasingly straitened 
financial circumstances of many universities in recent years have 
led to programme cuts and reduced teaching even at prestigious 
universities, and at less well-endowed institutions conditions are 
often critical. These are global concerns, but the noticeable downturn 
in the USA and Britain are of particular concern, since so many 
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of the resources (teaching facilities, libraries, museums, journals, 
publishers, research funds) upon which the global community 
depends, are located here.
Of the many national traditions we see today, some go back 
to the nineteenth century (for example, Russia, Italy, India), a 
larger group dates to the interwar years (China, Brazil, Mexico), 
a third and fourth wave came in the 1970s and 1990s. Quite a 
few have experienced longer or shorter hiatuses, due to political 
conditions (most prominently Russia and China, but also a number 
of Latin-American countries, where research was halted or severely 
restricted under various dictatorships.
The dominant position of the English language in academic 
discourse, which has been on the rise since the postwar years, was 
further strengthened in the 1990s and early 2000s. English supplies 
the global anthropological community with a lingua franca, but 
obscures the fact that most anthropology, outside the English-speak-
ing world, is neither taught, discussed or published in English, and 
that proficiency in English, even in countries like Norway, is often 
inadequate for participation in scholarly debate. In Brazil, there 
are at least twice as many practising anthropologists as in Britain, 
but with few exceptions, their publications are unknown to people 
who do not read Portuguese (Peirano 2008; Ribeiro and Escobar 
2006). Similarly, there are major bodies of anthropological and/
or ethnographic literature in Spanish, Russian and Japanese, and 
anthropological publication in the national vernacular is on the rise 
in most other countries in the world. The nearly 600 members of 
the German Anthropological Association predominantly read and 
publish in German. The trouble is not only language-related. There is 
a major English-language anthropological literature in India, which 
is scarcely known outside specialist circles. One reason for this is 
that many Indian anthropologists address local applied concerns 
that have little audience outside India. Another reason is that global 
research agendas are generally set in the leading Western countries 
and may not fit the established priorities of Indian researchers. 
Finally, access to major publications is unequal. Your chances, as a 
Ph. student, to have your paper published in a prestigious journal, 
are greater if you study at Oxford or Chicago than at Dibrugarh 
or Karnatka.
Since the early 1990s, non-metropolitan European anthropologies 
have received increased attention from the centres. One important 
event was the foundation of the European Association of Social 
Anthropologists (EASA) in 1988. Formed at the initiative of Adam 
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Kuper at Brunel University, an important purpose of the EASA 
was to bring anthropologists from (Protestant/Germanic) Northern 
Europe and (Catholic/Romance) Southern Europe together. Then, 
in late 1989, while the anthropologists were busy planning the 
first EASA conference (to be held in Coimbra, Portugal in 1990), 
the world was struck by what would become the defining event of 
the 1990s: the fall of the Iron Curtain (soon to be followed by the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union) and the concomitant cultural and 
intellectual opening-up of most of Central and Eastern Europe. 
The changes that followed in the wake of these upheavals would 
be manifold and paradoxical – and would from the start open 
up a new ethnographic region of continental dimensions for 
anthropological research. Modern and traditional anthropologists 
and ethnologists from Latvia to Serbia were back on the map of 
European anthropology, in some cases (as in Estonia) with few local 
traditions to build on, in others (like Poland), with rich pre-existing 
heritages. But for the EASA planners, the immediate concern was 
the opportunity for intensified academic contacts with colleagues 
in these countries. Relationships were formed with anthropological 
traditions that had almost been forgotten in Western academia for 
decades. In the former Soviet Union, an ethnography was discovered 
that combined German diffusionist traditions with Marxian 
evolutionism (Dunn and Dunn 1974; Gellner 1980; Kuznetsov 
2008). In Poland, the Chicago-inspired methodology of Znaniecki 
(Chapter 4) had been further developed into a sophisticated urban 
microsociology (Wedel 1986), and ethnography in Yugoslavia and 
later ex-Yugoslavia began to find its feet after the bloody breakup 
of the federation (Boskovic 2008). Hence, the EASA from the first 
faced not only the challenge of forging bonds between North and 
South in Europe, but between East and West.
Through the participation of anthropologists from all over the 
continent in EASA’s conferences, and through recurrent panels on 
the history of European anthropology (Vermeulen and Roldán 
1995), a picture of the discipline’s European past has emerged which 
is far more complex than depicted in this book. Swedish ethnology, 
Polish surrealism, Slovene Volkskunde, Lithuanian semiotics, Slovak 
structuralism, are only a few examples of possible new genealogies 
for European anthropology. And outside Europe the situation is not 
much different. There is much of anthropology’s history we have not 
yet told, and many potential futures we have not taken into account. 
Two glimpses of other traditions will serve to illustrate this point.
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As we have seen (Chapter 2), pre-revolutionary Russian 
anthropology shared important features with the German cultural 
history tradition. This focus was retained during the 1920s and 
early 1930s, but most Soviet ethnographers were at this point 
also practical workers, engaged in such tasks as literacy work, 
schooling and health care. Anthropologists were in these years 
instrumental in developing the first written languages for many 
non-literate minorities of the Soviet Union. By the late 1920s, 
‘Russian ethnology resembled Western European and American 
sociocultural anthropology’ (Kuznetsov 2008: 26). Then, under 
Stalin, both applied and theoretical ethnography were ruthlessly 
repressed, many practitioners were exiled or killed, and the 
profession was effectively reduced to empirical documentation 
and Marxist dogmatism. The 1960s and 1970s saw a resurgence 
of theoretically informed research with some degree of openness 
to international influence. A sophisticated theory of ethnicity with 
a decidedly non-Barthian slant was developed by Yuliy Bromley 
at the Moscow Academy of Sciences (Banks 1996); innovative 
work was done, for example, on statistical modelling of cultural 
cohesion; and large-scale ethnosociological surveys were carried 
out by Yuliy V. Arutyunyan (Moscow). In the West there was little 
knowledge of this work, in spite of the dedicated efforts of a few 
individuals, such as Stephen P. Dunn, a former student of Morton 
Fried’s at Columbia, who founded and for 25 years edited Soviet 
Anthropology and Archaeology, a journal of translations that 
published a wide variety of Soviet scholarly literature in English. 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russian anthropology has 
undergone a painful process of diversification (Tishkov 1992). While 
anthropologists of the older generation often occupied leading 
positions at the dominating institutions in Moscow, St. Petersburg 
and Novosibirsk, and had vested interests in perpetuating Soviet 
traditions, many younger anthropologists (some never educated as 
anthropologists at all) looked to the West for inspiration (Condee 
1995; Kuznetsov 2008). In St Petersburg, the foundation of the new 
European University, funded by the Hungarian-American billionaire 
George Soros, has to some extent crystallised this opposition, with 
many Western-oriented anthropologists clustering around Nikolai 
B. Vakhtin at the new university. In applied settings, we may find 
fertile cooperation going on between anthropologists, sociologists, 
psychologists, historians and others, and Western anthropological 
methods and theories are discussed with informed interest.
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Brazilian anthropology presents a rather different picture. Here, as 
in Russia, the primary influence was German. Foundational studies 
of Native Brazilian American religion and cosmology were carried 
out by the self-taught German anthropologist Curt Nimuendajú 
(1883–1945). While the coastal tribes had been described many 
times during the last centuries, Nimuendajú (the name was given 
him by the Apapocuva Indians) decisively shifted the regional focus 
to the inland. He published more than 60 titles and did years of 
fieldwork. The interwar years was dominated by another German, 
Herbert Baldus (1899–1970), whose studies of Native South 
Americans were also very extensive. In the 1930s, he was awarded 
an academic position in São Paolo, where taught many students and 
established São Paolo as the centre of South Americanist studies in 
Brazil. It was Baldus who attracted Lévi-Strauss to the city, where 
he played a key role in building a modern anthropological research 
tradition, and São Paolo thus also came to be a major centre of 
French influence in Brazil, attracting many French anthropologists 
and utilising French methodologies and theoretical approaches. 
Meanwhile, the Brazilian-born Gilberto Freyre (1900–1987), who 
studied with Boas at Columbia and who became a highly visible 
journalist and politician, started up the first courses in cultural 
anthropology at the University of Rio de Janeiro, in 1935. Freyre 
opened up the field of Afro-Brazilian studies, wrote on poverty 
and oppression in Brazilian history, and established of a centre of 
US-style anthropology in Rio. Rio and São Paolo, with their different 
profiles, continued to dominate Brazilian anthropology into the 
postwar years. Meanwhile, substantial numbers of Brazilian anthro-
pologists were educated, many going abroad (typically to the United 
States or France) for graduate studies. The Brazilian Association 
of Anthropology was established in 1955; by 1960, it had several 
hundred members. Brazil was becoming one of the largest and most 
dynamic anthropological communities in the world.
During the military dictatorship (1963–85), there were attempts 
to limit the scope of anthropological research and to close down 
institutions that were troublesome for the regime, but these were 
mostly fended off. Later, Brazilian anthropology has expanded 
substantially, with a wide range of themes are researched today, 
from urban anthropology and institution studies, to cultural 
hybridity. Studies of indigenous tribes and their modern transforma-
tions continue to be a major focus of research, and other research as 
well is almost exclusively carried out in Brazil. Brazilian anthropolo-
gists have actively supported the rights of their country’s indigenous 
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tribes against governmental and commercial interests, and against 
anthropologists who overstep ethical boundaries in their research. 
As Mariza Peirano (2008) puts it, Brazilian anthropology – diverse, 
broad-ranging, applied and basic by turns – is an ‘anthropology 
with no guilt’: Brazilians carrying out research in Brazil do not 
represent a former imperial power, nor are they white people from 
the North building careers by studying poor people in the South. 
They engage with social and political conditions in their own 
country. But Brazilian anthropology has in latter years also given 
us outstanding international scholars like Roberto DaMatta (1995), 
who has published on urban life, carnival and Brazilian identity 
(at present based in the USA), and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro 
(1992), who has done groundbreaking work on shamanism among 
Amazonian Indians (and remains in Brazil).
These sketches of Russia and Brazil give at least a hint of the 
range of variation among the national anthropologies that are 
increasingly making themselves noticed internationally. They also 
indicate the greatest limitation of the present book. Our narrative 
has concentrated heavily on anthropology as it emerged during 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in three language areas: 
German (until the interwar years), French and English (British and 
American). We have made this choice, because these traditions have 
effectively defined the mainstream of methodological and theoretical 
development in the discipline. In part, this is a matter of definitional 
power, and if, say, the best of Brazilian or Russian anthropology 
had regularly been translated into French and English, the history 
of the discipline as a whole might well have been different.
Nevertheless, English is increasingly becoming anthropology’s 
lingua franca, and lack of English-language proficiency is becoming 
a severe handicap. At the biannual EASA conferences, both English 
and French are official languages, but English is by far the most used; 
even many French anthropologists present their work in English on 
these occasions. Young scholars in countries with strong anthropo-
logical traditions are increasingly encouraged to publish their work 
in English. While there are perfectly sound academic reasons for 
this, the situation also creates a peculiar power asymmetry, since 
the English of non-natives is a poorer instrument of communication 
than their native language. Another, related question – on which 
there ought at least to be a qualified anthropological opinion – 
is whether the current linguistic convergence will ultimately lead 
to homogenisation or heterogenisation – to de-tribalisation or re-
tribalisation, in the Manchester school’s terms. On the one hand, a 
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wider variety of scholars, writing from different national traditions, 
are exposed to each others’ work through the medium of a shared 
language. On the other hand, the very transformation of that work 
into a foreign language inevitably removes some of its qualities 
(Wierzbicka 1989; Eco 2003). Any anthropologist who works in 
two languages – and the present authors both belong to that group 
– knows that the richness and nuance of expression one cultivates 
in one’s native tongue is difficult to achieve in a foreign language, 
which may even lack concepts for what one wants to say. Few are 
endowed with the linguistic skills of Malinowski, and even he was 
never truly ‘at home’ among the Trobriand Islanders.
TRENDS fOR THE fUTURE
Taking into account both the increasingly complex geography 
and history of the discipline, and its current lack of theoretical 
coherence, we shall now very tentatively outline some trends in 
contemporary anthropology. As of 2012, continuity with the past 
was still surprisingly strong – which may be reassuring or disquieting, 
depending on one’s point of view. Participant observation remained 
the method of choice for procuring reliable and detailed data, 
though it was increasingly supplemented by other methods, and it 
was taken for granted that fieldwork in complex societies raises its 
own methodological issues. The idea that the world is socially and 
culturally constructed was also still shared by most anthropologists 
– albeit with a variable accent on postmodern relativism. The last 
two decades saw a general backing off from extreme postmodern 
positions, as the postmodern revolution, like others before it, was 
assimilated into the mainstream. There was a return to a more 
balanced ethnographic ‘realism’, a need to assert that anthropologi-
cal knowledge may well be relative, but it is no less relevant for 
that. All-out particularism was fading into more pragmatic interests 
in empirical interactions between the universally human and the 
culturally particular. As a result, some old controversies resurfaced 
in a new guise; and some new research involved the rediscovery of 
older work. During the 1980s and 1990s, Mauss was rediscovered 
in at least three different contexts: as a theorist of the morality of 
exchange (Thomas 1991; Weiner 1992), as a theorist of personhood 
(Carrithers et al. 1985), and as a theorist of the body (Mauss 1934). 
All three fields remain major concerns into the twenty-first century.
However, there were also some new features to contemporary 
anthropology, which cannot go unmentioned. Let us note some 
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prominent examples. First, as seen in the previous chapter, any 
simple distinction between us and them, or observer and observed, 
has become difficult to defend. ‘Natives’ are perfectly capable of 
‘representing themselves’, and are increasingly hostile to anthropo-
logical attempts to dictate who they are. This has contributed to 
a sharpened awareness of ethical issues in anthropology, that has 
increased ever since the American Anthropological Association – at 
the height of the revolution in fieldwork – published the first version 
of its ‘Statement on ethics’ in 1971. Today, ethical considerations 
form a routine part even of student work. Ethics also became 
important because ‘anthropology at home’ is no longer a curiosity, 
but a perfectly normal part of the enterprise – and ethical dilemmas 
are more clearly seen when we encounter them close to home.
Second, simple ‘modern–traditional’ dichotomies have also 
become indefensible, whether for epistemological or empirical 
reasons. Indeed, it seems to the present authors that this aversion 
to anything that even smacks of evolutionism is so strong in 
anthropology that it may amount to a blind spot. As the neo-evo-
lutionists and neo-Marxists demonstrated in the 1960s and 1970s, 
it is easy to document empirical differences between small-scale 
hunter-gatherer societies and modern post-industrial societies, in 
terms of quantitative measures such as energy-flow per capita or 
power differentials. Such questions should concern us, since homo 
sapiens have inhabited the Earth as hunter-gatherers for some 
150,000 years, while modern society is very recent. Since only about 
one-tenth of a per cent of human history has been spent in ‘modern’ 
societies, it stands to reason that general theories of human sociality 
are dependent on insights into the difference between ‘primitive’ 
and ‘modern’ social systems.
Third, the world has seen a phenomenal growth in transnational 
connections of every kind – from migration to tourism, from 
international wars on terrorism to the Internet. This acceleration 
of sociocultural mobility across all traditional ethnographic regions 
has led many anthropologists to question the often taken-for-
granted link between groups of people and bounded geographical 
localities to which they ‘belong’. The whole concept of space needs 
rethinking, as anthropologists increasingly study globally dispersed 
groups, such as refugees and migrants, workers in multinational 
firms or internet communities. The classical synchronic, single-site, 
single-society studies that used to be the hallmark of anthropology 
are becoming increasingly rare, and anthropologists are expected 
as a matter of course to contextualise their work both historically 
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and regionally. Multi-sited fieldwork (Marcus 1998) is no longer 
experimental and daring, but part and parcel of the methodological 
toolbox. We shall shortly return to some of the theoretical thinking 
that has emerged from this.
Fourth, and as part of this ‘rethinking of space’, we have seen 
a renewed interest in the physical territories occupied by people, 
whether ecosystems, cityscapes, or virtual realities – all of which 
was considered irrelevant by the extreme social constructionists of 
postmodernism. We sense an affinity between this interest in the 
physical environment, and the orientation towards the (physical) 
human body that was emphasised by the practice theorists (Chapter 
8), and, indeed, Bourdieu places equal emphasis on the physical 
surroundings and the physical body in his theory of habitus. This 
suggests that a new rapprochement between anthropology and the 
physical world is taking place on very different terms than during 
the cultural ecology movement of the 1960s.
Finally, the general undermining of the concept of culture that 
had been going on since the 1960s, had, by the end of the 1990s, 
successfully discredited the old notion of ‘a people’ sharing ‘a 
culture’. Thus, on the one hand, the idea of the social whole has 
been weakened, as ‘society’ dissolves into dispersed and overlapping 
networks or social fields. On the other hand, the idea of the material 
and bodily world has attained greater prominence. This perhaps 
suggests a long-term drift away from Durkheimian notions of 
society as a self-sufficient system, towards various kinds of alliances 
with the natural sciences.
This theoretical trend is one of two we have singled out for 
consideration in this final chapter of our history of anthropology. 
The second trend covers studies of globalisation and place. Our 
choice of these two subjects is obviously debatable, and there are 
other trends we might have discussed with equal justification. There 
has been very significant work done in anthropological research 
on exchange, both in the traditional heartlands of the discipline 
(such as Melanesia: Weiner 1992; Godelier 1999; or comparatively: 
Wyschogrod et al. 2002) and ‘at home’ (a North London street: 
Miller 1998; or the global economy: Hann and Hart 2011). These 
interests interface with issues in economic anthropology, which 
has lain dormant for two to three decades waiting for theoretical 
advances such as these (see Carrier 2012 for an overview). Work 
on economic consumption, inspired by the rediscovery of Georg 
Simmel since the 1980s, is already seeing something of a boom. The 
potential for cooperation with economists that arises from this, is 
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particularly great in our days, when ‘new institutional economists’ 
– the distant offspring of Polanyi’s substantivism (Chapter 5) – are 
winning Nobel Prizes. Fundamental work is also being done on 
symbolism, history and power, inspired in particular by the work 
of Marx, Gramsci and Foucault (Herzfeld 1992; Trouillot 1995; 
Gledhill 2000; Comaroff and Comaroff 2006). An offshoot of 
this research is a growing interest in the anthropology of political 
violence (Malkki 1995; Nordstrom and Robben 1995; Tambiah 
1996) and human rights issues (Wilson 1997; Wilson and Mitchell 
2003); new research areas which may become prominent in the 
future of the discipline.
Our decision to focus on globalisation studies and studies of 
biology and culture does not imply that we consider these fields 
more important than the above. We do, however, consider the two 
trends to be particularly interesting in the context of the history of 
the discipline – in part, because they both ‘push the envelope’ of 
mainstream anthropology in noticeable ways; in part, because both 
have been the subject of major debates during the last decades. The 
two trends also present us with a number of interesting contrasts and 
overlaps. Roughly, we might say that they respond to the present 
state of anthropology and the world in two very different ways. The 
first seems to retreat from history and current complexities and to 
pose once again the old question ‘What is a human being?’ – thereby 
revitalising the nature/nurture controversy, which was in its day 
constitutive of the discipline. The second returns us to two other 
classical questions, ‘What is society?’ and ‘What is culture?’ – but 
now in a context of global flux and flow.
BiOlOGy AND CUlTURE 
Two complementary questions may be asked about the nature of 
humanity (Ingold 1994): ‘What is a human being?’ (answer: ‘A small 
twig on a branch of the great trunk of evolution’; ‘A close relative 
of chimpanzees’, and so on) and ‘What does it mean to be a human 
being?’ (a question that generates a range of different answers, from 
Dostoevsky to Renoir, from Lévi-Strauss to Goffman). In twentieth-
century anthropology the latter question has predominated over 
the former. Grasping the native’s point of view was essential both 
for Boas and Malinowski, and Mauss and Radcliffe-Brown were 
both concerned with the nature of society rather than the nature 
of the human species. Explanations seeing culture and society as 
results of external forces, be they environmental or genetic, were 
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always minority views, though sometimes influential. During the 
last two decades, we have seen a revitalisation of the relationship 
between anthropology and several of the natural sciences. This 
movement is ultimately driven by the fact that the natural sciences 
are making use of increasingly complex models, that may be able 
to provide realistic simulations of biological, and to some extent 
even mental and social, processes. In the foreseeable future, the 
direct application of such models to qualitative social science will 
be impossible, since the models are dependent on quantitative input, 
nevertheless, as we saw in our discussion of cybernetics (Chapter 
5), models from mathematics or natural science at times be used 
with profit as metaphors of social process.
It is the complexity of the new models that is their prime attraction 
for many anthropologists. With complex systems theory, natural 
science itself seems to have abandoned the unilinear world of cause 
and effect in favour of a probabilistic, multistranded universe 
that seems more familiar to social scientists – and also increases 
understanding for the social sciences among many natural scientists. 
However, there is still substantial distrust between these branches 
of academia, and misunderstandings are common, which impedes 
the exchange of ideas. Much work still remains to be done – on 
both sides of the divide – before true cooperation becomes possible.
In 1979, Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar published their seminal 
Laboratory Life. This was a traditional, single-sited monograph 
based on Malinowskian fieldwork – carried out in a high-tech 
biochemical laboratory in California. The authors were careful, 
from the outset, to separate their task from that of the scientists 
they studied. While the biochemists were unearthing knowledge 
about the physical world ‘out there’, Latour and Woolgar asked how 
such knowledge became a social fact: how did a scientist recognise 
a ‘result’ when he saw it, how did ‘results’ circulate within the 
laboratory collective, to be criticised or accepted, defended, related 
to other ‘results’ and published? In their answer to these questions, 
the authors develop the rudiments of what Latour (1991) would 
later call ‘actor-network theory’, which links persons, objects 
and ideas in a network, where constant ‘translations’ (person to 
object, object to idea, and so on) take place. In the monograph’s 
introductory chapter, by now a classic, the authors describe their 
entry into the laboratory, which is consciously exotified, to make it 
seem as ‘unfamiliar’ as a New Guinea tribe to the reader.
In the wake of this study, quite a number of sociological and 
anthropological studies of science, often referred to as ‘STS’ (studies 
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in technology and science) have appeared, ranging from general 
accounts of the embeddedness of science in large-scale economic and 
political processes to micro-studies of particular research milieux. 
However, the implicit critique of natural science that many of these 
studies conveyed, and their often post-structuralist concerns with 
knowledge regimes and ideology, did little to improve relations 
between anthropologists and their subjects of research. Latour and 
Woolgar generally avoided these pitfalls; nevertheless, their work 
was mostly either criticised or ignored by biologists and physicists. 
More recently, another controversy demonstrated that tensions are 
still considerable. In 1996, physicist Alan Sokal published an article 
entitled ‘Transgressing the boundaries: Toward a transformative 
hermeneutics of quantum gravity’ (1996) in the journal Social Text, 
where he argued that theoretical physics should be seen as a social 
construction and not as ‘objective truth’. Shortly afterwards, he 
announced that the article had been a hoax; an incomprehensible 
argument full of postmodernist jargon and foggy thinking, and 
that the whole exercise had been an attempt to expose the vacuous 
anti-intellectualism of the postmodern cultural elite. While the 
Sokal affair did not involve anthropologists (his targets were chiefly 
literary theorists and philosophers), it offered an acute illustration 
of the continuing gap between humanistic and scientific approaches.
It is worth noting, however, that Latour is hardly a strong social 
constructionist. Indeed, in We have Never Been Modern (1991) he 
asserts that it is as futile to reduce physical science to social science 
as vice versa. Instead, he tries to develop an analytical language to 
describe the ‘translations’ that constantly take place between the 
two, ostensibly separate, fields. On the one hand, Latour’s theory 
thus constitutes a frontal attack on the axiomatic separation of 
society and nature that has been constitutive of both the natural 
and the human sciences since Descartes. On the other hand, it calls 
attention to the hybrid nature of all scientific endeavours, to the fact 
that knowledge is transformed as it moves out of the laboratory 
or the fieldwork situation, into global networks of translation and 
re-re-translation.
This is worth keeping in mind in the following, where we will 
be discussing two broad families of anthropological approaches 
that engage (often through interdisciplinary work) with the natural 
sciences. The first family is linked to the expanding interdisciplinary 
field of cognitive science. ‘Cognition’ (which we might define as all 
mental processes associated with the acquisition and management 
of knowledge, including perception, memory, judgement, concept 
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formation, language use, and so on) is an old anthropologi-
cal interest, which had taken many forms in the history of the 
discipline: from the Ethnopsychologie of Wundt and Durkheim’s 
collective representations, through the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, the 
‘rationality debate’ and Lévi-Straussian structuralism, to American 
ethnoscience and the specialisation often referred to as cognitive 
anthropology (D’Andrade 1995). Since the 1980s, several of these 
concerns have converged with work in linguistics, psychology, 
neurology, evolutionary biology, artificial intelligence research and 
general systems theory, to form the new field of cognitive science.
Cognitive science remains a field in formation, which utilises 
a wide variety of methods (from computer-assisted tomography 
to participant observation), and poses a number of complex and 
potentially groundbreaking questions. New simulation models for 
complex systems have stimulated many branches of this research 
and, with software becoming more complex and hardware 
more powerful day by day, may in the long run change the way 
we understand human mental processes fundamentally. This 
information, which would have given Descartes pause for thought, 
has not been wasted on funding agencies worldwide, which have 
invested heavily in several branches of cognitive science. Influential 
research institutes and centres of excellence have been established, 
and extensive experimental and field-oriented research is carried 
out. All this means that cognitive science offers countless tantalising 
and suggestive questions, but so far – from an anthropologist’s point 
of view – mostly tentative and fragmentary results.
The long-term impact of cognitive science on anthropology is 
hard to assess. However, it is bound to make an impression that 
cognitive scientists consider it proven that humans are not born as 
cognitive ‘blank slates’. Ever since Durkheim, anthropologists have 
tended to defend the tabula rasa postulate to an extent that even 
Locke did not (Chapter 1). Human mental processes were socially 
constructed, and could thus be adapted freely to an infinite variety 
of conditions. In contrast, the new research demonstrates that 
our mind and sensory apparatus are specialised instruments, with 
specific potentials and limitations. Clearly, if positive knowledge 
of how these instruments function is forthcoming, it will be of the 
greatest interest to anthropology.
The incipient interest in cognitive science in anthropology itself 
was indicated by an early, influential study by Scott Atran (1990; 
see also Atran and Medin 2008), which develops themes from 
both Durkheimian sociology and ethnoscience, and argues that 
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there are inborn ways of classifying the natural world that are 
universally human. Otherwise, anthropologists working within 
the framework of cognitive science represented a wide range of 
persuasions. On the one hand, Lévi-Strauss’ former student Dan 
Sperber (1996) developed an hypothesis of symbolic systems as 
networks of mental representations and public ‘productions’, in 
which a form of Darwinian evolution takes place. On the other 
hand, a number of theorists suggested that neurology might contain 
clues to an understanding of universal aspects of human cognition 
(Turner 1987; Bloch 1991; Borofsky 1994). Finally, such scholars 
as Bradd Shore, Dorothy Holland and Naomi Quinn (Holland and 
Quinn 1987; Shore 1996) adhered to varieties of schema theory or 
prototype theory, which postulate that cognition is organised around 
a limited number of prototypical ‘elementary meanings’, which 
are composites of biological hardwiring and social construction: 
‘up’ and ‘down’ may be universal human categories (Elementärge-
danken, as Bastian would have called them), but their meaning is 
understood differently (as Völkergedanken) on a Polynesian atoll 
and in the Andes.
A somewhat similar view is expressed in two books co-written 
by the linguist George Lakoff and the philosopher Mark Johnson 
(1980, 1999), in which the idea is advanced that human cognition 
and knowledge build on metaphors based on bodily experience. 
Bodily experience, which clearly has a universal component (we are 
all born with two hands), is also clearly particular to individuals 
and societies. Moreover, bodily experience is intimately known 
to each of us, and is therefore a fruitful source of analogies with 
other experiential fields, which are imbued with the ambience of 
particular bodily experiences. Lakoff and Johnson’s work has been 
particularly important in subfields such as medical anthropology 
and the anthropology of knowledge.
A final example of this genre is the linguist Anna Wierzbicka’s 
comparative work on concept formation in various European 
languages. In an influential comparison of Russian and English 
words for emotional states, she demonstrates that the two languages 
draw the conceptual separation of mind (or soul) and body in the 
two languages (Wierzbicka 1989). Such work might seem to be 
no more than a revival of the (relativistic) Sapir-Whorf hypothesis 
(Chapter 4), but in fact has a universalistic component, in as much 
as Wierzbicka seeks to discover ‘semantic universals’.
The above examples – and many others could be cited – suggest 
a tentative revival of universalism in anthropology and a reversal 
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of postmodern trends, with their rejection (as some would have it) 
of anything reminiscent of scientific pretensions in anthropology. 
No matter how they stand on the nature–nurture issue, and here 
cognitive anthropologists differ, they consider cultural representa-
tions as ‘enrichments of an intuitive ontology’ (Boyer 1999: 210) 
and are intent on revealing the hardwiring underlying the soft and 
shifting ‘cultural stuff’.
The universalism of the second approach we have chosen to 
highlight is more pronounced, though it is related to cognitive 
science, as witnessed in recent research on religion as a cognitive and 
evolved phenomenon (Whitehouse and Laidlaw 2007). The attitudes 
of anthropologists towards evolutionary theory, or neo-Darwinism, 
were – and are – contentious. Some see the accounts as dehumanising 
and politically irresponsible, or as attempts to reduce the richness 
of experience and sociocultural variation to genetics. Others see 
them as poorly supported by evidence and therefore impossible to 
assess. Yet others see great potential in the fusion of Darwinism, 
cognitive psychology and ethnographic research.
In anthropology, the sceptics have dominated the scene, and have 
marshalled support from a venerable lineage of anthropologists. 
Before the war, Boas, Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown (Kuper 
1999: xiii–xiv) were relentless critics of biological determinism, 
and the often associated racist pseudo-science eugenics, which many 
Darwinian biologists had supported (Malik 2000; Gingrich 2005). 
After the war, the orthodox view on both sides of the Atlantic 
was that biological accounts of human nature were irrelevant 
to anthropology. Anthropologists, indeed, rarely studied human 
nature as such, generally restricting themselves to accounts of 
particular societies or cultures, and maintained that society and 
culture were perfectly intelligible in terms of their historical 
development and internal dynamics. When universal questions were 
broached, they were generally content to postulate some abstract 
idea of human sociality (for example, ‘maximisation’ in formalist 
economic anthropology, or ‘binary oppositions’, as in Lévi-Strauss). 
Nevertheless, most anthropologists appear to work with an implicit 
theory of human nature, though they may hesitate to make it 
explicit. But if the postulate of the ‘psychic unity of mankind’ is 
accepted, which it must be to enable comparative research, then 
it would clearly be useful to be able to specify the scope and char-
acteristics of this mental unity. This, after all, was Bastian’s and 
Wundt’s project (Chapter 2).
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As we have seen, biological accounts of human nature briefly 
re-emerged in mainstream intellectual life in the mid-1970s (Chapter 
7), when they were rejected by anthropologists. Since the early 
1990s, however, sociobiology has re-emerged in a more sophisticated 
form, with greater potential for coalitions with social scientists – 
but again, anthropologists have generally rejected their advances. 
Nevertheless, the debate has become less aggressive; perhaps because 
of the ‘cognitive turn’ in sociobiology, perhaps because anthropolo-
gists have become more receptive to universalistic issues.
The project of a Darwinian social science, which would account 
for aspects of human social life and culture in terms of the 
evolutionary history of the species, can roughly be divided into 
two approaches (Knight et al. 1999: 1–2). One, ‘evolutionary 
anthropology’, addresses the biological evolution of the human 
species as well as the sociocultural evolution of human behaviour. 
Sociocultural evolution is often understood in the light of models 
of ‘cultural transmission’ (or ‘communication’, as anthropologists 
would call it), with an accent on learning. Certain practitioners 
within this extremely broad field have attempted to establish that 
human solidarity is determined by genetic distance. And while many 
anthropologists were put off by early claims that parents would be 
more willing to make sacrifices for biological kin than for adopted 
kin, newer research linking genetic distance to interethnic conflict, 
for example by Frank Salter (2004), has had more success. Many 
anthropologists feel that generations of anthropological research 
on social cohesion and conflict be taken seriously before general 
propositions of this kind are advanced.
The other approach, known as ‘evolutionary psychology’ (in 
fact a branch of evolutionary anthropology), ‘has focused less on 
the functional consequences of behaviour than on the cognitive 
mechanisms believed to underpin it’ (Knight et al. 1999: 2). This 
school is more hesitant at drawing inferences from the existence of 
particular behaviours or beliefs to their immediate adaptive value, 
and is more concerned with cognition and classification than with ‘sex 
and violence’. The benchmark publication for this new synthesis was 
the omnibus work The Adapted Mind (Barkow et al. 1992), and the 
most dedicated proponents of the theory have been anthropologist 
John Tooby and psychologist Leda Cosmides. Deliberately avoiding 
the contentious label of sociobiology, they developed a theory of 
the human mind which saw it as composed of specific domains 
that originally evolved as adaptive responses to the ‘environment 
of evolutionary adaptation’: the environment in which the human 
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species originated (most likely the upland savannahs of the East 
African Rift Valley), and their adaptation to that environment, as 
hunters and gatherers. The defining features of the human mind 
were thus originally adaptive (enhancing the species’ potential for 
survival), but in contemporary contexts may well be maladaptive. 
Again, there would seem to be good reason for anthropologists to 
welcome positive knowledge in this area – but so far the research 
of these scholars is too inconclusive and fragmented to be of much 
use. Moreover, though several evolutionary psychologists have 
tried to account for the relationship between biological evolution 
and cultural change (Boyd and Richerson 2005), the school has 
not developed a theory of cultural change, which makes it seem 
singularly inappropriate in today’s world. In this respect, it is worth 
noticing that the neurolinguist Steven Pinker, whose Blank Slate 
(2004) was an unanimous defence of an evolutionary perspective 
on the human mind, later published a book about the decline of 
violence (2012), which indicated that human nature might be more 
malleable than he had previously thought.
At the end of the day, and in spite of numerous refinements, 
evolutionary psychology is still seen by most anthropologists as a 
form of biological reductionism, and has made few inroads into the 
mainstream of social and cultural anthropology.
In 2000, this and other issues were thrust into the public eye. In 
1968, the US anthropologist Napoleon Chagnon, who had conducted 
long-term research on the Yanomami in Brazil and Venezuela, 
published Yanomamö: The Fierce People (1968), which became a 
bestseller used in introductory courses to anthropology worldwide. 
Unlike Mead’s bestseller on Samoa, Chagnon portrayed the 
Yanomami as extremely warlike and aggressive, traits he explained 
in sociobiological terms. The book, embraced by sociobiologist 
E.O. Wilson, was resented by many anthropologists. In 1988, 
the Brazilian Anthropological Association raised ethical issues 
concerning Chagnon’s research and asked the American Anthro-
pological Association to review his case. This was not done. Scandal 
erupted in 2000, when The New Yorker magazine, renowned for 
its meticulous fact-checking, published an article by the journalist 
Patrick Tierney, accusing Chagnon and his collaborators of causing 
a deadly epidemic of measles among the Yanomami as part of their 
sociobiological research. In response to new demands from their 
Brazilian colleagues, the AAA reviewed Chagnon’s case, clearing 
him of most, but not all, charges. The highly visible debate that 
ensued included reviews by several other academic bodies as well, 
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which agreed that Chagnon was not at fault, and Tierney had 
wilfully distorted the facts, but the AAA only rescinded their report 
in 2004, dropping the remaining accusations against Chagnon. In 
2011, Alice Dreger, an historian who had researched the case for 
two years, confirmed that there was no substance in the accusations 
at all, and accused the AAA of subjecting one of its members to an 
harrowing review process on the basis of questionable journalism, 
without checking the facts or inviting Chagnon to defend himself.
Two points in this complex case (see Borofsky 2004 for a review) 
are worth noting in the present book. First, the AAA’s action 
against Chagnon was influenced by several factors, including his 
sociobiological convictions, pressure from the powerful Brazilian 
anthropological community and the self-critical attitude of 
metropolitan anthropologists fostered by postmodernism. These 
were all extraneous to the case at hand, but highly relevant within 
the context of the history of anthropology. Second, that the prestige 
of Tierney’s highbrow publishers and the virulent, lowbrow debate 
on the internet that followed, conspired to damage not only 
Chagnon’s reputation, but the reputation of anthropology in the 
USA and globally.
Issues of research ethics, advocacy and the obligations of anthro-
pological professional organisations were in this debate fused 
with the theoretical debate on evolutionary anthropology, and 
the still broader issue of how anthropologists are enmeshed in an 
increasingly interconnected world. Theoretical debates that could 
previously be contained within the anthropological community, 
are today liable to expand into globalised and uncontrollable 
controversies, with potentially catastrophic results for individual 
researchers, informants, and the discipline as such. The generalised 
self-criticism of postmodernism is of little help in this situation, 
which instead demands of us an enhanced consciousness of the 
globalised world of which we are a part.
GlOBAliSATiON AND THE PRODUCTiON Of lOCAliTy
For a while during the 1990s, it seemed that hardly a conference 
in the social sciences failed to include the word ‘globalisation’ 
in its title. Before the late 1980s, the term had hardly been used 
(Robertson 1992: 8); then, suddenly, it was on everybody’s lips, and 
the interest (so far) seems to continue. Many anthropologists were 
active in defining the field and developing new research agendas, 
new journals were inaugurated (such as the Chicago-based Public 
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Culture and the British Global Networks), and a flurry of books were 
published, often with words like ‘global’, ‘culture’, ‘modernity’ and 
‘identity’ in their titles. The most influential edited volume was, in 
this early period, Mike Featherstone’s Global Culture (1990), which 
was followed by Scott Lash and Jonathan Friedman’s Modernity 
and Identity (1991), sociologist Anthony Giddens’ Modernity and 
Self-Identity (1991), Ulf Hannerz’s Cultural Complexity (1992), 
Friedman’s Global Identity and Cultural Process (1994) and Arjun 
Appadurai’s Modernity at Large (1996), to mention a few of the 
most widely read books in those years that were marked by the 
end of the Cold War, the expansion of the internet and the advent 
of mobile telephony.
Globalisation can be provisionally defined as any process that 
relativises the geographical distance between locations. The spread 
of, say, human rights concepts, consumption patterns, information 
technologies, pop music, nationalist ideologies and (as we have 
seen) anthropological debates across the world are processes of 
globalisation, as are international capital flows, the AIDS pandemic, 
the illegal drugs and arms trade, the growth of transnational 
academic networks, Islamic and right-wing terrorism, or the 
migrations through which, for example, Caribbean or Palestinian 
communities are established in Britain, Canada and the USA. Such 
processes are dependent on the development of global infrastruc-
tures (long-distance transportation, communication technologies, 
and so on), though anthropologists are quick to point out that 
the sociocultural effects of, say, inexpensive plane tickets, satellite 
television or Facebook are unpredictable and highly diverse (Eriksen 
2003, 2007).
Globalisation itself is not new, and anthropologists have studied 
it for many years under other names. Indeed, one might say that 
Herodotus and Ibn Khaldun (Chapter 1), were early representatives 
of the trend. Still, it may reasonably be argued that phenomena 
such as the emergence of poly-ethnic urban societies in the West, 
the spread of modern educational systems in the Third World, 
the global dissemination of Western lifestyles and political ideals, 
the new forms of organisation permitted by the internet, or the 
growing politicisation of essentialised ethnic identities, deserve 
to be regarded as truly new, setting new agendas for theory and 
method in anthropology. It seems beyond doubt that the speed and 
volume of contemporary flows of information, people and goods 
are unprecedented in human history; though long-distance networks 
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of trade, kinship, ritual exchange and political conflict have existed 
– on a smaller scale – as long as human society itself.
It may seem trivial, but we also need to emphasise the distinction 
between globalisation itself – a complex of actually occurring 
sociocultural processes, and globalisation studies – a family of 
anthropological approaches to these processes that attained 
prominence during the 1990s. As regards ‘globalisation itself’, the 
most prominent event of the last decades was undoubtedly the 
fall of the Iron Curtain. For anthropology this had wide-ranging 
repercussions. As mentioned above, Western and Eastern anthro-
pologists were soon rubbing shoulders at conferences, trying to 
make sense of each others’ conceptions of the discipline and the 
world – while a new ethnographic region was ‘opened up’ to anthro-
pological enquiry. Its recent shared past had established a measure 
of commonality throughout the region (embodied, for example, in 
bureaucratic, educational and scientific conventions, ideology and 
social memory), overlying a patchwork of local traditions of diverse 
extraction, which asserted themselves with renewed force upon the 
sudden collapse of central authority. To the Western anthropologists 
who soon engaged in fieldwork in the ‘post-socialist region’, these 
conditions seemed sufficiently unique to prompt the development of 
innovative theoretical and methodological approaches. In 1991, the 
American anthropologist Katherine Verdery published the influential 
article ‘Theorizing socialism: A prologue to the “transition”’. 
Drawing on the research of a handful of Western anthropologists 
who had done fieldwork in the region prior to 1989 (see Halpern 
and Kideckel 1983 for an overview), on the work of Eastern 
European scholars (such as the Hungarian economist János Kornai), 
and on the theories of Karl Polanyi (Chapter 5), Verdery develops a 
holistic model of pre-1989, ‘socialist’ society, which describes it as 
a distinct social type, with similarities to feudalism. Later research 
has in part followed up Verdery’s model (Humphrey 1996–97), 
in part developed along different paths (Ries 1997). In 2002, the 
Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology was opened in Halle, 
Germany, and rapidly established itself as an important research 
centre for the study of post-socialist societies under the leadership 
of Chris Hann and Günther Schlee. ‘European universities’ with 
Western-style curricula, initially financed by George Soros, were 
opened up in St Petersburg (see above) and Budapest.
The collapse of the Iron Curtain illustrates several points, and 
at the same time introduces us to the anthropological study of 
globalisation. On the one hand, we see global socioeconomic 
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processes that lead to the collapse of a regional political system. On 
the other, we see anthropologists (themselves agents of globalisation) 
penetrating into a pristine ‘field’, defining it as an ‘ethnographic 
region’, forging alliances with local scholars, and attempting to 
establish a respectable ‘regional tradition of ethnographic writing’ 
(Fardon 1990). Thus, while globalising processes erased the 
barriers around the region, anthropologists were busy localising 
themselves in it, proclaiming its uniqueness, and developing theory 
tailored to it. However, the theory thus developed is not itself much 
concerned with globalisation. Indeed, its emphasis on typologies 
and mechanisms of social integration harks back to the 1970s and 
earlier. This typological bent further strengthens the argument that 
the region is distinct, and thus a legitimate object of study for a new 
sub-group of anthropologists.
Globalisation has local effects, which are unpredictable, and 
may be autonomous to the extent that they directly oppose 
globalisation. This realisation was an important point of departure 
for the globalisation researchers that emerged in anthropology from 
the 1990s. Ranging from Melissa Caldwell’s study of the cultural 
significance of McDonald’s in Moscow (2003) to Anna Tsing’s (2005) 
rich ethnography of Indonesian environmental activists and James 
Ferguson’s (1990, 1999) influential studies in ‘post-development’; 
from John and Jean Comaroff’s research on the commercialisation 
of identity in South Africa (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009) to Ulf 
Hannerz’s study of foreign correspondents (2004), connectedness, 
always partial, and transnational flows have struck at the heart of 
anthropological enquiry, prompting a reconsideration of central 
concepts – most obviously, ‘society’ and ‘culture’ – on firmer 
empirical ground than that of the postmodernists.
As we have said, the anthropological interest in globalisation was 
not without precedent. The studies of ethnicity and nationalism 
that emerged during the 1970s and 1980s (Chapters 7 and 8) 
clearly anticipated the globalisation school, inasmuch as the rise 
of nationalism was historically associated with modernity and the 
state, and ethnic movements were typically products of change 
and modernisation. Likewise, there are clear continuities with the 
1970s interest in ‘political economy’ (Chapter 7). Indeed, two of 
the grand old men of this school, Eric Wolf (Steward’s student) 
and Peter Worsley (Gluckman’s student), had published major 
books in the early 1980s (Wolf 1982; Worsley 1984) dealing with 
cultural aspects of global capitalism and the universalisation of 
modernity. Still further back, there are continuities with the Marxian 
Eriksen HOA3 01 text   214 16/04/2013   16:04
GlOBAl NETWORKS 215
theory of imperialism, with the peasant studies pioneered by the 
Chicago school and Steward, and with the studies of urbanisation 
and colonialism conducted by the Manchester school. This is not 
least evident in the work of John and Jean Comaroff, professors 
at Chicago, whose intellectual itineraries from Cape Town via 
Manchester to Chicago illustrate these connections perfectly.
In the influential work of the Swedish anthropologist Ulf Hannerz, 
such continuities are reflected. While his first monograph (1969) was 
a study of American ghetto life largely in the Chicago tradition, and 
his first major theoretical work (1980) was an appraisal of urban 
anthropology, his most important contribution in the 1990s was 
a discussion of the field, methods and potentials of globalisation 
studies (1992). Here, the concept of culture was redefined to signify 
flow, process and partial integration, rather than stable, bounded 
systems of meaning. This concept of culture was compatible with 
the still-dominant postmodernist sensibilities, as was Hannerz’s 
definition of globalisation – as global aspects of modernity, 
rather than a monolithic ‘global village’. Such adjustments made 
globalisation studies more palatable to traditional-minded anthro-
pologists, but were also tailored to make sense of a world where 
bounded, stable cultures were hardly prevalent. Hannerz coined 
the term ‘cultural creolisation’ to describe the intermingling of two 
or more formerly discrete traditions; another term for the same 
phenomenon was ‘cultural hybridity’ (Modood and Werbner 1997).
Finally, like nearly every anthropologist writing in this field, 
Hannerz stresses that global processes have local consequences. 
Globalisation does not entail the disappearance of local difference; 
instead, a battle is waged with unpredictable, and often innovative, 
outcomes. Indeed, the neologism glocalisation has been proposed 
to stress the local aspect of globalisation (Eriksen 1993b).
For anthropologists like Hannerz, globalisation studies were 
simply an extension of existing research into a new empirical context. 
For others, globalisation seemed to pose a number of new questions, 
to which they responded with new theoretical formulations.
An example of the latter is the ‘actor-network theory’ proposed by 
Bruno Latour. Originally developed in a study of scientific practice 
(see above), the theory’s emphasis on ‘hybrids’ and processes of 
‘translation’ that occur when persons, objects or ideas flow from 
context to context, seemed ideally suited to a globalised world. 
When deployed methodically along the lines suggested by classical 
network theory (Chapter 5), and informed theoretically by the 
discussions of exchange that emerged in the 1990s, actor-network 
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theory seemed a formidable tool for analysis of phenomena that 
influence each other without making up a coherent system.
Arjun Appadurai is another anthropologist who has contributed to 
a dedicated theory of globalisation. In his edited volume on economic 
anthropology from 1986, he develops ideas of value transformation 
in global networks that are ultimately inspired by phenomenological 
concerns. Both Appadurai and Hannerz were concerned to retain 
the virtues of ethnography, even when considering large-scale 
processes. Hannerz wrote about ‘cosmopolitans and locals in world 
culture’, giving primacy to the locals, and Appadurai’s article on 
‘The production of locality’ argued that locality and local identity 
had always been a scarce resource and continued to be so in a period 
of accelerated globalisation. By linking locality production to ritual, 
he gave his theory a classical twist (and potentially redefined the 
study of ritual).
Though globalisation research was largely an Anglophone 
speciality, important contributions to the field were made by the 
French anthropologist Marc Augé, who had studied ritual and 
politics in West Africa in a structural Marxist mode during the 
1960s. In small ethnographic studies of the Paris Metro and the 
Luxembourg Gardens (1986, 1985), and most influentially in his 
later theoretical books, including Non-lieux (1991; Non-Places, 
1995), Augé discussed the fate of classical anthropological notions 
of place, culture, society and community in the postmodern era 
of flux and change. Arguing that the stability of ‘place’ could no 
longer be taken for granted, Augé parallels many of Appadurai’s 
concerns (Appadurai 1996). In a work reminiscent of his 
postmodern countryman, Jean Baudrillard, Augé discusses dreams 
and imagination under different informational regimes, drawing on 
his West African research as well as on recent global developments 
(1999). Godelier also engaged with the discourse of globalisation, 
publishing on the neoliberal capitalist hegemony as well as raising 
the fundamental question ‘What is a society?’ on the basis of data 
from the Baruya, a New Guinean people he had studied since the 
1960s, who were now embedded in capitalism and could no longer 
be said to form an autonomous ‘society’ (2009).
The kinship between globalisation studies and postmodernist 
deconstructionism was evident in the work of several anthropolo-
gists, perhaps most poignantly in Strathern’s Partial Connections 
(1991), which argued that neither societies nor symbolic systems are 
coherent wholes, and cited globalisation research (notably Hannerz) 
in support of this view. The multiplicity of voices, the erasure of 
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clear distinctions between ‘cultures’ or ‘societies’, the eclectic 
attitude to research method, and the insistence that the world was 
inhabited by ‘hybrid’ objects, people and concepts, were some of the 
shared notions. Among the leading postmodernist anthropologists, 
George Marcus (1998) advocated comparative studies of modernity 
as a framework for an updated, reflexive anthropology. In some 
studies of the global–local interface, the paradoxes of widespread 
cultural reflexivity and the global spread of icons and institutions 
of modernity, gave empirical grounding to the often abstract claims 
of the postmodernists.
In spite of the continuities with previous research, the emergence 
of globalisation studies may signify the final demise of the classical 
anthropological notions of ‘culture’ and ‘society’, that have shown 
remarkable resilience in the face of near-continuous criticism ever 
since the 1960s. Characteristically, the Colombian anthropologist 
Carlos Londoño Sulkin (2012) explains, in his ethnography of 
Amazonian Indians, that he describes them as ‘the people of the 
Centre’ rather than with an ethnonym, since the boundaries of their 
identity are made fuzzy by mobility, intermarriage and cultural 
change. ‘Culture’ and ‘society’ are thus again under threat, and 
the reason is not so much the intrinsic value of the globalisation 
theories themselves, as an empirical reality where even the ideal 
type of the ‘authentic’ culture seems increasingly anachronistic. 
The actor-network models mentioned above may be a preview of 
the kind of concepts that will in the end replace the classical ones. 
They portray a world of ‘partial connections’ and ever-changing 
and hybridising ‘discursive objects’, employed and deployed by 
human carriers with reflexive ideas of their own identity, among 
which ‘culture’, derived from anthropology, may figure prominently. 
Indigenous peoples like the Sami of northern Scandinavia or 
the New Zealand Maori actively debate the relative merits of 
ethnographic studies of their cultures; people in Trinidad may be 
familiar with M.G. Smith’s (1965) theory of cultural pluralism 
(and actively object to it); Australian aborigines draw on classical 
ethnographies in presenting their ‘culture’ to the authorities; Pacific 
Islanders copyright rituals in order to stop anthropologists from 
broadcasting video recordings of them, or else accept payment to 
masquerade as savages in some reality show. In an era of cultural 
reflexivity, anthropologists may end up in the ‘hybrid’ situation 
of studying not people’s cultures, but their quasi-anthropological 
representations of their cultures.
Eriksen HOA3 01 text   217 16/04/2013   16:04
218 A HiSTORy Of ANTHROPOlOGy
Enthusiasm for globalisation studies was not universally shared 
in the discipline. For some, it was a case of the emperor’s new 
clothes: globalisation was just a fancy name for neo-imperialism, 
cleansed of its political dimension. But while it is true that power 
relations have not always been visible in globalisation research, they 
have not been absent either. Power is a major issue in Appadurai’s 
work, as well as in the research on comparative modernities that 
has been produced or stimulated by the Comaroffs (for example, 
Comaroff and Comaroff 2006). Inspired by work on power and 
resistance (Chapter 7) by such authors as James C. Scott (1985), 
Anthony Giddens (1979), Eric Wolf (1969) and ultimately Marx, the 
Comaroffs have argued, inter alia, that traditional rituals, such as 
witchcraft, may – under the impact of the stresses inherent in global 
processes – mutate into virulent forms that stimulate mass violence.
Other objections levelled at globalisation studies were that 
anthropology should continue to emphasise the local and the 
unique, and that the prophets of globalisation exaggerated the reach 
of modernity. However, as we pointed out above, a recognition of 
global interconnectedness does not preclude a concern with the local 
– indeed, the fragmented local cultures of the globalised world seem 
to invite a particularist, even a Boasian, approach. The most famous 
anthropologists associated with American cultural relativism in the 
last decades of the twentieth century, namely Geertz and Sahlins, both 
wrote essays that situated the impact of modernity on traditional 
societies within the larger framework of their respective projects. 
Sahlins wrote about the ironies of identity politics in Melanesia; 
‘as the New Guinean said to the anthropologist: if we didn’t have 
kastom [custom], we would be just like white men’ (1994: 378). 
He described the commercialisation and politicisation of identity 
in the Pacific, decrying the ‘Hawaiian’ culture presented to tourists 
by Hawaiians recreating themselves ‘in the image others have made 
of them’ (1994: 379). However, as he emphasised, in continuity 
with his earlier work, ‘what needs to be studied ethnographically 
is the indigenization of modernity – through time and in all its 
dialectical ups and downs’ (1994: 390). Geertz, in a similar vein, 
wrote ironically that difference ‘will doubtless remain – the French 
will never eat salted butter. But the good old days of widow burning 
and cannibalism are gone forever’ (1994: 454). He nevertheless 
saw no contradiction between the emergence of a global world of 
chaotic interconnections and his overall research programme, which 
he summarised as ‘grasping an alien turn of mind’ (1994: 462).
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Both essays, however, conveyed a distinct sense of discomfort. 
Both authors saw that the era of classical anthropology was gone, 
displaced by a world of fragmentation, reflexive modernity, blurred 
boundaries and uncertain futures.
Methods, conceptualisations and research agendas change. The 
boundaries between anthropology and other disciplines are 
fuzzy in places, and interdisciplinarity, as we have seen, is on the 
rise. Globalisation studies link up with political theory, human 
geography, macrosociology and history; evolutionary approaches 
with psychology, biology and neurology. Eclecticism in theory and 
method has been characteristic of the last decades of anthropologi-
cal history. Yet it can still be said that some of the classic tensions of 
anthropology, some of the ‘differences that have made a difference’ 
and that have defined the space in which anthropology arose and 
thrived, are still intact. 
First, it still makes sense to distinguish between anthropology as a 
generalising social science and as one of the humanities, aiming for 
interpretive richness. Second, it makes sense (though there are plenty 
of crossovers) to distinguish anthropologists of society (focusing on 
agency, social structure, politics, and so on) from anthropologists 
of culture (focusing on symbols, mental structures, meaning, and 
so on). We deliberately avoid the terms ‘social’ and ‘cultural’ 
anthropology, which refer to an American-European divide that 
only in part overlaps with this distinction. Third, it is still reasonable 
to distinguish approaches that see society and culture as historical 
phenomena and approaches that search for unchanging structures 
and patterns.
Many, if not most, anthropologists place themselves at the 
crossroads of one, two or all of these polarities, but most feel 
the magnetism of the poles and are occasionally forced to take a 
stance. Boas himself oscillated between scientific and humanistic 
ambitions on the discipline’s behalf, and his cultural relativism is 
often highlighted to the extent that it overshadows his beliefs in the 
scientific pretensions of anthropology.
Insofar as these tensions have not been resolved, the intellectual 
space that defined anthropology in the first place is still intact, 
notwithstanding ‘the end of modernism’ and the soon-to-be-final 
demise of ‘primitive’ society. The idea of the primitive may be gone, 
and the notion of a world of discrete cultures rendered obsolete; but 
the larger questions – ‘What is society?’, ‘What is culture?’, ‘What 
is a human being?’, ‘What does it mean to be human?’ – remain 
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unanswered. Or rather, they are still answered in many different 
ways; sometimes complementary, sometimes conflicting. It is only 
if these conflicts are made explicit, in anthropology itself and in 
dialogue with other disciplines, that the discipline of anthropology 
can continue to thrive, for, as this book has shown, anthropology 
has throughout its history depended on controversy.
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